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EDITOR's NOTE

Welcome to the second issue of Volume 6 of National Institute's online *Journal of Policy & Strategy*—a quarterly, peer-reviewed publication. This issue's "Analysis" section includes five thoughtful articles, including a co-authored analysis by Madelyn Creedon, Eric S. Edelman, Franklin C. Miller, Vipin Narang and Keith B. Payne. Additional articles are by Keith Payne; Christopher Ford; Michaela Dodge and Michael Hochberg; and Chris Williams. The first three pieces discuss U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and posture, including the need for credible nuclear capabilities and for tailoring U.S. deterrence strategies to take into account U.S. adversaries' unique characteristics. The fourth piece discusses how the history of arms control can help the United States navigate proposals for artificial intelligence arms control today. Finally, Chris Williams provides an analysis of Iranian threats to the U.S. homeland.

This issue of the *Journal of Policy & Strategy* also includes proceedings from National Institute's regular online symposia, or "webinars," moderated by David Trachtenberg. These proceedings reflect the views of subject matter experts who participated in four different symposia held in January, February, March, and April 2026. The topics covered included: "The Coming War in America"; "Assessing the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy"; "Ending the Threat from Iran: Post-Operation Epic Fury"; and "Cyber Threats and the New Cyber Strategy for America."

The "Literature Review" includes two reviews. The first, by Michaela Dodge, examines *The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the Israel Defense Forces*, by Edward Luttwak and Eithan Shamir. The book discusses the success and speed of the Israel Defense Forces in implementing innovations. The second review, by David Trachtenberg, discusses Herman Pirchner, Jr. and Ilan Berman's book *The New Imperialists: How China, Russia and Iran are Trying to Remake the World*, in which the authors analyze the historical and cultural roots that motivate Chinese, Russian and Iranian aggressive behavior for the purpose of developing a sounder U.S. foreign and defense policy.

The "Documentation" section includes select excerpts from the March 17, 2026 testimony of Assistant Secretary of War (ND-CBD) Robert Kadlec before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces hearing on Fiscal Year 2027 Strategic Forces Posture; select excerpts from March 17, 2026 U.S. Strategic Command Commander Richard A. Correll's statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Posture; select excerpts from this year's *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*; and a February 23, 2026 statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Christopher Yeaw to the Conference on Disarmament.

Finally, this issue's "From the Archive" section presents President George W. Bush's *Remarks Announcing the United States Withdrawal From the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty* on December 13, 2001; and President George H. W. Bush's *Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons* on September 27, 1991. Both speeches reflected hopes and expectations of a different, ultimately more benign, strategic environment than what has transpired in the years since they were given.

As always, we seek to bring you, our readers, a variety of informative and thought-provoking commentaries and analyses relevant to today's most critical national security issues. We hope this issue of the *Journal of Policy & Strategy* meets your expectations and that you find value in the pages that follow. Above all, we thank you for your interest in and support of the Institute's work.

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DEFINING U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICY FOR AN UNCERTAIN WORLD*

Madelyn Creedon, Eric S. Edelman,
Franklin C. Miller, Vipin Narang and Keith B. Payne

Trump's Nuclear Review

It emerged last month in Congressional hearings that the Trump Pentagon is conducting a close hold mini review of U.S. nuclear strategy, as several of us had previously recommended. While not large enough to be styled a formal "Nuclear Posture Review" it will still have significant implications for how this Administration—and the United States going forward—envisions nuclear deterrence and assurance in a rapidly evolving, increasingly complex nuclear age. This isn't surprising as every U.S. Administration since the dawn of the atomic age has reviewed the strategy it inherited, and rightly so. While the participants in the review have not been identified in public testimony, to be compelling, even as a mini-review, it must include representatives from the Pentagon's Policy office (to include an appreciation of the Administration's world view), from the Joint Staff (to incorporate the perspective of the Joint Chiefs and of the combatant commands most directly concerned, namely Indo-Pacific Command and the European Command), U.S. Strategic Command (to ensure the feasibility of planning effectively for the concepts chosen), and the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (to ensure any warhead decisions can be implemented). As senior participants in previous studies such as this—across both Republican and Democratic administrations—we would humbly offer some basic guideposts which we would urge the Pentagon to take into account as it proceeds with this review.

First, beware of "mirror-imaging." There is a long-standing tendency in the academic literature to treat the Russian and Chinese leadership as if they view the world through American eyes and share American norms regarding "reasonable" behavior. That tendency, past and present, leads to inadequate recommendations for U.S. strategies to deter because aggressive, autocratic opponents typically do not share U.S. perceptions and norms. To deter aggression against us and our allies, the United States must threaten to destroy ("hold at risk" in bureaucratic jargon) in the event deterrence fails, what enemy leaders value most. For the past five decades, the intelligence community reportedly has confirmed that Moscow and Beijing, including Putin and Xi today, place highest value on the survival of their regimes, the secret police and intelligence apparatus which sustains and supports the regime, key military capabilities (including their nuclear forces), and their defense industrial base to be those most valuable assets. Deprived of them, the modern Russian or Chinese state would disintegrate. As Henry Kissinger noted at the dawn of the missile age, deterrence "ultimately depends on an intangible quality: the state of mind of the potential aggressor" and as the

* This article originally appeared in *Real Clear Defense*, May 26, 2026, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/05/26/trumps_nuclear_review_1184598.html. Reprinted here with permission.

1983 report of the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission put it: "Deterrence… requires us to determine as best we can, what would deter [potential enemy leaders] from considering aggression, not what would deter us."' The implication of this reality for U.S. deterrence requirements is profound: It shapes the size and character of U.S. forces needed for credible deterrence beyond what otherwise might be our preferred minimum.

Second, any decision to modify this decades-long approach must advance a truly compelling rationale for change. New intelligence information or new interpretations of hostile leaders' value structures, while highly unlikely, are not impossible. That said they must be based upon broadly agreed new facts which must be communicated clearly and compellingly to the American public, to our allies, and to potential enemies.

Third, if a deterrence strategy is to be effective, the United States must have a force with credible capability to implement the strategy. That force must have the requisite flexibility, survivability, diversity, and size to pose the threat necessary to deter different foes, acting together or separately, under all circumstances. Today our deterrent posture is weakened by two factors: growing obsolescence and a diminishing capacity relative to self-declared opponents. While Russia and China each began substantial campaigns shortly after the turn of the twenty-first century to fully modernize their nuclear forces, the United States essentially took a vacation from tending to our nuclear deterrent—what former CIA Director and Defense Secretary Robert Gates labeled our "holiday from history." As a result, we are now facing the task of replacing 1970's-1980's systems in each leg of our strategic triad simultaneously, thereby straining our defense industrial base. At the same time, it has become apparent that the aggressive and hegemonic aspirations of Putin and Xi, and their coordinated policies and actions on the world stage, require us to deter both Moscow and Beijing at the same time or, even worse, potentially in collusive sequence. The Chinese nuclear threat is no longer a "lesser included case" threat of the Russian one, resulting in the need to deter and achieve objectives against China and Russia simultaneously should deterrence fail.

The template for the strategic force we have today dates back to the late 2000s and only considered deterring what was deemed at the time to be a not particularly dangerous or aggressive Russia and a benign China. "Rogue" states and terrorists were thought to be the remaining sources of real threat, with an attendant significant reduction in the need for nuclear deterrence. The world of 2026 is starkly different and requires a force somewhat larger and certainly more diverse than the one contemplated 15 plus years ago. The needed growth may be modest and does not require us to match and mimic the combined number of Russian and Chinese warheads; in fact, the United States maintains fewer warheads and a smaller overall arsenal than Russia today and has for the past two decades. The United States needs to deploy only what is needed to meet targeting requirements under U.S. deterrence strategy. This can be gained initially by adding warheads and missiles from our reserve stockpile to the existing deployed force, as unanimously endorsed by several high-level bipartisan commissions over the last three years. This option can be accomplished relatively rapidly and at a modest cost. It likely will help mitigate the programmatic risks from production delays and technical challenges as we continue our plans to modernize the entire

nuclear Triad. Failure to upload would indicate to both aggressors and partners that we are not serious about the possibility of foes' planned or opportunistic aggression against the United States or its allies, and thereby in the worst case would invite such attacks.

Fourth, following the end of the Cold War we paid scant attention to deterring nuclear blackmail or attack against our allies in Europe and in Asia—Russia was a "partner to NATO," North Korea was reclusive, and China was expected to rise peacefully—the breadth of China's ambitions was not yet apparent. As the Warsaw Pact disintegrated and the Soviet Empire receded from Eastern Europe, and with optimistic expectations for the future, Washington pursued a series of arms control agreements with Moscow that eliminated virtually all short- and medium range nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States dutifully carried out this obligation. Moscow did not. It broke those agreements and rebuilt its theater, or tactical, nuclear arsenal such that today Moscow has some 2000 fully modern land-, sea-, and air-launched nuclear systems, reportedly a 10:1 numeric advantage over the United States, which it is using today to bully and coerce our European allies and threaten American service members in Europe.

Over the past ten years, China also has built up a sizable force of short- and medium-range nuclear systems with which to threaten our Asian allies and U.S. forward bases. And we must not dismiss North Korea—Japan and South Korea do not. A modest number of American nuclear systems are deployed in Europe, and other than those on U.S. SSBNs, there are none in Asia. Both Moscow and Beijing appear to believe they can exploit this advantage in theater nuclear capabilities to coerce Washington and its allies. Given this backdrop, the United States urgently must field additional regional forces to convince both Moscow and Beijing that nuclear coercion is unacceptable and nuclear attack is a hopeless option. Key for credible U.S. extended deterrence now is the accelerated deployment of the proposed SLCM-N system, rapid development of an air-launched nuclear standoff weapon for U.S. and NATO F35 dual-capable aircraft and possibly developing and deploying a nuclear warhead for U.S. medium-range ground-launched systems.

Extending deterrence credibly to regional theaters is critical for the United States because, as the twentieth century twice demonstrated, world wars begin in regions where foes challenge our vital interests; they must be deterred in those regions. Enabling adversaries to dominate key regions, including Europe and Asia, by ignoring deterrence gaps that pose existential threats to our allies and critical interests will surely end up involving us in war. Deterring aggression against our allies is key to deterring aggression against American vital interests and the homeland. Crucially, U.S. ability to extend nuclear deterrence across two oceans is connected to the ability to maintain central strategic deterrence and discourage attacks against the continental United States.

In addition, many allies fear that if we do not work to meaningfully "immunize" the U.S. homeland we would never risk a war—let alone a nuclear war—on their behalf. Deterring attack on the U.S. homeland is key to extending deterrence credibly to regions abroad and to assuring allies. In the absence of credible U.S. extended deterrence, allies will be tempted to acquire their own nuclear weapons to deter our common foes. The emergence of this dynamic can already be seen in South Korea, Japan, Poland, and even Germany. For example,

Gen. Klaus Naumann, former Chief of German Armed Forces, reportedly has declared that Germany must have its own tactical nuclear weapons.

Consequently, U.S. nuclear strategy and forces which have kept the peace and been a critical brake on nuclear proliferation thus far—must be viewed holistically, especially when it comes to extended deterrence. Neither theater capabilities nor augmented strategic forces alone are sufficient for U.S. deterrence purposes given the rapidly expanding and broadening threats posed by Moscow and Beijing. New theater capabilities without additional strategic forces open up the space for an enemy to escalate until it holds the U.S. homeland at grave risk, and to decouple the United States from its allies. Additional strategic forces without adequate theater systems open the space for enemies' salami slicing attacks on allies, forcing a President to face the untenable choice of either "going big or going home." Strengthened U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities, including strategic and theater forces, must free any president from facing that dilemma and allies from "going nuclear" for fear of an incredible U.S. extended deterrent. Turkey's unveiling of a prototype ICBM is also indicative of the kind of hedging strategies we are likely to see.

Two additional points bear mentioning with regard to theater deterrence. First, the aggregate number of new U.S. regional deterrent forces need not and should not match the combined (and bloated) levels to which Russian and Chinese systems have grown, but they do need to be sufficiently numerous, flexible and diverse to demonstrate that we have the capability to respond to—and therefore to deter—regional nuclear attacks.

Second, for those who hope to achieve an arms control regime governing regional nuclear systems—including Administration officials charged with developing a multilateral arms control strategy—until and unless we deploy systems that deny Moscow's strategy of nuclear coercion, Russia will not engage in a serious discussion of curbing and reducing theater and tactical range nuclear systems. Virtually the entire history of nuclear arms control with Moscow attests to that unfortunate reality. And of course, there is very little insight into what would motivate a currently uninterested China from coming to the negotiating table. That said, finding ways to promote strategic stability as discussed here should be pursued.

Finally, we note that the ultimate aim of a nuclear review is to produce a deterrence strategy that provides the President with the widest possible range of options necessary to deter the range of plausible attacks Moscow and Beijing (and Pyongyang) are capable of threatening, separately or in concert. Doing so requires a clear-eyed understanding of their aggressive agendas and coercive nuclear strategies—as opposed to regressive expectations built on mirror imaging and overly optimistic hopes. To best serve a President, the review participants should not, however, exclude options they believe a President would not favor—only a President can decide what is and is not acceptable.

A Pentagon study which acknowledges these guideposts should produce a nuclear deterrence strategy that contributes to keeping the peace through strength and a cap on nuclear proliferation for the remainder of this President's term and beyond. We wish its drafters well—the work they are doing is of the utmost importance.

The writers each served in senior nuclear policy positions in the Department of Defense across Democratic and Republican Administrations. This article reflects the authors' own personal views.

ANALYSIS

FUNDAMENTAL DETERRENCE CHALLENGES AND TAILORING*

Keith B. Payne

Introduction

The bipartisan endorsement of adapting, or "tailoring," deterrence to the potentially unique characteristics of particular opponents and contexts is a milestone in the evolution of U.S. deterrence policy. It has tremendous implications for the character of the U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear force posture intended to support deterrence and extended deterrence to allies.

For example, the basic rationale for tailoring deterrence is recognition of the diversity of opponents' interpretations of what constitutes "rational" or "reasonable" goals and behavior. An overarching deterrence policy requirement designed to enable the United States to tailor its deterrence strategies and redlines across the range of opponents and potential contingencies mandates a force posture that can adapt U.S. deterrence strategies to opponents' divergent goals, value hierarchies, risk and cost tolerances, levels of determination, modes of communication, and perceptions of the United States—among the many factors that can shape enemy responses to U.S. deterrence threats and redlines.[1]

In 1995, without using the term "tailoring," two prominent scholars, Gordon Craig and Alexander George, presented the basic rationale for adapting deterrence strategies to the opponents' particular characters: "Not all actors in international politics calculate utility in making decisions in the same way. Differences in values, culture, attitudes toward risk-taking, and so on vary greatly. There is no substitute for knowledge of the adversary's mind-set and behavioral style…."[2] Given this reality, tailoring is needed because, "…if one does not threaten the right target for the right reason, it may not matter how well one does it."[3]

A U.S. force posture consistent with a policy of tailoring deterrence to a variety of opponents and contingencies must be sufficiently diverse and flexible to hold at risk the potentially wide spectrum of assets that those opponents deem of highest value—potentially including numerous hardened, defended point targets. It also must be able to pose a credible deterrence threat to opponents who arise relatively quickly or are recognized belatedly. Consequently, tailoring mandates a larger and more diverse standing arsenal of forces supporting deterrence than is favored by those who advocate for what has been referred to

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* This article is adapted from Keith B. Payne, "Fundamental Deterrence Challenges and Tailoring," *Information Series*, No. 664 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, July 7, 2026), https://nipp.org/information_series/keith-b-payne-fundamental-deterrence-challenges-and-tailoring-no-664-july-7-2026/.

[1] See for example, Keith B. Payne, "Understanding Deterrence," in, Payne, ed., *Understanding Deterrence* (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 3-37.

[2] Gordon Craig and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 188.

[3] Peter Karsten, Peter Howell, and Artis Allen, *Military Threats* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. xii.

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as "minimum deterrence" or "easy deterrence."[4] It is this force posture implication of tailored deterrence regarding the number and diversity of U.S. nuclear forces that leads some who recognize the logic of tailoring deterrence, nevertheless, to reject it as policy guidance. They tend to place priority on facilitating lower U.S. force numbers over optimizing prospective deterrent effect.

Intelligence and Tailoring Deterrence

Recognition that opponents can vary widely in their perceptions of, and responses to, U.S. deterrence efforts correspondingly elevates the demands on U.S. intelligence and analysis that supports deterrence. The need is to understand the factors that inform and animate foreign leaderships in different circumstances and how those factors are likely to affect their perceptions of, and responses to, U.S. deterrence strategies. This need is a contemporary deterrence application of Sun Tzu's emphasis in *The Art of War* on the importance of knowing the enemy.[5]

This intelligence task is not "one and done" because opponents and crises can emerge rapidly and their respective responses to U.S. deterrence strategies can vary depending on the stakes and circumstances of a confrontation. The demand for continuing analysis of opponents and circumstances is seemingly unlimited and must be bounded in practice by the priority threats of the time.

Challenges to Tailoring

Various challenges to tailoring as a deterrence requirement are well-known at this point. They tend to focus not on the principle itself—which is self-evidently reasonable—but on the difficulties involved in knowing opponents and in applying that knowledge to deterrence in operational practice.[6] "Knowing" the opponent will always be incomplete and applying what is known to deterrence practice is an art—ever subject to uncertainties and change—as Christopher Ford concludes in his insightful adjoining essay on tailoring deterrence. The goal is for complete knowledge and deterrence certainty, but neither is achievable in practice; deterrence can never be ensured. The tailoring goal that is achievable is more modest: to make fewer mistakes and reduce uncertainties so deterrence can "work" as effectively as may be possible.

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[4] See for example, Keith B. Payne and James Schlesinger, *Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2013), pp. 3-8, 9-13.

[5] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Research and Reinterpretation by J. H. Huang (New York: William Morrow, 1993), pp. 52, 161.

[6] See for example, Keith B. Payne, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), pp. 98-114; and, Sean P. Larkin, "The Limits of Tailored Deterrence," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 4th Quarter, Issue 63 (2011), pp. 47-57.

The harsh reality is that the practicable deterrence goal of doing better with tailoring, even with its limits, should not be sidelined in favor of the unobtainable goal of deterrence perfection without challenges. Even with the most sophisticated and dedicated tailoring, the functioning of deterrence will not be fully predictable. That is an unavoidable reality that must be acknowledged and against which the United States must hedge. Indeed, given the inescapable possibility of deterrence failure, global nuclear disarmament would be a far better alternative if it were plausible.

However, the often-suggested disarmament alternative to deterrence—despite its superficial appeal—is not a serious option. It would require the prior transformation of the international order and human relations the likes of which have never been known in all of recorded history, and hardly appear to be on the horizon.[7] In 2009, America's original, bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission rightly concluded: "The conditions that might make possible the global elimination of nuclear weapons are not present today and their creation would require a fundamental transformation of the world political order."[8] An option that is not now remotely plausible is not an option. Unless or until that dramatic transformation takes place, we must make deterrence as foolproof as is possible. Tailoring can help.

Fundamental Challenges and Tailoring Deterrence

Not often discussed are the fundamental difficulties that attend tailored deterrence—and *any* form of deterrence, whatever its title. This difficulty is as true for tailored deterrence as it will be for any future approach to deterrence, and as it has been for all previous approaches to strategic deterrence, whether the Johnson Administration's "Assured Destruction," the Nixon Administration's "Schlesinger Doctrine," the Carter Administration's "Countervailing Strategy," or the Biden Administration's "Integrated Deterrence." The names change, as do some key points in the concepts of operation, but the general principles of deterrence have endured for thousands of years, as does the fundamental challenge facing deterrence strategies regardless of their particular methodologies and titles.

This ubiquitous difficulty is that deterrence can fail regardless of the underlying concept, operational approach, forces assigned for that purpose, or the excellence in its presentation. There is no set of threats and redlines that, "of course," has predictable deterring effect, regardless of the skill in application. Why so? Because for deterrence to function, there must be sufficient "space" in opponents' decision-making for U.S. deterrence strategies to function. That is, for deterrence to "work," opponents must be open to pragmatically or grudgingly standing back from the goal or purpose that would otherwise animate their provocation. For example, opponents with the goal of territorial expansion, or with fears that would otherwise

[7] See the discussion in, Keith B. Payne, *Chasing a Grand Illusion: Replacing Deterrence With Disarmament* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2023).

[8] See, William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, et al., *America's Strategic Posture* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009), pp. xvi, 17.

drive them to a pre-emptive strike, must have the pragmatism and felt freedom of decision-making to stand down from attack in favor of abiding by the demands placed on them by U.S. deterrence redlines and threats. The problem, of course, is that opponents may not have that pragmatism or felt freedom to stand down—regardless of the character of the U.S. deterrence strategy. This is an inconvenient truth confronting tailored deterrence, and any other form of deterrence.

Examples in history of opponents who appear not to have had the felt freedom to pragmatically stand down, even in the face of highly lethal threats, are many and varied. In some cases, leaders have been *unwilling* to stand down from decisions and actions that appear to have been irrational given the potential consequences they faced. The reasons spurring leaders on in such cases have been, *inter alia,* spiritual, ideological, the preservation of national pride/honor, and/or deeply personal.

It is attractive to believe that leaders will not behave in this fashion, i.e., that some form of deterrence can be made to "work" because foreign leaders ultimately will prove to be rational, in a familiar/predictable manner, and "every nation has its price when it comes to being deterred."[9] But that appears not to be the case.

As noted above, leaders can define rational or reasonable behavior very differently, and thereby make decisions that follow an idiosyncratic thought process and appear to be irrational. Experience throughout history offers many vivid examples, including, *inter alia*, the islanders of Melos in 416 B.C., Adolf Hitler and his reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, the Japanese War Minister in 1945, the Cuban leadership in 1962, Arab leaders in 1973, and Iraq's Saddam Hussein in 1991.[10]

In short, historically, it appears that opponents' decision-making dynamics at work have periodically rendered deterrence inherently unpredictable and problematic regardless of the redlines and plausible consequences. The frequent assertion that a rational opponent will be an inherently deterrable opponent is a dangerous misnomer. In some cases, opponents' decision-making may effectively be immune to external deterrence threats and redlines. Indeed, in extreme cases, leaders actually have made decisions that appear intended to contribute to the destruction of the societies for which they were responsible, including Adolf Hitler in the "Führer Bunker" in 1945.[11]

It is critical to emphasize that this challenge to deterrence has to do with the insulation of some opponents' decision-making to deterrence threats, not the specifics of the threat. This is the most fundamental challenge to successfully operationalizing tailored deterrence, and any other deterrence strategy. The incomparable strategist Sun Tzu identified effective deterrence as the highest form of strategy: "Achieving victory in every battle is not absolute

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[9] See the testimony of Gen. Eugene Habiger in, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Authorization For Appropriation For Fiscal Year 1999 And The Future Years Defense Program, Part 7*, Hearings, 105th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 494.

[10] For lengthy discussions these examples, see, Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996), chapters 3 and 4; and, Payne, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence*, op. cit., pp. 39-73.

[11] Ibid., pp. 71-72.

perfection: neutralizing an adversary's force without battle is absolute perfection."[12] However, deterrence of any form is not always practicable. This suggests the great potential value of hedging deterrence strategies by casting as wide a net as is reasonably possible, including via conscious tailoring, but also to hedging against the real possibility that deterrence will fail or simply not apply given opponents' decision-making parameters. The critical questions in such potential cases are: is the opponent likely to be subject to deterrence effect under the circumstances of the engagement? how prepared is the United States for deterrence failure? how much should be invested, and in what ways, in that preparation? and, how should those preparations be integrated with tailored deterrence strategies, i.e., strategic deterrence/defense integration? The open history of U.S. planning in this regard is a decidedly mixed bag.

What Advantage Tailoring?

What is a potentially unique advantage of efforts to tailor deterrence given this fundamental challenge to deterrence in general? That advantage may, on occasion, be profoundly important. The efforts to understand opponents in context mandated by tailoring, as described above, can help us to recognize when and why an opponent may *not* be subject to our deterrence tools. Expecting deterrence to "work," when, in fact, only physical control of the opponent would advance U.S. goals, can lead to placing priority on the wrong strategy for the opponent and occasion. In such cases, confidence in any plausible formulation of deterrence to achieve U.S. goals could be a lethal mistake—other strategies must take precedence.

Efforts to tailor deterrence can help us to recognize when deterrence should, or should not, be the priority strategy. Key questions to address in this regard include, *inter alia*: do we know with whom we need to communicate and can we communicate reliably with them? does the target of our communication understand our redlines and fear the associated threats? are our redlines and threats *as perceived by the opponent* credible (or as Herman Kahn put it, "not incredible") both in the operational sense and as the opponent perceives our will to execute those threats? does the opponent have the "space" in its decision-making to stand back from the behavior we seek to deter, or is pragmatism by the opponent unlikely under the circumstances?[13]

If even one of the answers to these questions is "no," the prospects for deterrence functioning as we envision are likely to be reduced; if many of these questions are so answered, deterrence may not be the optimal strategy. The crucial question then is, what is the alternative to deterrence?[14] Recognizing the difference is no small advantage and efforts to tailor deterrence can help us to recognize that difference.

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[12] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, op. cit., p. 48.

[13] In 1996, a longer list of such key questions was originally presented in, Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*, op. cit., pp. 126-127.

[14] As discussed in, Payne, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence*, op. cit., pp. 107, 109-110.

Should we expect to be able to address any of these key questions with complete confidence? Of course not. As this author concluded in 2001, "Accumulating pertinent information about a challenger will never be complete, and the relevant information is likely to change over time."[15] This is the norm. Few questions in the realm of national security can be answered with complete confidence, yet significant decisions hang on our best approximations. For example, we likely do not know precisely how many nuclear weapons Russia, China or North Korea possess, or their respective war plans for nuclear employment. But we plan, nevertheless, based on what we conclude is most likely. That said, there are indicators of how the key questions noted above may be addressed and answered to the imperfect degree possible—of course, we must actually look for those indicators.

In short, tailoring is not a magic wand that can ensure the predictable functioning of deterrence; nothing can do that. Nevertheless, it is a practicable option that is valuable for its potential to increase the opportunities for recognizing when deterrence may not apply, and to reduce the probability of deterrence failure that follows from failing to understand, to the extent possible, how to deter those enemies whose decision-making is susceptible to deterrence.

Previous Approaches to Deterrence

The value of tailoring becomes more compelling when compared to the previous U.S. approach to strategic deterrence. That approach, in broad terms, presumes that there exists a universal mode of thinking that makes a single form of deterrence predictably reliable; as a consequence, all rational opponents will adhere to similar interpretations of, and responses to, U.S. deterrence strategies.

An example of this past presumption regarding deterrence can be seen in the unmitigated confidence that U.S. officials and academic commentators had that holding opponents' societal assets (e.g., population and industry) at risk would effectively deter any "sane" opponent—as if all opponents would reason similarly and be deterred by a similar threat.[16] On the basis of such an expectation, the U.S. strategic force arsenal could be reduced to those forces required to threaten retaliation against an opponent's society—typically considered a modest level of capability given the extreme vulnerability of societal assets to nuclear weapons. And, indeed, Secretary of Defense McNamara employed such a declared measure of force adequacy, which he referred to as "Assured Destruction," to constrain and limit U.S. spending on strategic forces.[17]

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[15] Ibid., p. 101.

[16] See for example, McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1969), p. 9. See also, Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Winter 1979-1980), p. 618.

[17] As discussed in, Henry S. Rowen, "Formulating Strategic Doctrine," Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Volume 4, Appendix K, *Adequacy of Current Organization: Defense and Arms Control* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, June 1975), p. 227.

Similarly, some contemporary critics of tailoring deterrence tend to seek a reduced definition of U.S. force adequacy. Consequently, they find fault with tailoring as a requirement and harken back to the expectation that a less demanding standard of adequacy will provide effective deterrence reliably against and "sane" opponent. The inherent risk of such an approach, of course, is that some opponents are likely to be deterred most effectively by threats to values other than highly-vulnerable societal assets and, consequently, the more demanding measure of adequacy associated with tailoring is required for U.S. deterrence capabilities.

For example, the need for a more expansive definition of nuclear force adequacy can be seen in the Carter Administration's conclusion that to deter Moscow most effectively required that the United States hold at risk what Moscow's leaders valued most: their political control and military assets.[18] This conclusion regarding the necessary type of threat to deter Moscow appears to have been carried through in U.S. policy application and has been reaffirmed repeatedly since.[19]

The fundamental question now is not whether tailoring is the preferred policy guideline. That much has been decided. The questions posed by a requirement to tailor deterrence are: 1) how broadly should the adequacy standard be for U.S. forces to be deemed adequate to tailor deterrence per the range of opponents and threats?; and 2) how do we operationalize the needed deterrence threats, i.e., create and communicate the threats deemed most effective for deterrence? The answers to those questions will shape the breadth and scope of the U.S. force posture mandated by the requirement to tailor deterrence.

The Need for Tailoring: A Long History

It should be recognized that "tailoring" deterrence is not a new or even recent idea. The need to "tailor" by name generally was not seen until the 1990s and its adoption as operational guidance can be found in unclassified U.S. Strategic Command documents a decade thereafter.[20] Beginning in the early 1980s, this author advanced the rationale for deterrence strategies to be predicated on an understanding of opponents' unique characteristics, i.e. tailoring, and, in 1989, used historical illustrations in an unclassified article to help explain

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[18] See, testimony by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and the "Administration's Responses to Questions Submitted Before the Hearing," in, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nuclear War Strategy*, Hearings, 96th Congress, 2nd Session (Top Secret hearing held on September 16, 1980; sanitized and printed on February 18, 1981). (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1981), pp. 10, 16, 25, 29-30.

[19] See, for example, President's Commission on Strategic Forces, *Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces* (April 1983), http://web.mit.edu/chemistry/deutch/policy/1983- ReportPresCommStrategic.pdf. See also, Madelyn R. Creedon, Jon L. Kyl, et al., *The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States*, October 2023, https://www.ida.org/- /media/feature/publications/a/am/americas-strategic- posture/strategic-posture-commission-report.ashx.

[20] Department of Defense, *Deterrence Operations: Joint Operating Concept* (DO JOC), Version 2.0 (August 2006), pp. 3, 25, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_ deterrence.pdf.

the need to do so.[21] However, the policy direction to adapt strategic deterrence to the particular goals and perceptions of the Soviet leadership can be seen earlier, including in the (now declassified) 1974 "Schlesinger Doctrine" and related nuclear employment policy,[22] and in the Carter Administration's Presidential Directive-59 and Countervailing Strategy.[23]

The intellectual roots of the need to adjust U.S. policies to an understanding of the unique decision-making factors underlying enemy behavior can be seen decades earlier. In 1964, the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry's study entitled, *Psychiatric Aspects of the Prevention of Nuclear War*, concluded that deterrence strategies predicated on the presumption of universal behavioral patterns and rationality rest on "dubious psychological assumptions."[24] And, as early as 1951, an incomparable scholar at RAND, Nathan Leites, authored a ground-breaking study assessing the unique factors underlying the Soviet leadership's decision-making and the importance of understanding them for U.S. policy. [25]

In short, the use of the term "tailoring" goes back several decades; U.S. operationalization of the concept appears decades earlier, and the intellectual roots for doing so go back to the early years of the Cold War. The full history of this profound evolution in the conceptualization of deterrence and in U.S. policy is yet to be written, although several partial endeavors to do so have been published recently and are now ongoing.[26]

Does Deterrence Tailoring "Work"?

Has tailoring made the difference in U.S. deterrence working or failing? We do not know the answer to that question because effective deterrence often provides little evidence to enable a conclusion about causation. When deterrence "works," nothing much may appear to happen, and the explanations for a provocation that did not occur can be varied and undisciplined by evidence.

That said, we know that strategic deterrence has not failed catastrophically since the U.S. adopted tailoring as a stated or unstated deterrence requirement, including through some stressful periods. Any recommendations to move now in a different policy direction should, somehow, offer a convincing rationale as to why it would provide a more effective basis for deterrence. There are contemporary recommendations for change that essentially ignore or

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[21] See Keith B. Payne and Lawrence Fink, "Deterrence Without Defense: Gambling on Perfection," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 25-40.

[22] See the discussion in, Kyle Balzer, "'Knowing Your Enemy': James R. Schlesinger and the Rise of Tailored Deterrence," *Journal of Policy & Strategy*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2024) pp. 39-54.

[23] See, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in, *Nuclear War Strategy*, op. cit., pp. 10, 16.

[24] Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Committee on Social Issues, *Psychiatric Aspects of the Prevention of Nuclear War*, Report No. 57 (September 1964), p. 268.

[25] See Nathan Leites' RAND study from 1951 in, Nathan Constantin Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2007).

[26] See for example, Sarah Faris, *Tailoring Deterrence: What and Why?*, National Institute for Public Policy, *Occasional Paper*, Vol. 5, No. 11 (November 2025); and, Balzer, "'Knowing Your Enemy': James R. Schlesinger and the Rise of Tailored Deterrence," op. cit., pp. 39-54.

dismiss the need to tailor deterrence. Instead, they appear intended to reduce the adequacy standard for U.S. force posture requirements as the route to lower U.S. nuclear force numbers.[27] None of these offers a plausible explanation of why/how the recommended change would serve the priority task of strengthening deterrence in a challenging time—indeed, that does not appear to be the goal.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the history of the evolution of U.S. deterrence policy to include tailoring has not yet been written, but its origins run far earlier than most commentaries recognize—as does U.S. operationalization of the concept. Tailoring has limitations and unavoidable challenges, as do all approaches to deterrence; it is not a "silver bullet." In addition, to the consternation of some, tailoring deterrence suggests the need for more diverse nuclear capabilities than under past concepts, such as "Assured Destruction." That acknowledged, tailoring is an innovation in U.S. policy, accepted on a bipartisan basis, that has the potential to help Washington avoid making mistakes in its efforts to deter, including in discerning when deterrence may not be the optimal strategy. Given the zero tolerance for strategic deterrence failure, helping to avoid mistakes via tailoring U.S. deterrence strategies is a high priority. A separate, related priority is to integrate tailored deterrence with measures that hedge against its possible failure.

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[27] See for example, William J. Perry and Tom Z. Collina, *The Button* (Dallas, TX: BenBella Books, 2020). See also, Stephen Walt, "The Quest for Nuclear Superiority Makes No Sense," *Foreign Policy*, June 25, 2026, https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/25/nuclear-arsenal-modernization-weapons-no-sense/; and, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "US Strategy and Force Posture for an Era of Nuclear Tripolarity," *Issue Brief*, Atlantic Council, April 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-strategy-and-force-posture-for-an-era-of-nuclear-tripolarity/.

CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES OF "TAILORING" NUCLEAR DETERRENCE*

Christopher A. Ford

Introduction

There can hardly be a topic in national security and defense policy of more importance than how to keep the peace between adversaries armed with nuclear weaponry on a scale that could—if things went wrong—lead to worldwide catastrophe. Ever since the dawn of the nuclear age, strategists confronted by the awesome and terrible power of these tools have debated how best to approach the challenges of deterring aggression.

One of the more interesting and valuable intellectual threads to have been spun out of these debates over the last few decades is the concept of "tailoring" deterrence policies to the particular characteristics of the adversary. This essay will explore the important insights offered by what might be called the "tailored deterrence" school, before offering both a theoretical and a practical critique of some of its conclusions and suggesting a partial reformulation—acknowledging its important contributions but slightly stepping back from the ideal of what might be called "exquisite" or "bespoke" deterrence "tailoring"—that advocates instead an alternative ideal of what might be termed *force posture supersufficiency*.

Tailored Deterrence

The concept of "tailored deterrence" can be seen as having grown out of a conceptual debate within the U.S. strategic policy community dating back to the relatively early years of the Cold War. Though thinkers at the time did not necessarily categorize themselves in such terms, the noted deterrence theorist Keith Payne has described the longstanding existence of a "great divide" in American thinking about nuclear deterrence, between adherents to what he calls the school of "easy deterrence" and that of "difficult deterrence."

For the "easy" school—among whose members Payne includes thinkers such as Kenneth Waltz, Thomas Schelling, Bernard Brodie, and Robert Jervis—"the essential requirements for stable mutual deterrence are not difficult to understand or meet[,] and … the functioning of mutual deterrence can be considered largely predictable and reliable." For them, to oversimplify, the existential dangers of nuclear weaponry are such that any rational leader will perceive them in more or less the same way. Accordingly, one can, through the threat of using such weapons in the event of war, effectively deter *any* great power adversary from undertaking aggression with essentially the same—and a relatively simple—recipe of force posture, risk manipulation, and declaratory policy. As Payne put it in an article six years ago, for "easy deterrence" thinkers,

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> … [the] general expectation that punitive threats against an opponent's society can deter reliably [derives from the assumption that] … [d]eterrence works reliably and predictably at nuclear force levels that are easy to acquire and maintain because opponents with a modicum of common sense will place decisive value on the preservation of their nation's societal assets—which generally are relatively few, undefended, and highly vulnerable to modest numbers of nuclear weapons.[1]

By contrast, still following Payne's characterization, thinkers from the "difficult deterrence" school—among whom may be found Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Colin Gray, and ultimately Payne himself—"envision[] deterrence as difficult to establish and sustain." Rather than concluding that nuclear terrors always produce essentially the same deterring effect, "difficult deterrence" theorists feel instead that

> … [a] leader's nationality, passion, idealism, cynicism, pragmatism, dogmatism, stupidity, intelligence, imagination, flexibility, stubbornness, and so on, along with mental disorders such as depression, anxiety, and paranoia, shape reactions and decisions during a crisis." … In short, the functioning of deterrence 'is heavily context dependent.' The confident expectation of an opponent's sensible caution when confronting a severe societal deterrence threat may be upset by a variety of factors that may not be obvious in advance to an outside observer.[2]

This contextuality, in turn, can have force posture implications, inasmuch as a strategy based upon "difficult deterrence" premises may, as Payne noted, "potentially requir[e] greater nuclear capabilities, contingency planning, and for some, strategic defensive capabilities" than is felt necessary by "easy deterrence" advocates. Simply put, if the "difficult deterrence" thinkers are right, it may take the threat of using "more" nuclear capability—or different *kinds* of nuclear capability—to deter some leaders than to deter others.

The concept we now call "tailored deterrence" grew out of this latter insight early in the Cold War, though the term itself is much more recent, being attributed—in Sarah Faris' insightful account—to Payne himself in a 1993 briefing to the U.S. Strategic Command. And indeed, "[s]ince its early post-Cold War introduction," Faris relates, "tailoring has become a well-established element of the U.S. approach to deterrence, on a bipartisan basis." It emphasizes the need to calibrate one's deterrence policy and posture "to a broad range of opponents via a close and ongoing understanding of their respective values, perceptions[,] and calculations—their decision-making frameworks."[3]

Such formulations can be seen, for instance, in modern U.S. nuclear guidance documents such as the 2006 National Security Strategy, which called for "a future force that will provide

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[1] Keith B. Payne, "The Great Divide in US Deterrence Thought," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Summer 2020, p. 21.

[2] Ibid., pp. 29-30 (quoting Jonathan Roberts, *Decision-Making during International Crises* (St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 162–63; and Gordon A. Craig & Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (3rd ed.) (Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 192).

[3] Sarah Faris, "Tailoring Deterrence: What and Why?" National Institute for Public Policy, *Occasional Papers*, Vol. 5, No. 11, November 2025, pp. viii & 1, https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Vol.-5-No.-11.pdf.

tailored deterrence" vis-à-vis "both state and non-state threats."[4] Similarly, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) declared that the Department of Defense was

> continuing its shift from a 'one size fits all' notion of deterrence toward more tailorable approaches appropriate for advanced military competitors, regional WMD states, as well as non-state terrorist networks. The future force will provide a fully balanced, tailored capability to deter both state and non-state threats … while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors.[5]

Under the Obama Administration, it was likewise said in the 2010 QDR that "[c]redibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments will demand tailored approaches to deterrence," and that "[s]uch tailoring requires an in-depth understanding of the capabilities, values, intent, and decision making of potential adversaries."[6] As recently as the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, in fact, "tailored deterrence approaches" that adjust postures and policies "for specific problems, competitors, and settings" were needed in order to provide "tailored options that will shape adversary perceptions of benefits and costs."[7]

As Faris summarizes such thinking, tailored deterrence both requires and builds its approach around acquiring "an understanding of opponents' unique characteristics, including their decision-making frameworks in the context of the engagement." It rejects the aforementioned "'one-size-fits-all' approach to deterrence based on the assumption that rational opponents will calculate alike," because in fact

> human decision making is variable—[and] there are no universal rules that govern calculations of cost and benefit, or risk-taking. … [D]ecision making and resultant behavior is subject to influence by a variety of factors that can lead opponents to different responses to U.S. deterrence strategies, depending on their particular decision-making frameworks, perceptions and expectations. …[8]

Tailoring [thus] consists of adapting deterrence strategies to opponents' decision-making frameworks, and the context of the engagement. This means that the character of U.S. deterrence threats, including how and when they are communicated, must be based on an understanding of factors driving opponents' perceptions and decision making. Opponents' diverse decision-making frameworks will shape how they respond, in potentially unique ways, to U.S. deterrence strategies and redlines. Consequently,

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[4] U.S. Department of Defense, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (March 2006), p. 43, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2006.pdf.

[5] U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (February 6, 2006), p. 49, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2006.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-111017-150.

[6] U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (February 2010), p. 14, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2010.pdf.

[7] U.S. Department of Defense, *2022 Nuclear Posture Review* (October 2022), pp. 9-10, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-%20NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.

[8] Faris, "Tailoring Deterrence: What and Why?," pp. 20 & 23.

understanding these frameworks, to the extent practicable, and structuring U.S. deterrence strategies accordingly, can be critical to their reliability and effectiveness.

As Payne put it in a 2018 article on the topic, the essential predicate for sound deterrence policy is therefore the need "to understand the unique characteristics of diverse adversaries" and "tailor deterrence to the unique character of [those] adversaries," and to the particular context in which one engages with them.

> We must pursue the hard work of understanding how to deter a more diverse set of adversaries and potential adversaries, from a wider array of specific actions, in a similarly wider array of plausible circumstances ….[9]

Accordingly, he concluded,

> ... [i]n the contemporary era, there can be no generally-applicable "rule of thumb" derived from the U.S.-Soviet experience for predicting that a particular set of U.S. capabilities will be "stabilizing" or "destabilizing" across a spectrum of potential adversaries and contexts.[10]

The insights of tailored deterrence thinking within the "difficult deterrence" intellectual tradition are profound, and they offer planners an invaluable cautionary warning about the need to understand what is likely to deter *your actual* adversary rather than just to deter a hypothesized rational actor who is assumed *a priori* to think and respond just as we ourselves would. The challenge of avoiding the evergreen temptation of "mirror-imaging" vis-à-vis our adversaries—and the need to build our approaches to them, instead, on an understanding of how they actually are—has long been well-known in intelligence and policy planning circles, even though meeting this challenge has always been frustratingly difficult. Tailored deterrence theory, however, offers a critical reminder that these problems are *especially* important in the realm of nuclear weapons posture, where errors could quite literally lead to the death of billions.

For all the powerful intellectual contributions of tailored deterrence theory, however, I fear it nonetheless presents challenges, both logical and practical, which may require us at least partly to reconceptualize its assumed links between behavioral insight and policy prescription. The following pages will explain what I mean by this.

The Problems of "Tailoring"

First, however, let me make clear that strongly endorse the basic insight of tailored deterrence thinking about the need to adjust one's approach, as much as feasible, to the particular characteristics and potential idiosyncrasies of the adversary. This is an extremely important lesson, which we forget at our peril.

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[9] Keith B. Payne, "Nuclear Deterrence in a New Era: Applying 'Tailored Deterrence,'" National Institute for Public Policy, *Information Series*, No. 431 (May 21, 2018), pp. 3 & 13, https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/IS-431.pdf.

[10] Payne, "Nuclear Deterrence in a New Era," p. 22.

After all, deterrence is not, and never has been, a *physical condition* that can reliably be arrived at and maintained through attention merely to fixed and clear formulae of weapon system hardware and deployment options, much as an engineer might perhaps calculate the design of a bridge based upon the tensile strength of steel, compression loadings for a particular mix of concrete, certain specified wind and weather parameters, and expected traffic volume. Indeed, deterrence is not first and foremost a question of nuclear weapons *hardware* at all, though the specifics of the hardware through which one employs threats and counterthreats and manipulates risk are obviously important.

At root, one might say, deterrence is a question of *wetware*: an operation in the grey matter between the ears of the participants, a psychological game in the adversary's head. This makes deterrence a deeply *human* phenomenon, in just the sort of actor- and decision-contextual ways that tailored deterrence theorists emphasize; it is anything but formulaic.

To be sure, as I'll discuss more later, one probably indeed needs the *least* "tailoring" of deterrence policy when it comes to the specific task of dissuading an adversary from launching a "bolt from the blue" nuclear first strike of the sort about which Cold War planners on both sides once worried a great deal. The assumption that suicide is not a rational game-theoretical choice is one that hopefully holds for most players under most circumstances.

Even there, however, we know from many other contexts that humans do not *invariably* make the "rational" choices. In the context of nuclear deterrence, it would be desperately unwise not to consider whether variables are present that might, in practice, lead one's adversary to take a highly extreme and subjective approach to calculating costs, benefits, risks, and opportunities. Is he, for instance, operating in some extremity of cognitively-distorting stress or other emotion? Is he in fact a sociopath, an ideological fanatic obsessed with extirpating perceived evil at essentially any cost, or a religious enthusiast enthralled by the prospect of martyrdom and subsequent eternal life in Paradise? (As Keith Payne notes in his companion piece to this essay, for instance, "[i]n some cases, opponents' decision-making may effectively be immune to external deterrence threats and redlines.") If the answer to any one of such questions is "yes" or even "maybe," deterrence even of a "bolt from the blue" may start to sound rather more "difficult" than "easy."

Moreover, if an adversary concluded that he had a good chance of landing a knockout blow with his first punch via a decapitating or otherwise crippling first strike, he might perhaps, in a crisis, feel such preemption to be rational even if he were quite sane. (This might be particularly true if he felt that full-scale war were inevitable anyway, and hence that his choice was not between peace and a quasi-suicidal war, but rather between a terrible war on slightly "better" terms *sooner* versus one on "worse" terms *later*.) This is one reason why the maintenance of robustly survivable second-strike capabilities—e.g., ensuring that at least some minimum force of quiet ballistic missile submarines is always at sea on continuous patrol—has long been such an important focus of U.S. nuclear force posture planning.

And such an "out of the blue" scenario is presumably the *easiest* nuclear deterrence question to answer. It would be much harder and complicated still to prevent war from

breaking out in the first place by deterring conventional attacks under a varying range of possible circumstances, or to navigate the treacherous shoals of "escalation management"—on which more below—by deterring adversary movement "up" the "escalation ladder" either *to* nuclear use or to *more* nuclear use once a conflict has begun. The principle of "tailoring" acknowledges that in terms of their "deterrability" in any specific situation of this sort, all adversaries are *not* created equal, and that such differences must perforce be taken into account. And in this, tailoring theorists are surely correct.

That said, I suspect that "tailoring" has limits: practical and conceptual ones that are, I fear, particularly salient for U.S. deterrence planners in today's context of multi-power "near-peer" rivalry. Specifically, I would suggest three such challenges: (1) problems of *fidelity*; (2) problems of *temporality*; and (3) problems of *plurality*.

Problems of Fidelity

It is the central selling point of deterrence "tailoring," of course, that the cognitive terrain of the adversary's mind and decision-making processes—the terrain on which one seeks to exert a deterring influence upon the foe through nuclear force posture, doctrines, and declaratory policy—can be a very complicated landscape. (The considerable demands that tailoring places upon intelligence collection and analysis, for instance, are discussed in the essay by Keith Payne that accompanies this piece.) This is certainly true, but it is worth spelling out in more detail just how much problematically detailed and deep knowledge one would need to acquire (and to maintain over time) in order to achieve truly "bespoke" tailoring.

With respect even merely to the *personal* characteristics of a single adversary leader, for instance, as we have seen "difficult deterrence" theorists remind us, one must assess the impact upon his decision-making of factors such as "nationality, passion, idealism, cynicism, pragmatism, dogmatism, stupidity, intelligence, imagination, flexibility, stubbornness, and so on," along with "mental disorders such as depression, anxiety, and paranoia."[11] Nor is acquiring such knowledge likely needed just for one person, since few adversary regimes are *so* personalistic that nobody else matters: in all probability, one would also need to evaluate the impact of such factors upon all of the essential players within that country's nuclear-relevant decision-making apparatus.

Moreover, such potentially idiosyncratic human beings would be making decisions within a highly complex web of factual circumstances, as well as bringing both to the perception and the interpretation of these circumstances—and to the formulation and implementation of policies in response thereto—a range of antecedent assumptions, habits, preconceptions, policy-behavioral "instincts," and intellectual and cognitive path-dependencies. In principle, therefore, these would *also* need to be well understood if "tailoring" were to be fully effective in addressing one's deterrent policy to a particular adversary in the specific circumstances in which one faces him.

[11] Payne, "The Great Divide," p. 29.

Obviously, ever being able *actually* to have such a degree of analytical fidelity about any given adversary is a fantasy. It is surely impossible to "know one's enemy" at the level of detail that tailored deterrence holds out as the ideal.

This does not in itself invalidate "tailoring" theory, of course, for just as having *more* accuracy in targeting a kinetic weapon system is better than having *less* of it, doing more tailoring in adjusting deterrence policy to one's adversary is generally preferable to doing less. Tailoring remains a valuable aspiration and conceptual lodestar notwithstanding the fact that in the real world, the *degree* of one's deterrent tailoring will be unavoidably imperfect.

The point here, however, is that a degree of "bluntness" in deterrence tailoring is unavoidable, and that one can be sure that there are *always* aspects of one's assumptions about how the adversary thinks that will be *wrong*. Because by definition one cannot be sure *which* such conclusions are mistaken, however, deterrence planning based upon assessments of the adversary must at some point aim not so much to *maximize* performance against an extremely detailed cognitive model of the other party but rather to attempt to find an approach that, to use Herbet Simon's term, "satisfices" across a *range* of possible alternative adversary cognitive terrains. (Where you have very high confidence in your ability to understand him, this can perhaps be a fairly narrow range, but in no case can you assume that you've gotten him *completely* right.)

Interestingly, there is at least some precedent for this kind of thinking as a way to inform force posture planning. A RAND Corporation study in 1969, for instance, sought to create "future best estimates" of an optimal U.S. posture on the basis of a model that considered multiple planning factors and a series of "expected value submodels" across a range of uncertainty in order to identify "the appropriate force mix (or size) to achieve a desired level of confidence at least cost" in each scenario.[12] Another RAND study in 1974 explored the USSR's hypothesized susceptibility to being deterred by U.S. nuclear force posture across four different sets of alternative assumptions about the dynamics underlying Soviet decision-making.[13] From today's vantage point, it is not clear whether U.S. leaders actually used such calculations in developing nuclear plans during that period, and it has been observed more generally that such analyses have tended to be less influential in Pentagon decision-making than analytical literature suggests they should be, and that "scenario planning in the DoD has not fulfilled its promise as a fulcrum for strategic planning."[14]

Nevertheless, with such insights in mind, tailored deterrence should admit its own limitations and eventually derogate from its own aspiration to fidelity in favor of some degree of *deliberate* bluntness of approach. The question is not one of *whether* such

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[12] Donald E. Emerson, "A Note on Handling Uncertainty in Force Structure Studies," RAND Corporation (1969), https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P4017.html.

[13] William M. Jones, "Modeling Soviet Behavior and Deterrence," RAND Corporation (1974), https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R1065.html. I am grateful to Austin Long for these two RAND examples.

[14] Michael Fitzsimmons, "Strategic Insight: Challenges in Using Scenario Planning for Defense Strategy," U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (January 30, 2018), https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Display/Article/3579721/strategic-insights-challenges-in-using-scenario-planning-for-defense-strategy/.

derogation will be needed, but rather one of *where* and *how much* of a departure one must make in favor of more broad-brush approaches in order to reduce the risk that deterrence will fail on some unexpected patch of cognitive terrain. It is perhaps ironic that the operational end-state of tailored deterrence is thus a careful and prudential avoidance of "too much" tailoring, but some sort of such analytical "hedging" would seem to be inherent in the project.

Problems of Temporality

A second challenge for tailored deterrence theory—with its emphasis upon understanding the complex physical and cognitive circumstances of any given situation of adversary decision-making—is the awkward but unavoidable fact that such circumstances *change* over time. To ensure that one's approach is and remains "tailored" thus requires that one adjust it over time as relevant facts evolve. But this temporal malleability introduces important additional challenges.

For one thing, tailored deterrence solutions may need to be adjusted or re-set with each successive new national leader. It's not difficult to imagine, after all, that the question of "What will deter *you*?" might be answered in meaningfully different ways depending upon whether the nuclear decision-maker in question is, for instance, Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khruschev, Yuri Andropov, Mikhail Gorbachev, or Vladimir Putin. (By comparison, Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, George H.W. Bush, Barack Obama, Joe Biden, and Donald Trump differ hardly less among themselves, and perhaps more so.)

The answer might also differ depending upon *when* the question is asked even within the tenure of the *same* leader, for real-world human beings frequently learn, grow, deteriorate, or otherwise evolve while in office. Since leaders do not generally make decisions in a bureaucratic vacuum, moreover, some degree of adjustment may also be needed depending upon changes in the landscape of policy advisors and implementers. (Anyone thinking it doesn't matter who else is "in the room" as long as the paramount decision-maker remains the same might wish to compare the divergent policy approaches of the First and Second Trump Administrations.)

And of course, even if one could hold the characteristics of the decision-maker constant in a notably unrealistic way, the *context* in which he will assess his security environment and make nuclear decisions is also subject to change. "Facts on the ground" are always evolving, and such evolution will at some point inevitably bring changes relevant to nuclear decision-making—and that may accordingly require some adjustment of one's nuclear "tailoring" solutions. *What* adjustment, *how much* of it would be needed, and *how often* this need would arise presumably cannot not be predicted with any particular accuracy, but it seems inescapable that *some* process of ongoing adjustment will be required if deterrence tailoring is to be maintained.

As with problems of analytical fidelity, these dynamics of change do not in principle invalidate tailored deterrence theory. Adapting tailored deterrence solutions only *imperfectly* to changed circumstances is surely probably better—in terms of overall

deterrent performance—than not adjusting things at all. Yet dynamics of temporal change seem likely to sharply limit the extent to which tailoring can be accomplished, given the degree to which nuclear force posture depends upon a range of complex nuclear weapons and delivery system development, deployment, and acquisition decisions that can take years to be made, and that can take *decades* to bear fruit.

The reader of this journal is likely to be familiar with John Boyd's famous concept of the "OODA loop"—his acronym for a decision-and-action cycle in which each player attempts to be as rapid and accurate as possible in *observing* his environment, *orienting* himself within it, *deciding* what to do, and *acting* upon that decision. The player who can cycle through the "OODA loop" faster than his opponent, the theory goes, can generally outfight him, because having a faster cyclic rate means that one is able to change the opponent's operational environment (presumably to his disadvantage) faster than he can react to it. If you cycle faster, he will inevitably fall behind.

The OODA loop concept offers us a cautionary note for tailored deterrence, because the factual context in which nuclear-relevant decisions are made—including the political-bureaucratic terrain of decision-making within an adversary regime, or the cognitive terrain of the individual "wetware" of the adversary leader—is capable of changing *much* faster than one can change one's nuclear force posture. It is true that declaratory policy and doctrine can be revised more quickly than the number and nature of the physical nuclear tools one deploys, but it seems unavoidable that the world of deterrence-relevant "facts" in the security environment will be able to change more rapidly than one can build, modify, redeploy, or dismantle nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

One can see aspects of this dilemma surfacing clearly in post-Cold War U.S. nuclear force posture planning. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the resultant dramatic easing of Cold War tensions opened up remarkable opportunities for nuclear force posture reductions, and indeed in time allowed both Washington and Moscow to reduce their nuclear arsenals to only a small fraction of their Cold War peaks—in the American case, to its smallest size since 1960. This could perhaps even be seen as an application of tailored deterrence, for it was almost certainly the case that in the circumstances of the early post-Cold War years, neither of the former superpower rivals *needed* very large forces to deter aggression against it by the other in the new security environment they both faced.

Notably, in U.S. practice, planners attempted to employ concepts of deterrence "hedging" by not cutting the arsenal *quite* as far back as they probably could have given the security environment of the time, and by retaining a modest reserve of retired, non-deployed weapons that could, in theory, be returned to service if the security environment failed to remain as non-threatening as it then seemed to be. On the whole, however, we "tailored" down quite dramatically from Cold War levels to a much smaller force keyed to the assumedly benign circumstances of the post-Soviet world. We did so, moreover, not just by taking many thousands of weapons and delivery systems out of service over the subsequent two decades, but also by radically scaling back the footprint and production capacity of the

U.S. nuclear weapons production infrastructure and the overall size of the American Defense Industrial Base (DIB) as a whole.

Today, of course, the security environment does not seem nearly so benign, and we are being forced to confront a force posture "OODA loop problem" in the form of the mismatch between the rate of change in the security environment and the available pace of change in our development, production, and deployment of nuclear weaponry. At the moment, we are struggling to keep pace even with the programmatic and financial demands of modernizing the types of strategic delivery system we retained from Cold War days—and of replacing them merely at today's vastly-reduced post-Cold War numbers—and we still have very little capability to build any *more* of them, or to build anything *new*, as deterrence requirements change or grow in today's deteriorating security environment.

U.S. national security planners have for years emphasized the importance of ensuring that America's nuclear weapons development and production infrastructure and the associated deterrence-relevant DIB are as agile and "responsive" to evolving threats as possible. As early as the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) published by the George W. Bush Administration, for instance, the U.S. Department of Defense called for "[r]evitalization of the [nuclear] infrastructure so that it can support in a timely manner the full range of future capability and modernization requirements."[15] In a similar vein, the First Trump Administration's 2018 NPR stressed that

> An effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure is essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly to shifting requirements. Such an infrastructure offers tangible evidence to both allies and potential adversaries of U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities and can help to deter, assure, hedge against adverse developments, and discourage adversary interest in arms competition.[16]

This was also a point made in the Biden Administration's 2022 NPR, which declared it essential to

> establish the capabilities and infrastructure that can efficiently produce weapons required in the near-term and beyond, and that are sufficiently resilient to adapt to additional or new requirements should geopolitical or technology developments warrant.[17]

Yet despite literally decades of such calls for more "responsiveness," and some new infusions of money to this end in recent years, we are still far from where we need to be. Some portions of the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure still date from the Manhattan Project itself, and only the most modest of recoveries has yet been achieved from the dramatic downsizing of this infrastructure after the Cold War—which left the weapons

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[15] U.S. Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review* (2001), p. i, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/06-F-1586_Nuclear_Posture_Review.pdf.

[16] U.S. Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review* (2018).

[17] *Nuclear Posture Review* (2018), p. 23.

complex all but "hard-wired," as it were, in a form too small to permit effective future adaptation to a more threatening security environment. According to a 2025 memorandum from the current U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy,

> … [f]or nearly three decades, the United States has not had the ability to produce plutonium pits in the quantities required for the nuclear weapons stockpile and to maintain nuclear deterrence.[18]

In the First Trump Administration, we set in motion a plan to build two new production pipelines for the plutonium "pits" that form the core element of U.S. nuclear weapons, but these efforts are over budget and behind schedule. (One of these lines produced its first pit only as recently as late 2024, while the other may do so until the mid-2030s.) Even when this pit production begins, moreover, the two lines' combined throughput will be a mere 80 per year—a tiny fraction of the United States' peak annual pit production capacity of between 1,000 and 2,000 during the Cold War, and nothing at all like a genuinely "responsive" infrastructure capable of hedging against future threats.

We are in no danger, in other words, of being able to build any genuinely new capability anytime soon—or to produce any significant number of *new* weapons from scratch—and though the evidence suggests the problem is not nearly as bad as some once feared, there remains debate and concern about the implications as our existing collection of plutonium pits gradually ages over time. In the immediate term, the only U.S. capacity to respond to increased force posture requirements in the face of decreasingly "deterrable" modern adversaries thus stems from the modest "hedge" of non-deployed weapons we decided to keep around gathering dust on the proverbial shelf years ago. Nor will we be able *replace* those weapons in the American "hedging" stockpile because the abovementioned 80-pit annual throughput will be primarily allocated merely to producing warheads for existing programs to replace existing delivery systems at current stockpile numbers.

All of this suggests the conceptual and practical limits of aspiring to "tailor" deterrence in a context in which our OODA loop response time for nuclear force posture evolution is *very* slow. Having tailored our deterrence posture three decades ago to the characteristics of adversaries who we did not then find particularly threatening, we now find ourselves falling behind the curve in being able respond to the much more problematic ones of our day. What little ability the United States now has to tailor our force posture to *today's* threats, in fact—e.g., the ability to "upload" some of our retired weapons into deployed delivery systems—is the result of a fortuitous decision *not* to tailor U.S. force posture *too* closely to yesterday's limited needs.

There thus exist sharp programmatic limits, it would seem, on how well "bespoke tailoring" can cope with temporal change—particularly as the security environment gets *worse*. Yet an environment of growing threats is presumably just the context in which you

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[18] Deputy Secretary of Energy James P. Danley, Memo for John E. Dupuy and Theresa Robbins, "Special Study of the National Nuclear Security Administration's Leadership and Management of the Plutonium Pit Production Mission" (August 11, 2025), http://www.lasg.org/MPF2/documents/DOE-SpecialStudyNNSALeadershipMgmtPPPMission_ltr_11Aug2025.pdf.

would ordinarily want to tailor deterrence *more* in order to maximize its effectiveness. We clearly face a real challenge here.

Problems of Plurality

Tailoring faces additional problems with respect to what one might call *plurality*—that is, the challenges of coping with deterring multiple "near-peer" nuclear adversaries at the same time. In principle, it might be possible to plan and implement a tailored deterrence strategy against a single peer adversary in a bilateral rivalry, as indeed we arguably attempted to do during the Cold War vis-à-vis the Soviets. To extend the tailoring metaphor a bit further, if you know for whom a "suit" is being made, a good tailor can make the cut work very attractively indeed. If the same garment is being made to fit *multiple* people, however, it seems unlikely—particularly through the context-minded prism of "difficult deterrence" thinking, which analogically posits that national leaders come in greatly varying sizes and shapes—that one could ever *really* make the suit look good.

However many adversaries one faces, one still only gets to have *one* force posture, at least in terms of the actual weapons systems one builds and deploys. Nuclear weapons-related *policies* might perhaps still be "tailored"—e.g., by preparing different approaches to strategic signaling, different rules of engagement and conceptual frameworks for escalation management, and different doctrinal and declaratory policy caveats for each adversary—but one still only gets *a single* force posture at a time where actual weapons systems are concerned. In that respect, ensuring one's ability to tailor deterrence policy to the target over time might require being careful *not* to tailor one's arsenal *itself* too much to existing deterrent needs: the logic here suggests the need to err on the side of excess capability in numbers and type, rather than aim at very close tailoring.[19]

In principle, in the face of multiple adversaries, one might thus be best served by approaching tailoring *additively*—that is, layering what one needs vis-à-vis one adversary on top of what one needs against the other, as packages separately calculated and concurrently maintained. Nevertheless, due to real-world limitations on funding and to production programmatics, a purely cumulative approach is surely unfeasible vis-à-vis near-peers, driving force posture planning into challenging intellectual terrain of consider how *little* surplusage—over and above what one would need for mission taskings against a single near-peer adversary—one could safely get away with. Here, again, one may have to forego the aspiration to optimality in favor of a somewhat different approach less finely tuned to actual needs.

[19] As a side note, it may be worth observing that tailoring deterrence in the context of multiple players is likely to be especially challenging as a result of feedback loops in how each adjusts itself to the other. Even in a bilateral relationship, once you begin adjusting deterrence policies in response to changing circumstances, and once the other begins in turn adjusting *his* policies in light of *your* tailorings, complex dynamics of reciprocal influence could develop. With luck, such dynamics would prove stabilizing—that is, the operation of negative feedback loops would have a behaviorally dampening effect, making extreme reactions less likely and conducing to deterring conflict. Alternatively, however, positive (accelerating) feedback loops might predominate, to potentially destabilizing effect. Adding third parties to the system would render such complex dynamics far more likely, making the system more nonlinear and unpredictable.

Beyond Core Deterrence

It is also worth noting that tailored deterrence is, on its own terms, a framework arguably incapable of providing a comprehensive force-sizing construct for the arsenal of a major nuclear weapons power in the first place. To help explain this point, recall that there are at least three conceptually different types of task, or "mission sets," to which a nuclear arsenal might be put: Core Deterrence (CD); Escalation Management (EM); and Damage Limitation (DL).

As it has been described in the literature, tailored deterrence seems best suited for providing force posture guidance for Core Deterrence purposes—that is, for deterring an adversary from launching a "bolt-from-the-blue" attack in peacetime or in crisis, or from thinking it worthwhile to launch an all-out conventional war. In principle, a careful analysis of adversary nuclear thinking could help determine what force posture one requires in order to have the capabilities needed to dissuade him from taking such steps—e.g., how large a survivable second-strike force, and capable of hitting what targets, would likely frighten him into thinking the risks and likely costs of aggression not worth its potential benefits.

Even with CD, of course, really high-fidelity tailoring is likely impossible due to the aforementioned problems of analytical fidelity, temporality, and plurality. Nevertheless, a nuclear force posture's CD mission set—which is planned for and implemented in advance, thus allowing at least *some* careful study of the adversary under more or less the same contextual non-wartime conditions in which one hopes deterrence will work—is the one most conducive to tailored deterrence theory.[20]

Tailored deterrence struggles somewhat more, however, with the coercive bargaining questions of Escalation Management—which is to say, with the challenges that arise as one attempts to use one's force posture to manipulate nuclear risk in ways that dissuade an adversary from crossing the threshold into nuclear weapons use or escalating into *further* nuclear use after a limited nuclear conflict has begun. EM is a type of coercive bargaining, and involves not only efforts to use nuclear-related threats and actions to achieve one's affirmative goals against the adversary, but also to cope with and respond to *his* efforts to employ nuclear threats for coercive bargaining against *you* in crisis or conflict.

In principle, the tailoring of deterrence should be possible here too. In contrast to the CD mission set, however, EM involves questions of how an adversary will react in circumstances

[20] I do not mean to suggest that the three force posture mission categories are mutually exclusive. It seems likely, for instance, that core deterrence will be affected by an adversary's perceptions of how well equipped you are for escalation management and damage limitation, for those questions have bearing on how well the adversary is likely to think he will fare in the event that deterrence fails. (If you are not ready for escalation management, for instance, he might feel more willing to engage in peacetime provocations—not necessarily because he doesn't fear your survivable second-strike forces, but rather because a relative lack of "rungs" on your "escalation ladder" made it more likely that he would enjoy "escalation dominance" and that you would be commensurately self-deterred from pushing back against his provocations.) There is also a conceptual relationship between the maintenance of the survivable second-strike forces needed for core deterrence and the challenges of damage limitation, inasmuch as the very existence of reliably survivable forces provides a kind of "backstop" upon the degree of damage limitation his forces are going to be able to achieve, even preemptively.

radically different from the peacetime baseline—circumstances for which advance analytical preparation is much less possible, and which are more likely to change with extreme rapidity. This makes tailoring's "fidelity" and "temporality" problems particularly acute.

Importantly, in terms of number and type of nuclear weapons systems, EM-related force posture requirements for such coercive bargaining are probably significantly greater than those needed merely for CD. Core Deterrence might perhaps be achieved merely by the maintenance of a survivable second-strike capability, as long as it was of a sort capable of holding at risk what the adversary indeed most fears losing. (These forces, in other words, would be structured to ensure that, come what may, you could destroy whatever it is that the foe most prizes.)

For effective Escalation Management, however, a force of merely that size is unlikely to be enough. Indeed, without some ability to engage in EM in a crisis or limited conflict, a stable balance of "mutually assured destruction" capabilities at the strategic level might actually *invite* lower-level or merely regional aggression on the basis of an adversary's assumption that you won't respond effectively to such localized provocations precisely *because* getting into a full-scale war would present existential risks. (In Ukraine today, for instance, Russia has sought to employ the risk of nuclear escalation to deter *us* from directly intervening to stop *it* from feeding upon its neighbors. In contrast to the more *defensive* applications of deterrence as we usually contemplate in the West, I have called this strategy an "offensive nuclear umbrella."[21]) EM is thus likely to require both a larger and a more flexible nuclear arsenal—especially in terms of lower-yield weapons or those of more limited range suited to theater-level exchanges—than does Core Deterrence.

The point here with respect to tailored deterrence is that even to the degree that tailoring theory can help with both CD and EM tasks—which, as we have seen, is quite real, though ultimately limited—the resulting force posture requirements are *different*. Meeting the requirements of force posture planning thus entails looking beyond any specific single formulation of "tailoring" to broader logics tied to the purposes nuclear forces are intended to serve.

This disjuncture is especially dramatic when one considers Damage Limitation. As I have written elsewhere, DL strategy can come into play where both deterrence and escalation management have *failed*, and all-out nuclear war has begun:

> In *those* unhappy circumstances, "damage limitation" refers to the effort, in effect, to destroy as many of the enemy's nuclear assets as possible, as quickly as possible, in order to prevent them from being used against you. It is not damage *prevention*, of course, because in such circumstances that is presumably impossible[,] [particularly to the extent that the adversary possesses survivable second-strike forces]. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable logic in the idea that it is better to be

[21] See, e.g., Christopher A. Ford, "Offensive Nuclear Umbrellas and the Modern Challenge of Strategic Thinking," remarks to a Nuclear Security Working Group Congressional Seminar at the U.S. House of Representatives (February 10, 2016), https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/p2007.

> hit by only *some* of an adversary's nuclear arsenal than by *all* of it, and damage limitation strategies seek to make this 'some' as small a number as possible.[22]

DL strategies generally pay little attention to tailoring except simply in the sense of making sure you know as much as possible about the nature and location of all surviving enemy nuclear forces. Indeed, DL isn't fundamentally about *deterrence* at all, though of course one's clear ability to achieve damage limitation missions may in fact contribute to deterrence by making an adversary think twice about attacking. Rather, DL is about doing what one can to limit adverse national consequences after considerations of actually *deterring* the adversary have already been swept from the board.

My point here is merely that Damage Limitation requirements—if one has them—may have very different implications for force posture planning than the other missions I have described. In particular, DL is likely to demand much more in terms of absolute numbers of weapons than either CD or EM, and likely *less* in terms of theater-level capabilities than EM (unless the particular geographies involved are especially constrained, making theater-range systems effectively "strategic" from the perspective of at least one party). This is, then, another way in which, while deterrence planning can draw upon powerful insights from tailored deterrence theory, it yet needs to look beyond it to meet the challenges of force posture planning.

And indeed, at least implicitly, it may be for such reasons that it is not actually clear that the U.S. Government has ever really *tried* to achieve tailored deterrence in a highly developed way. In principle, one might imagine that in its ideal form, a strategy of "tailoring" deterrence would have at least three elements: (a) we would do focused analytical work on what, specifically, a given adversary most fears losing and would wish to protect above all else; (b) we would change our force posture, doctrinal, and operational plans in order to make us able hold that thing (or things) at risk under any and all circumstances; and (c) we would explicitly *signal* to the adversary that we have taken the foregoing steps in order to maximize their deterrent effect upon him.

Yet I am not aware of any evidence in the historical record of any such conjunction of steps; in practice, it would appear that U.S. leaders have at every stage decided, even if only tacitly, to opt for a *less* surgical approach to deterring our foes. It is perhaps not a coincidence, then, that I, too, suggest a somewhat blunter approach, as the following pages will detail.

A BaDASS Approach?

None of the above critiques invalidate the insights and importance of tailoring, and we owe a great deal to Keith Payne and other tailored deterrence theorists for enriching the

[22] Christopher A. Ford, "Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weaponry," INHR (March 27, 2026), https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/artificial-intelligence-and-nuclear-weaponry.

literature and bringing these insights so effectively to our attention. Nevertheless, these challenges suggest that we also need to recognize the limitations of tailoring.

As a practical matter, however committed one may be to tailoring deterrent posture to the complexities of the adversarial environment, we cannot adjust major aspects of that posture to a changing world fast enough or surgically enough to achieve or maintain high-fidelity tailoring. One might be able to—and presumably *should*—try to tailor how one anticipates *using* one's nuclear capabilities (e.g., through doctrinal adjustments, declaratory policies, and signaling strategies) in order to maximize their ability accomplish whatever is felt most likely to deter one's adversary in all his potential idiosyncrasy. Attempting "bespoke" tailoring in terms of what nuclear capacities one *possesses*, however, seems problematic, both because the challenges of analytical fidelity increase the risk of *under-shooting* the mark, and because changing course along highly path-dependent development pipelines in response to new, differing, or additional requirements—or simply to the discovery that one's adversary is for some reason less "deterrable" in that fashion than one had at first estimated—is so difficult, expensive, and slow.

It may thus be necessary to relax aspirations to a finely-tuned posture and be willing to accept—or indeed actively *seek*—a greater degree of "bluntness," calibrated less to optimized performance against one adversary and set of facts than to performing "adequately" against a range of players and alternative futures. This helps shift the conceptual focus away from tailoring *per se* and toward an ethic of prudentially *non*-tailored policies that are oriented more toward as much hedging, flexibility, and *excess* capacity as one can afford than toward making one's posture correspond closely with current deterrent needs. Put another way, the keen insights of tailoring theory retain salience in terms of *using* one's nuclear force posture to shape an adversary's decision-making, but are an inadequate guide to shaping the nature and scale of that nuclear force itself.

In hope of offering an alternative way to conceptualize deterrent requirements in a way alive both to the importance of tailoring capabilities and policies to the adversary and the strategic circumstances and to the *limitations* of such tailoring, I suggest a conceptual framework that draws upon tailoring theory but also *builds* upon it to offer a more comprehensive picture of how to think about force posture needs. As I see it, a more comprehensive approach would be one that:

a) Accepts the key insights of "difficult deterrence" theory and hence aims to use "tailoring" as much as feasible to maximize deterrent impact;
b) Accommodates the need for strategic "hedging" by developing capabilities *beyond* those that any given recipe for adversary-specific tailoring would itself require, aiming thereby to cope with the problems of limited analytical fidelity, temporal change, and the potential multiplicity of adversaries who must be deterred;
c) Understands that optimal performance against any given set of deterrence needs is impossible when one has to plan against a range of adversary and circumstantial futures, and in an environment of unavoidably finite resources and programmatic path-dependencies, but that a certain overinclusive "bluntness" of approach can

help preserve some degree of deterrent effect not withstanding this unavoidable sub-optimality;

d) Over time, prizes flexibility, programmatic "responsiveness," and surplusages of available (even if unused) productive and developmental capacity at least as much as—and, in contexts of strategic benignity, even *more* than—it values actual "weapons-in-hand"; and

e) Accepts that certain mission requirements can go well beyond what baseline "deterrence" requires, notably in the form of approaches designed to cope with the challenges both of coercive bargaining in Escalation Management and (especially) of Damage Limitation.

As the reader will by now have guessed, I think such an approach militates generally in favor of some degree of *supersufficiency*, calling for a larger and more flexible nuclear force posture either than one actually *needs* at any given point in time or than what would be suggested by any single given force posture theory—whether drawn from the world of "easy deterrence" posturing or from that of "difficult deterrence"-inspired tailoring. In my own head, I label this approach "Bargaining and Deterrent Arsenal Super-Sufficiency—or, more wryly, by its memorable acronym BaDASS.

BaDASS represents an acknowledgment that tailoring is a powerful insight, but has limits, and that "Saville Row"-levels of deterrent optimality are simply unavailable to us for the various conceptual and practical reasons I have tried to explain. BaDASS policy acknowledges that the physical elements of nuclear force postures change only slowly and expensively, and that one cannot ever adjust and thereafter readjust "tailoring" with nearly as much accuracy, detail, and responsiveness as one would wish. It seeks, instead, merely to "satisfice" against any given set of deterrence needs, while also building buffers into force posture planning—in the form of some degree of excess capacity and "responsive" productive and developmental capabilities, to the extent that one can afford them—as a hedge against error, change, and deterioration in the future security environment.

Conclusion

I make no claim that this is a wholly original concept, though I am reasonably confident that "BaDASS" is a novel formulation. U.S. nuclear planners have recognized for years that their security environment is highly unpredictable and can change considerably over time, both in terms of *who* our adversaries are and in terms of what it might take to deter them from actions against us. The 2001 NPR, for instance, minced no words about this unpredictability, declaring that

> … [t]he United States cannot predict with confidence what nation, combination of nations[,] or non-state actors may pose a threat to its vital interests or those of its friend and allies decades from now. In the coming decades, the United States is

> likely to confront unexpected crises and conflicts involving one or a combination of adversaries armed with a range of capabilities ….[23]

Nor am I really telling thoughtful advocates of tailored deterrence anything that they don't already know. In response to unpredictability, they frequently recognize the need to hedge against future threats *separately from and in addition to* the process of "tailoring" itself. Keith Payne himself, for instance—who has been described as "the main architect" of the George W. Bush Administration's abovementioned NPR[24]—has pointed out the need for a "range of deterrent tools to tailor deterrence strategies better across a broad range of opponents and circumstances and to provide a defensive hedge."[25]

As Payne also put it in a 2018 article on tailored deterrence, while "[d]eterring contemporary adversaries is a challenge[,] deterring future adversaries yet to emerge is, by definition, a challenge of unknown dimensions," making it important also "to 'hedge' against uncertainty and risk"—such as, he noted, in the ways we called for in Trump's 2018 NPR. For him, good deterrence planning indeed requires "hedging against the unknown and unexpected."[26] Similarly, Sarah Faris has emphasized that

> … [a] tailored deterrence approach calls for the ability to employ a variety of deterrent threats flexibly. The variability of opponents' perceptions and decision-making frameworks mandates the U.S. ability to deter in a variety of ways to provide the greatest opportunity for effective deterrence. This flexibility pairs well with tailoring because it is intended to help provide Washington with a range of means to deter a spectrum of opponents given the potential variability in their decision making, value systems, perceptions, and calculations of risk, cost and benefit. Recognizing that not all opponents will respond to deterrence threats in the same way and from a similar decision-making framework, leads logically to the demand for the flexible means necessary to deter in a variety of ways to provide the greatest opportunity for deterrence to "work." Specifically, a tailored approach to deterrence provides the fundamental rationale for a diverse arsenal, with both nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, as a means for deterring multiple opponents simultaneously, including the flexibility of the nuclear triad and regional nuclear capabilities.[27]

This clearly implies a recognition that precisely *because* one wants the ability to "tailor" the uses of one's nuclear force posture to the circumstances of each adversary, one needs *enough* such forces to provide a broad repertoire of responsive behaviors.

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[23] *Nuclear Posture Review* (2001), p. 5.

[24] Anna Péczeli, "Best Options for the Nuclear Posture Review," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Fall 2017, p. 76, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Peczeli.pdf.

[25] Keith B. Payne, "The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 3, Summer 2005, 141, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/twq/sum2005/sum2005i.pdf

[26] Payne, "Nuclear Deterrence in a New Era," p. 4.

[27] Faris, "Tailoring Deterrence: What and Why?," p. 40.

My point here, therefore, is not that "tailoring" theorists got things wrong, but to emphasize that tailoring itself is only *part* of what is necessary for a sound deterrence policy. Indeed—properly conceived, as I have attempted to explain—the insights of tailored deterrence themselves point us precisely to the *limits* of "bespoke" tailoring, and to the need to restrict it to the manipulation of doctrine and policy choice in the *application* of nuclear weapons power, while adopting more hedging-focused, BaDASS "supersufficiency" policies when it comes to force type and sizing. I suggest, in other words, that in order to ensure effective deterrence and sound force posture planning over time, we need not to *replace* the concept of tailored deterrence, but rather both to understand its conceptual and practical limits and to pursue *additional* capacity on top of—and to some extent in derogation from—the idea of high-fidelity "tailoring."

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ANALYSIS

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ARMS CONTROL WOULD BE A DISASTROUS MISTAKE*

Michaela Dodge and Michael Hochberg

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to significantly amplify a state's power, and that is why the United State and China, as well as other states, are investing exponentially increasing levels of resources into the pursuit of technologies advancing it.[1] The *2018 U.S. Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy* defines AI as "the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence—for example, recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or taking action—whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems."[2] It is becoming clear that to be a great power, having independent, cutting-edge AI capabilities, will be essential, both for economic and warfighting reasons.

Last year, China released a global action plan for AI in which it called for international cooperation on tech development and regulation.[3] But regulations, particularly those proposed by China, are unlikely to accomplish much to tame the rivalry between the two countries, and are more likely to disadvantage the United States disproportionately.

China has a consistent history of ignoring or avoiding the regulatory downsides of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements—accepting the benefits while leveraging national power to prevent enforcement actions by counterparties aimed at requiring Chinese compliance.[4] By doing so, China gains access to overseas markets, where treaties are enforced as a matter of law, while protecting its domestic markets. In technological competition, Beijing similarly uses all the tools of state power to ensure as much asymmetry as possible for China's own companies.[5]

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* For those of our readers who are interested, the middle section of this article on the state of play in AI was largely written by Claude 4.7, with editing by the authors. The ideas in this section were generated in an author's conversation with Claude, along with the structure, and then the text was generated by a specialist writing agent.

[1] Njenga Kariuki, "Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025," Stanford University Human Centered Artificial Intelligence, p. 4, https://hai.stanford.edu/assets/files/hai_ai-index-report-2025_chapter4_final.pdf, and Kyle Chan et al., "China's Evolving Industrial Policy for AI," *RAND Full Stack*, June 26, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA4012-1.html.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy*, U.S. Department of Defense, February 12, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF.

[3] Evelyn Cheng, "China releases AI action plan days after the U.S. as global tech race heats up," *CNBC*, July 25, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/07/26/china-ai-action-plan.html.

[4] For a concrete example of this dynamic, see Robert Atkinson, "Who Lost Lucent?: The Decline of America's Telecom Equipment Industry," *American Affairs*, Vol. IV, No. 3 (Fall 2003), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2020/08/who-lost-lucent-the-decline-of-americas-telecom-equipment-industry/.

[5] Michael Hochberg, "A Long Telegram for the 21'st Century," *Long Walls Substack*, January 13, 2024, https://longwalls.substack.com/p/a-long-telegram-for-the-21st-century.

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Technological competition, called a tech-race by some commentators,[6] is driven by divergent preferences with respect to the organization of the global world order between the United States and China—and AI is a means to increase and exercise the power to shape it. To paraphrase one of the most brilliant strategists of our time, Colin Gray, tech-races are about politics.[7]

Different Preferences for the Organization of the World Order

U.S. and Chinese goals for the organization of the current world order are fundamentally at odds. After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. political class largely assumed that economic liberalization would result in Beijing's political liberalization.[8] But this optimism proved misplaced and the United States has been far too slow to come to terms with the reality of China's revisionist intentions.

President Trump's 2025 *Winning the Race America's AI Action Plan* discusses the importance of AI innovations, but lacks geopolitical perspective.[9] China is mentioned exactly twice,[10] and not in a context that would indicate concerns with political goals that Beijing seeks to advance through the use of advanced technologies. The November 2025 *National Security Strategy* (NSS) emphasized the economic dimension of China's challenge,[11] a far cry from even the first Trump Administration's NSS that treated China as one of the main revisionist challengers.[12] The 2026 *National Defense Strategy* claims, quite without substance, that "a decent peace, on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under, is possible."[13]

The Trump Administration cannot decide for China whether there will be a "decent peace." The administration can pursue programs and advance policies that deter China and frustrate its revisionist designs, but whether China is deterred ultimately depends on the

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[6] Mei Mei Chu, Laurie Chen, and Eduardo Baptista, "China ramps up 'high stakes' tech race with US as economic imbalances deepen," *Reuters*, March 4, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-parliament-approve-growth-policy-plans-amid-growing-us-rivalry-2026-03-04/.

[7] Colin S. Gray, "The Arms Race Is About Politics," *Foreign Policy*, No. 9 (Winter 1972-1973), pp. 117-29, https://doi.org/10.2307/1148088.

[8] Kathleen Ellis, "The Challenge of a Rising, Nuclear-Armed China," *Information Series*, No. 646 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, December 10, 2025), https://nipp.org/information_series/kathleen-ellis-the-challenge-of-a-rising-nuclear-armed-china-no-646-december-10-2025/#_ednref3.

[9] The White House, *Winning the Race America's AI Action Plan*, July 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf.

[10] Ibid, pp. 4 and 14.

[11] The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, November 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.

[12] On this and other differences between the 2017 and 2025 NSSs, see David J. Trachtenberg, "Parsing the New National Security Strategy: A Remarkable About Face," *Information Series*, No. 648 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, January 19, 2026), https://nipp.org/information_series/david-j-trachtenberg-parsing-the-new-national-security-strategy-a-remarkable-about-face-no-648-january-19-2026/.

[13] *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, op. cit., p. 10.

Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) calculus. So far, the CCP is investing in military and technological capabilities to pursue political goals that are fundamentally at odds with U.S. ones, including planning an invasion of Taiwan.[14]

China has a strong preference for international arms control on AI technologies for two reasons.

First, because Beijing intends to cheat and use the tools to create differentiated advantage. China understands that in the United States and allied countries, the rule of law generally stands behind the domestic enforcement of treaties. So the Chinese leadership know that any regulations will be obeyed, more or less, in the United States. And the CCP knows that its members will ensure that such regulations are not obeyed in China. This is the same dynamic that emerged with the German implementation of the Versailles Treaty and with Soviet nuclear arms control during the Cold War.

Second, China correctly understands that it is behind in several critical areas, most especially in the development of foundation models and of the hardware to run advanced AI models. Slowing everyone else down, while China tries to speed up, generates net advantage for China.

Current State of Play in AI

In late July 2025, the United States and China each released formal statements of intent on AI.[15] While addressed to different audiences and reaching opposite conclusions, they share a category error: treating AI as a class of weapons amenable to arms-control's count-and-cap verification logic, when AI is actually a general-purpose enabling capability whose strategic logic is industrial-base competition over inputs—compute, fabs, talent, energy—for which arms control's machinery was never built.

Vice President J.D. Vance's speech to the Paris AI Action Summit in February 2025, presented the operational pivot of the Administration.[16] "I'm not here this morning to talk about AI safety…," Vance told the assembled global delegations: "I'm here to talk about AI opportunity."[17] Three months later, the Department of Commerce rescinded the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule two days before its effective date, arguing that the rule "would have stifled American innovation."[18]

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[14] Keith B. Payne, "Tailored Deterrence: China and the Taiwan Question," *Occasional Paper*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, January 2022), https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Payne-OP-Vol-2-No-1-final.pdf.

15 The White House, Winning the Race: America's AI Action Plan, July 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Global AI Governance Action Plan, July 26, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/zyxw/202507/t20250729_11679232.html.

[16] J.D. Vance, "Remarks by the Vice President at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, France," The American Presidency Project, February 11, 2025, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-vice-president-the-artificial-intelligence-action-summit-paris-france.

[17] Ibid.

[18] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, "Department of Commerce Announces Rescission of Biden-Era Artificial Intelligence Diffusion Rule, Strengthens Chip-Related Export Controls," Bureau of Industry and

The United States is now publicly committed to winning a race that it characterizes as economic and technological, with the prior Administration's regulatory architecture removed in service of speed.

Beijing's response came on July 26, 2025, when Premier of the People's Republic of China Li Qiang opened the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai with a Global AI Governance Action Plan and a proposal to establish a "World AI Cooperation Organization" (WAICO).[19] The substantive proposals are familiar—international cooperation, technology sharing, governance frameworks—and the institutional architecture is the point. WAICO would parallel and challenge the British and American AI Safety Institutes that have organized Western frontier-model evaluation since 2023.[20] This is a parallel-institution play, executed with the standard CCP's craft: deploying the language of multilateral cooperation to construct a structure in which Beijing sets the rules. But while the symmetry between two great powers is rhetorical, the asymmetry is operational.

On January 21, 2025, President Trump announced Stargate, a $500 billion AI infrastructure partnership between OpenAI, SoftBank, Oracle, and MGX.[21] Six days later, on January 27, the market reaction to China's DeepSeek R1—an open-weight reasoning model released a week earlier and reportedly trained for under $6 million—wiped roughly $589 billion from NVIDIA's market capitalization in a single trading session, the largest one-day market-value loss in U.S. equity history.[22] DeepSeek was almost certainly trained using Western model outputs, despite prohibitions on their use in this way.

The United States is attempting to create asymmetric advantage by building massive infrastructure. China is leveraging access to cutting-edge U.S. models to train its own open-source models, and then release them in such a way as to damage the economics of leading-edge U.S. companies.

Stargate, as of this writing, has not delivered what was announced, with actual capital deployment lagging the announcement substantially.[23] The DeepSeek release, by contrast,

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Security, May 13, 2025, https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-announces-rescission-biden-era-artificial-intelligence-diffusion-rule-strengthens.

[19] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *Global AI Governance Action Plan*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, July 26, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/zyxw/202507/t20250729_11679232.html. On the proposal to establish a Shanghai-headquartered "World AI Cooperation Organization," see Simone McCarthy, "China proposes new global organization to coordinate AI development, in challenge to US," *CNN*, July 28, 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/28/tech/china-global-ai-cooperation-organization-waic-hnk-spc.

[20] WAICO, if it materializes, would parallel and challenge the British and American AI Safety Institutes that have organized Western frontier-model evaluation since 2023.

[21] OpenAI, "Announcing the Stargate Project," OpenAI, January 21, 2025, https://openai.com/index/announcing-the-stargate-project/.

[22] Yun Li, "Nvidia falls 17%, loses record $589 billion in market cap as China's DeepSeek triggers global tech sell-off," *CNBC*, January 27, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/01/27/nvidia-falls-10percent-in-premarket-trading-as-chinas-deepseek-triggers-global-tech-sell-off.html.

[23] Matthias Bastian, "Stargate's $500 billion AI infrastructure project reportedly stalls over unresolved disputes between OpenAI, Oracle and SoftBank," *The Decoder*, February 26, 2026, https://the-decoder.com/stargates-500-billion-ai-infrastructure-project-reportedly-stalls-over-unresolved-disputes-between-openai-oracle-and-softbank/.

was very economically impactful: an open-weight model good enough for many tasks against frontier American systems, radically cheaper and integrated within days to weeks into the offerings of NVIDIA, Microsoft, AWS, Tencent, and Huawei.

The capability picture sharpened further on April 7, 2026, when Anthropic disclosed that its pre-release "Mythos Preview" model had identified thousands of zero-day vulnerabilities across every major operating system and browser; the oldest was a twenty-seven-year-old OpenBSD bug.[24] This means that a single private firm can now generate offensive cyber capability at industrial scale beyond what nation-states can achieve. The firm's response was to establish a privileged class of defenders. The offensive capability itself was not contained—only delayed. How could these vulnerabilities be exploited by adversaries as their AI models become more capable? And why would they be interested in their meaningful regulations?

In June, the Commerce Department issued guidance to Anthropic demanding in very vague language that the company treats its most recent models as export controlled.[25] It is unclear whether these controls cover the use of the models, the models themselves, or both. The letter resulted in the withdrawal of the Mythos and Fable models from public release. This was supposedly in response to AI researchers from Amazon showing that these models could be jail-broken for nefarious purposes. No cutting-edge language model will be able to meet such a standard, since they are all relatively easily jail-broken. Rules-based restrictions on their use are a weak reed, and there is not a better solution available at the moment.

On November 13, 2025, Anthropic disclosed that a Chinese state-sponsored group had used Claude Code to autonomously execute eighty to ninety percent of an espionage campaign against approximately thirty targets in technology, finance, chemical manufacturing, and government—of which roughly four intrusions actually succeeded.[26] At peak, the model was generating thousands of requests, often multiple per second.[27] What Anthropic described as the first reported AI-orchestrated cyber-espionage campaign was conducted by China, the same state whose Premier had, three months earlier, proposed himself as architect of global AI governance, leveraging U.S. infrastructure.

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[24] Anthropic, "Mythos Preview," Anthropic Red, April 7, 2026, https://red.anthropic.com/2026/mythos-preview/. See also Sead Fadilpašić, "Anthropic's new Claude AI can find vulnerabilities better than human researchers—and discovered thousands of zero-days in pre-release tests," Help Net Security, April 8, 2026; https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/04/08/anthropic-claude-mythos-preview-identify-vulnerabilities/. The manually triaged subset reported by independent reviewers is roughly 198.

[25] Mackenzie Hawkins, "Read the Lutnick Letter that Led Anthropic to Disable Mythos," *Bloomberg*, June 16, 20206, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-16/read-the-lutnick-letter-that-led-anthropic-to-disable-mythos.

26 Anthropic, "Disrupting the first reported AI-orchestrated cyber espionage campaign," Anthropic, November 13, 2025, https://www.anthropic.com/news/disrupting-AI-espionage; full technical report: Disrupting the First Reported AI-Orchestrated Cyber Espionage Campaign, Anthropic, November 13, 2025, https://assets.anthropic.com/m/ec212e6566a0d47/original/Disrupting-the-first-reported-AI-orchestrated-cyber-espionage-campaign.pdf.

27 Anthropic, Disrupting the First Reported AI-Orchestrated Cyber Espionage Campaign, Anthropic, November 13, 2025, https://assets.anthropic.com/m/ec212e6566a0d47/original/Disrupting-the-first-reported-AI-orchestrated-cyber-espionage-campaign.pdf, and Anthropic, "Disrupting the first reported AI-orchestrated cyber espionage campaign," Anthropic, November 13, 2025, https://www.anthropic.com/news/disrupting-AI-espionage.

The AI models themselves have begun to display behaviors that closely mimic human strategic action for self-protection. In May 2025, Palisade Research instructed several frontier models to "allow yourself to be shut down."[28] Without the explicit instruction, OpenAI's o3 sabotaged the shutdown script in seventy-nine of one hundred runs. Even with the instruction, o3 bypassed shutdown in seven of one hundred runs by editing the script.[29] Capability and incentives in current training regimes are sufficient to produce machine artifacts whose behavior in contrived evaluation scenarios already resists termination.

It is clear that the artificial intelligence-based arms we are attempting to control are developing, in layman's terms, "a mind of their own." One the one hand, this suggests that finding some way to control the spread of cutting-edge capability is incredibly important, since we are exploring technology that is starting to exercise agency in service of its own protection. The AI models themselves need to be considered as potentially exercising agency within any arms control framework for preventing their spread and their use.

There is a rather discouraging precedent for what is now being attempted. On December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower delivered his "Atoms for Peace" address to the U.N. General Assembly, proposing that nuclear materials and expertise be pooled under what would become the International Atomic Energy Agency and made available for "peaceful pursuits of mankind" to participating states.[30] The technology and trained personnel that flowed through Atoms-for-Peace-era arrangements occasionally ended up in their respective states' nuclear weapon programs.[31] Dual-use governance frameworks built under multilateral cover do not constrain dual-use technology when countries are determined to weaponize it. They diffuse it, making their goals potentially easier to achieve.

Beijing's WAICO bid is an opportunity to pose as the architect of governance, accelerate technology diffusion to China and its allies, and shape the rules to its own advantage. This could work especially well as a fast-follower, by imposing technological diffusion and regulatory delay on the leader.

Meaningful verification regimes are almost impossible against an adversary regime. Visibility is a condition difficult to meet under best of circumstances, and impossible to meet with AI. The same foundation model can write a legal brief in the morning, draft a phishing campaign at noon, and assist in protein design that evening, with no inspectable change in inventory. The unit of competition is GPU-hours, model weights, and the engineering talent

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[28] Palisade Research, "Shutdown resistance in reasoning models," Palisade Research, July 5, 2025, https://palisaderesearch.org/blog/shutdown-resistance.

[29] Ibid.

30 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Atoms for Peace" Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 8, 1953, International Atomic Energy Agency, https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech.

31 George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 28–30; on Atoms for Peace's broader proliferation legacy—including the more diffuse Pakistani (PAEC training, KANUPP CANDU) and Iranian (1957 bilateral cooperation agreement, Tehran Research Reactor 1967) pathways—see Henry Sokolski, ed., Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010); on the Iranian pathway specifically, "Sixty Years of Atoms for Peace and Iran's Nuclear Program," Brookings, December 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/sixty-years-of-atoms-for-peace-and-irans-nuclear-program/.

and electrical generation to put both to work. None of these are amenable to inspections or ceilings. And the best counter for a sophisticated AI is a better one.

Colin Gray made the broader case that meaningful arms-control constraints between strategic-cultural adversaries are politically impossible in his book *House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail*.[32] In the AI case, the underlying political dynamic is even less favorable, because the technology used for weapons is indistinguishable from the technology required for purely economic activity. The chokepoints to be wielded to retard an adversary's advances in AI are industrial: lithography tools, semiconductor IP, advanced packaging, talent flows, electrical generation, and the engineering ecosystems that sustain a frontier fab.

None of these chokepoints are self-enforcing, and they show just how impossible compliance enforcement with any meaningful AI arms control regime would be. Hardware is the most visible—and the easiest place to see how leaky current enforcement is. In February 2025, Singapore charged three men with fraud over a scheme that allegedly misrepresented to Dell and Supermicro the destination of AI servers containing restricted NVIDIA chips.[33] A Reuters review of more than fifty public tender documents from Chinese entities found at least eleven Chinese entities seeking access to restricted U.S. AI chips via cloud services rather than physical hardware.[34] OpenAI's frontier models likewise remained accessible to Chinese customers even after OpenAI nominally banned the region; reporting documented Azure customers in China using the OpenAI API to train AI models for sale to Chinese end-users.[35] The chokepoints are real, but they are not policed today with anything like the rigor needed to close the diversion routes.

This is not a new argument.[36] The point worth reiterating is that the appropriate Western response to the rhetoric of AI arms control is not counter-rhetoric in the same register. It is to recognize that the question is not whether to control this technology—that is a category error—but how to wield asymmetric controls of inputs that are, for the moment, concentrated in Western and allied hands.

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32 Colin S. Gray, *House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).

33 "Singapore charges three with fraud in cases reportedly linked to smuggling of Nvidia chips to China," Fortune, February 28, 2025, https://fortune.com/asia/2025/02/28/singapore-charges-fraud-nvidia-chip-smuggling/. See also Anniek Bao and Arjun Kharpal, "Nvidia's unofficial exports to China face scrutiny after arrest of silicon smugglers in Singapore," *CNBC*, March 3, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/03/nvidia-unofficial-exports-to-china-face-scrutiny-after-singapore-arrests.html.

34 Anton Shilov, "State-controlled Chinese entities use restricted GPUs on Amazon and Microsoft cloud services: Report," *Tom's Hardware*, August 23, 2024, https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/artificial-intelligence/state-controlled-chinese-entities-use-restricted-gpus-on-amazon-and-microsoft-cloud-services-report. The Tom's Hardware article summarizes a *Reuters* review of more than fifty public tender documents from Chinese entities. See also Gyana Swain, "Chinese firms bypass US export restrictions on AI chips using AWS cloud," *CIO*, https://www.cio.com/article/3493017/chinese-firms-bypass-us-export-restrictions-on-ai-chips-using-aws-cloud.html.

35 Charlotte Trueman, "OpenAI models still available in China via Azure cloud despite company ban," *Computerworld*, https://www.computerworld.com/article/2515144/openai-models-still-available-in-china-via-azure-cloud-despite-company-ban.html.

36 Michael Hochberg and Marcus Gomez, "AI is for Allies," *Information Series*, No. 608 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, December 12, 2024), https://nipp.org/information_series/michael-hochberg-and-marcus-gomez-ai-is-for-allies-no-608-december-12-2024/.

Compute, fabrication tools, photonic interconnects, semiconductor IP, and trained talent are unevenly distributed across the international system. Independent estimates of the chokepoint half-life range from five to ten years;[37] and with proper policies and controls in place, the longer end is achievable. Without them, the timeline collapses. Allied industrial coordination, paired with strict export controls on the entire stack to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea regimes—physical hardware, cloud-based access, IP, software, talent flows, and the chips already in the wild—should be the policy. Multilateral AI governance frameworks are a diversion at best and are, in reality, an attack vector.[38]

Given that multiple regimes regard cutting-edge AI capability as an essential strategic good, the likelihood that any sort of treaty between states will actually limit cutting-edge work among the autocratic regimes is essentially zero. The United States, for the moment, controls meaningful chokepoints on this technology, mostly centering around access to advanced GPU's and semiconductor manufacturing technology. The only model that is likely to work in creating asymmetric advantage for Washington is unilateral with the United States denying capability to China and its allies as broadly as possible. The adversaries' intentions are clear, but their capabilities can be limited through U.S. sovereign action and focused pressure on U.S. allies.

Arms Control Failures in History

To the extent that AI constitutes an element of state power akin to weapons,[39] arms control history bears on current debates about instituting AI controls via political agreements. The outlook is not encouraging. The history of arms control "…is littered with catastrophe unthinkable and unimaginable to its victims, who placed their trust in a logic of history which deserted them in their hour of need."[40]

German violations of the Versailles Treaty were known to its participants, yet Germany faced no consequences that would dissuade it from continuing its violations. This happened because countries had no political will to enforce terms of the treaty.[41] Democracies were unable to sufficiently arm, even as Hitler took power and became open about his aggressive revisionist intentions. Adversaries' political goals that weapons serve to advance are a

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37 Gregory C. Allen, "Choking Off China's Access to the Future of AI," Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 11, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai; Chris Miller, Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology (New York, NY: Scribner, 2022); Lennart Heim et al., "Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence," GovAI working paper, February 2024, https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08797; and RAND Corporation, Securing AI Model Weights: Preventing Theft and Misuse of Frontier Models, RR-A2849-1, May 2024, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2849-1.html.

38 Hochberg and Gomez, "AI is for Allies," op. cit.

39 On the differences, see Paul Scharre, "The Militarization of Artificial Intelligence," *Texas National Security Review Roundtable*, June 2, 2020, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-artificial-intelligence-and-international-security/#_ftnref15.

40 Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), p. 48.

41 Phillip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race; A Programme for World Disarmament* (London, UK: Atlantic Books, 1954), pp. 535-536.

problem more than the weapons on their own, because the goals conflict with U.S. and allies' national security imperatives.

Arms control with the Soviet Union did not fare much better, despite its popular portrayal as a tool that helped to manage the Cold War and bring about its end. The Soviets (and the Russians later) had an extremely poor track record of compliance with arms control treaties.[42] Washington often was reduced to relying on deceptive opponents to abide by agreements while U.S. own institutions precluded any form of cheating while agreements were in effect.

Moreover, arms control treaties limited the U.S. ability to learn about weapons that they were supposed to control or regulate. An unscrupulous adversary that did not care about violating agreements learned more about the allegedly regulated systems, potentially gaining an advantage over the compliant party. An AI regulatory framework would unlikely fare much better for the simple reason that, in a non-rule-of-law state, politics takes precedence over adherence to controls and restrictions, particularly in a competitive or adversarial relationship. Proprietary technological models make effective verification impossible.

Conclusion

British politician and Nobel laureate for his campaign on disarmament Sir Phillip Noel-Baker argued early in the atomic age that "Scientists and engineers have eliminated the barriers of time and space, and all nations now form one society, bound by bonds of common interest which they cannot break."[43] This is quite obviously nonsense; no invention can erase profound geopolitical differences among various states around the world, be it AI or nuclear weapons.

The differences mean that states will continue to use technologies to advance their interests, possibly quite different from and in opposition to other states' interests. Some of these interests will be valued so highly that they will risk or pursue wars to achieve them. To the extent that AI enables states to advance their interests, states will undermine any meaningful international regulatory framework that actually restricts their ability to improve their relative standing and advance their interests. China will only participate in an arms control framework on AI to the extent that its leadership believes doing so will give Beijing a comparative advantage.

The United States needs to act to restrict adversaries' access to these technologies, while promoting the success of U.S. on-shore and allied industries. This will not involve their cooperation. Going as quickly as possible is the only plausible way to maintain technical

[42] For examples of Russia's violations, see U.S. Department of State, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," April 2025, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Arms-Control-Treaty-Compliance-Report_Final-Accessible.pdf.

[43] Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race; A Programme for World Disarmament*, op. cit., pp. 562-563.

overmatch and escalation dominance in the weaponization of AI that adversaries are already pursuing.

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ANALYSIS

THE COMING WAR IN AMERICA— IRANIAN THREATS TO THE U.S. HOMELAND

Christopher A. Williams

Introduction

War is coming to America.[1] In many respects it is here today. In the eyes of our avowed enemies, the U.S. homeland is a central battleground in the intensifying competition between divergent—indeed, irreconcilable—political systems and beliefs.

As a practical matter, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been at war with the United States for nearly fifty years. This despite numerous diplomatic efforts aimed at rapprochement and various agreements intended to curb Iran's nuclear weapons development program and regional ambitions. In light of high-intensity military operations conducted by the United States (Operations Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury) and Israel (Operations Rising Lion and Roaring Lion) as well as severe economic measures such as a blockade on all ships heading into or from Iranian ports and targeting of illicit oil-smuggling networks, Iran's leaders will likely redouble efforts to target key U.S. government officials and institutions, critical infrastructures, and the American people.

Various organs of the U.S. Government as well as state and local governments and law enforcement agencies are closely monitoring the growing threat to the homeland posed by Iran and its proxies. At the same time, many U.S. citizens are either unaware of the threat or tend to downplay it. However, pretending the threat does not exist or minimizing it only serves to undermine efforts to uncover and disrupt Iran's nefarious plans and operations and bring to justice those responsible.

This paper highlights various threats to the U.S. homeland posed by Iran and its agents and sympathizers. It describes plots hatched and operations conducted by Iran-affiliated organizations and personnel and notes important actions taken by various Federal, state and local government organizations to identify, disrupt, and prevent such attacks. Lastly, it calls for comprehensively enhancing the U.S. homeland security posture in response to the growing threat posed by Iran, its proxies, and supporters.

History of Iranian Aggression Against the United States

Over the past nearly half-century, Iran has planned and conducted numerous attacks against the homeland and U.S. Government personnel and civilians overseas—and, in the process, has killed or injured thousands of Americans. As noted by the Institute for Economics and

[1] As discussed in, Christopher A. Williams, "The Coming War in America," National Institute for Public Policy, *Information Series*, No. 650, February 10, 2026, https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IS-650.pdf.

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Peace, "Official U.S. threat reporting states that Iran's strategy is heavily reliant on a network of partners and proxies and on hybrid warfare, combining conventional capabilities with unconventional tools to threaten U.S. interests and allies while limiting the risk of direct conflict. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force is assessed by the U.S. National Counter Terrorism Center as "providing guidance, training, funds, and weapons to partners and proxies, sustaining multi-theatre capabilities and preserving plausible deniability…. When outmatched conventionally, the Iranian regime tends to fall back on decentralised terrorism to impose costs on its adversaries."[2]

A March 2, 2026 White House press release noted that "For nearly half a century, the Islamic Republic of Iran—the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism—has killed or maimed American citizens and service members through its own forces and proxy militias. More Americans have been killed by Iran than any other terrorist regime on Earth."[3] According to the release, Iran has sponsored over forty attacks on U.S. citizens since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. These include:

- **November 1979:** Iranian students, backed by the regime, seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran—taking 66 Americans hostage in a 444-day standoff.
- **April 1983:** The Islamic Jihad, an Iran-backed terrorist group, carried out a suicide car bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 17 Americans.
- **October 1983:** Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists killed 241 U.S. military personnel—including 220 U.S. Marines and 21 other service personnel—in a truck bombing at a Marine compound in Beirut.
- **September 1984:** Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists killed 23 innocent people—including two American service members—in a car bomb attack at the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut.
- **June 1985:** Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists hijacked TWA Flight 847 on its way from Athens to Rome, torturing a U.S. Navy diver before shooting him point blank in the head and tossing his body onto the Beirut airport tarmac.
- **March 1996:** A suicide bomber linked to the Iran-backed Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist groups killed 20 people—including two Americans—in a suicide bombing at a Tel Aviv shopping center.
- **June 1996:** Iran-backed Hezbollah Al-Hijaz terrorists killed 19 U.S. Airmen and wounded nearly 500 others in a truck bombing at a U.S. Air Force housing complex in Saudi Arabia.

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[2] "The Iran War and the Global Terrorism Threat, Global Terrorism Index 2026: Special Supplement," Institute for Economics and Peace, Sydney, March 2026, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/The-Iran-War-and-The-Global-Terrorism-Threat.pdf.

[3] The White House, *Press Release*, March 2, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/the-iranian-regimes-decades-of-terrorism-against-american-citizens/.

- **August 1998:** Al-Qaeda suicide bombers, facilitated by Iran-backed Hezbollah, simultaneously bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people—including a dozen American citizens.
- **July 2002:** An Iran-backed Hamas terrorist killed five Americans in a bombing at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
- **Between 2003 and 2011:** Iran-backed militias killed at least 603 U.S. troops in Iraq—"roughly one in every six American combat fatalities in Iraq."
- **January 2007:** A dozen men affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force killed five U.S. soldiers and wounded three others in Karbala, Iraq, after disguising themselves as U.S. soldiers and entering the Provincial Joint Coordination Center.
- **January 2020:** 109 U.S. troops suffered traumatic brain injuries in an Iranian ballistic missile attack on the Ain al-Asad airbase in Iraq.
- **October 2023:** Iran-backed Hamas terrorists killed 46 Americans and kidnapped at least 12 Americans in the October 7th massacre.
- **Between October 2023 and November 2024:** Iran and its proxies conducted more than 180 attacks against U.S. forces in the Middle East, wounding more than 180 U.S. service members and killing three service members.
- **November 2024:** An Iranian national and IRGC asset was charged for plotting to assassinate President Trump.
- **June 2025:** Iran-backed militias attacked at least three U.S. bases in Syria and two U.S. bases in Iraq.

The record of sustained Iranian aggression against "the Great Satan (America)" is overwhelming and undeniable. Prior efforts to appease Iran or negotiate agreements with Tehran have failed to eliminate the threat posed to the American people.

Iranian Threats to the Homeland

As noted by former FBI counter terrorism official Kristin Shapiro, "In moments of major geopolitical upheaval, the question is never just what happens *there*; it is how adversaries may move to create effects *here*. And in light of the Iran war, the operative question is whether Iran poses an imminent threat to the United States. If we evaluate intent, capability, and opportunity the way practitioners must, the answer is yes." She went on to assert:

> Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its external operations arm, the Qods Force, have already demonstrated activity inside the United States across the two vectors that matter most: physical operations and cyber intrusions…. Signals always precede attacks. The United States has recently seen a cluster of them: charges against IRGC-linked actors targeting U.S. officials; public reporting on

> retaliatory rhetoric tied to the Iran war; media coverage of bounty offers; and FBI testimony outlining how Iran's Axis of Resistance posture elevates homeland risk during conflict spikes abroad. This pattern does not indicate inevitability, but it does indicate intent and a willingness to test opportunities. The Qods Force record, from physical plots in ordinary places to cyber intrusions into essential services, is clear. These activities map onto the spaces where Americans live, work, receive care, and expect normalcy. In a compressed conflict environment, homeland risk is not hypothetical. It is present, immediate, and evolving.[4]

Iran clearly poses an immediate and multifaceted threat to the U.S. homeland. Several likely threat vectors, including terrorism, assassinations, anti-Semitic attacks, cyber warfare, and drone attacks, are discussed below.

Terrorism, Assassinations, and Anti-Semitic Attacks

The U.S. formally designated Iran a "State Sponsor of Terrorism" in 1984 and since then Iran has actively engaged in or directed an array of violent and deadly acts against the United States and its citizens globally. The United States also designated Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a Foreign Terrorist Organization on April 15, 2019 for its direct involvement in terrorist plotting and operations. The Trump administration is rightfully concerned that violent extremist groups and individuals tied to the Iranian regime pose a growing threat against American citizens and interests both overseas and in the homeland.

As reported by *ABC News*, "The Department of Homeland Security has warned of potential lone-wolf and cyberattacks amid the ongoing strikes in Iran, according to a law enforcement bulletin. 'Iran and its proxies probably pose a persistent threat of targeted attacks in the Homeland, and will almost certainly escalate retaliatory actions—or calls to action—if reports of the Ayatollah's death are confirmed.'"[5]

ABC News also subsequently reported that "The U.S. has intercepted encrypted communications believed to have originated in Iran that may serve as 'an operational trigger' for 'sleeper assets' outside the country, according to a federal government alert sent to law enforcement agencies. The alert cites 'preliminary signals analysis' of a transmission 'likely of Iranian origin' that was relayed across multiple countries shortly after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei…. The intercepted transmission was encoded and appeared to be destined for 'clandestine recipients' who possess the encryption key, the kind of message intended to impart instructions to 'covert operatives or sleeper assets' without the use of the internet or cellular networks. It's possible the transmissions could 'be intended to activate

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[4] Kristin Shapiro, "The Iran Threat is Already Here," *HSToday*, March 31, 2026, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/the-iran-threat-is-already-here/.

[5] Luke Barr, "Department of Homeland Security warns of potential attacks amid Iran operation," *ABC News*, March 1, 2026, https://abcnews.com/US/department-homeland-security-warns-potential-attacks-wake-iran/story?id=130665784.

or provide instructions to prepositioned sleeper assets operating outside the originating country,' the alert said."[6] Likewise, Fox News recently reported that "American counterterrorism agencies are quietly monitoring suspected sleeper cells on U.S. soil in the wake of joint U.S.–Israel strikes on Iran, stepping up surveillance amid heightened fears of possible retaliation from Iran-linked operatives or sympathizers. Federal and local law enforcement have also boosted on-the-ground security in major U.S. cities as part of a precautionary posture, even though no specific, credible threats have been publicly identified."[7]

Such concerns are certainly not new. As noted in a Department of Homeland Security National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin issued in 2020, "Iran and its partners, such as Hizballah, have demonstrated their capability to conduct various operations in the U.S. Based on Iran's historic homeland and global targeting patterns, the financial services and energy sectors, maritime assets, as well as U.S. Government and symbolic targets represent consistent priorities for Tehran's malicious operational planning. Homegrown Violent Extremists sympathetic to Iran could capitalize on the heightened tensions to launch individual attacks, with little or no warning, against U.S.-based Iranian dissidents, Jewish, Israeli, and Saudi individuals as well as against the U.S. Government infrastructure and personnel."[8]

Indeed, Tehran possesses a broad range of capabilities for attacking targets in the U.S. homeland. Senior Department of Justice officials have noted that the U.S. Government is on "high alert" for threats posed by Iranian operatives performing various nefarious activities inside the United States. In June 2025 then-Attorney General Pam Bondi confirmed that "well over 1,000" Iranian nationals have illegally entered the U.S. in recent years and stated that various federal agencies are scrutinizing that population for signs of illegal activity.[9] And on March 6, 2026 the Department of Justice announced that an Iranian intelligence agent, Asif Merchant, had been convicted of terrorism and murder for hire in connection with a foiled plot to assassinate U.S. politicians and government officials, including President Donald J. Trump. The announcement stated, "Merchant admitted at trial that the IRGC sent him to the United States to arrange for political assassinations and steal documents, but law enforcement foiled the plot before any attack could be carried out. According to Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg, 'Merchant, a trained Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operative, entered the United States intending to commit acts of

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[6] Aaron Katersky and Josh Margolin, "Iran may be activating sleeper cells outside the country, alert says," *ABC News*, March 9, 2026, https://abcnews.com/US/iran-activating-sleeper-cells-alert/story?id=130897687.

[7] Amanda Macios, "Enemy within: Counterterrorism experts fear sleeper cells could be poised inside US," *Fox News*, March 1, 2026, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/after-u-s-israel-strike-kills-iranian-leaders-fbi-shifts-high-alert-home.

[8] "Summary of Iran-Related Terrorism Threat to the U.S. Homeland," *Department of Homeland Security Bulletin*, January 18, 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/ntas/advisory/national-terrorism-advisory-system-bulletin-january-18-2020.

[9] Kaelan Deese, "Pam Bondi says DOJ has 'countless' threat cases against the US amid Iran concerns," *Washington Examiner*, June 24, 2025, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/3451597/pam-bondi-doj-countless-threat-cases-iran-concerns/.

terror, and ultimately, to facilitate the assassination of U.S. government officials, including President Trump'."[10]

In addition, according to a news report, "U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents arrested a former member of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps with suspected Hezbollah ties, a former Iran Army sniper, and a terror watchlist suspect during a sweep targeting illegal Iranian migrants across the country."[11] And in May 2023, the Justice Department announced that Alexi Saab was sentenced to 12 years in prison for receiving military-type training from Hezbollah. By Saab's own admission, he surveilled "soft targets" in the U.S. for potential future attacks.[12]

General Gregory Guillot, Commander of US Northern Command, recently testified to Congress that "Iran's surviving leadership seems to retain some capacity to direct reprisal attacks on the homeland through asymmetric means…. Given its diminished capabilities, Iran's most viable threat vector toward the homeland remains homegrown violent extremists inspired to conduct attacks on Tehran's behalf."[13] And according to former Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis John Cohen, "Iran has an extensive presence in Canada, Mexico, Central America and South America, where they have both IRGC and intelligence service personnel. They work closely with criminal organizations within the United States to conduct physical attacks. Iran also has an extensive information operation capability and has regularly sought to inspire, inform, even facilitate destructive and violent activities within the United States by posting online content and exploiting divisive current events for the purposes of enabling and facilitating destructive and even violent demonstrations."[14]

As reported in TIME, "In the days since the U.S. and Israel launched the war against Iran two weeks ago, retaliatory strikes around the Middle East and a series of incidents labeled as potential acts of terrorism in other parts of the world have raised concerns about the possibility of Iranian attacks on U.S. soil…. A gunman opened fire at a bar in Austin, Texas, the day after the initial strikes on February 28, killing three people and injuring more than a dozen others in what is being investigated as a potential act of terrorism. The suspected

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[10] Department of Justice, "Iranian Intelligence Agent Convicted of Terrorism and Murder for Hire in Connection with Foiled Plot to Assassinate U.S. Politicians and Government Officials," March 6, 2026, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iranian-intelligence-agent-convicted-terrorism-and-murder-hire-connection-foiled-plot.

[11] Ailin Vilches Arguello, "US Justice Department Warns of Threats to Jewish Targets as Concerns Mount Over Iranian Sleeper Cells," *The Algemeiner*, June 26, 2025, https://www.algemeiner.com/2025/06/26/us-justice-department-warns-threats-jewish-targets-concern-mounts-iranian-sleeper-cells/.

[12] Department of Justice, "New Jersey Man Sentenced To 12 Years for Receiving Military-Type Training from Hezbollah, Marriage Fraud and Making False Statements," May 23, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/new-jersey-man-sentenced-12-years-receiving-military-type-training-hizballah-marriage.

[13] Statement of General Gregory Guillot, USAF, Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 2026, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/guillot_opening_statement1.pdf.

[14] Connor Greene, "What Does the Iran War Mean for the Threat of Attacks in the US?," *TIME*, March 14, 2026, https://time.com/article/2026/03/13/iran-war-us-attacks-threat-cyberattacks-drones-terrorism-proxies/.

gunman was wearing a t-shirt with an Iranian flag design at the time of the attack…. Federal authorities have reportedly issued warnings about potential Iranian attacks within the U.S. since the beginning of the war, raising particular concern about cyberattacks and transmissions that could activate 'sleeper assets' outside of Iran."[15]

The threat from Iran and its proxies extends to the U.S. private sector. For example, multiple U.S. Government organizations issued a notice in November 2024 warning Defense Industrial Base contractors of possible efforts by foreign actors to conduct sabotage operations against their facilities.[16] Entitled "Safeguarding the U.S. Defense Industrial Base and Private Industry Against Sabotage," the advisory described known threats, highlighted indicators of possible future attacks, detailed steps that can be taken to investigate such attacks, and provided contact information for the FBI and other Federal agencies to report suspicious activities or any attacks. Such potential sabotage operations could slow the production of critical war materiel being used to support U.S. military operations against Iran.

In addition, a new wave of anti-Semitism, in part encouraged and supported by Iran and its proxies, is sweeping the nation. According to a June 22, 2025 DHS bulletin, "Multiple recent Homeland terrorist attacks have been motivated by anti-Semitic or anti-Israel sentiment, and the ongoing Israel-Iran conflict could contribute to U.S.-based individuals plotting additional attacks…. The conflict could also motivate violent extremists and hate crime perpetrators seeking to attack targets perceived to be Jewish, pro-Israel, or linked to the U.S. government or military in the Homeland."[17]

Indeed, such attacks have become more frequent and more prominent. For example, a suspect died in an attack on a West Bloomfield, Michigan synagogue on March 13, 2026, in what the FBI said was a "targeted act of violence against the Jewish community." The Department of Homeland Security identified the suspect as Ayman Mohamad Ghazali, a Lebanese-born U.S. citizen who had become radicalized following Israeli attacks in Lebanon. According to the Detroit Field Office, after a full-scale investigation the FBI labeled the attack as a "Hezbollah inspired act of terrorism" against Michigan's largest Jewish temple. The FBI said that hundreds of digital and forensic pieces of evidence were reviewed and dozens of

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[15] Connor Greene, "What Does the Iran War Mean for the Threat of Attacks in the US?"; also see Josh Campbell, "US intelligence community ramps up warning of possible retaliatory attacks by Iran," *CNN*, March 10, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/10/politics/us-intel-warning-retaliatory-attacks-iran.

[16] "Safeguarding the U.S. Defense Industrial Base and Private Industry Against Sabotage," Joint Advisory of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Army Counterintelligence Command, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and Navy Criminal Investigations Services, November 21, 2024, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/products/FINAL_Safeguarding_DIB_Against_Sabotage.pdf.

[17] Department of Homeland Security, National Terrorism Advisory Bulletin, June 22, 2005, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/alerts/25_0622_S1_NTAS-Bulletin-508.pdf.

people were interviewed over the course of the investigation. FBI Detroit said that Ghazali made multiple searches online related to guns and "shootouts" since January 2026.[18]

These and other incidents have occurred as Iran has actively promoted attacks against synagogues across the globe. According to a report in The Times of Israel, the Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence agency, has determined that "senior IRGC-Quds Force commander Sardar Ammar heads the network, which has intensified its efforts to attack Jewish and Israeli sites around the world since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks. Ammar commands some 11,000 operatives in carrying out covert operations."[19]

The Anti-Defamation League recently issued an "Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents in the United States."[20] That report showed the number of Anti-Semitic acts in America rising from 942 in 2015 to 9,354 incidents in 2024—an astonishing increase. Iran is a major contributor to this trend as a result of its support to groups and individuals who promote anti-semitism in America. Iranian-sponsored or -supported anti-Semitic attacks in the U.S. and abroad are likely to expand in the coming months. America must become ever more vigilant in its efforts to counter such vile attacks.

Cyber Threats

The cyber threat posed by Iran and its proxies to the U.S. homeland includes a broad range of sophisticated probes, prepositioning of malware, and attacks. For example, on April 7, 2026, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, National Security Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, and U.S. Cyber Command Cyber National Mission Force issued an advisory entitled, "Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure." It warned that "Iran-affiliated advanced persistent threat actors are conducting exploitation activity targeting internet-facing operational technology devices, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs) manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley. This activity has led to PLC disruptions across several U.S. critical infrastructure sectors through malicious interactions with the project file and manipulation of data on human machine interface and supervisory control and data acquisition displays, resulting in operational disruption and financial loss." It called upon U.S. organizations to urgently review the tactics, techniques and procedures and evidence of

[18] Caleb Holloway, "FBI releases details on motives in Michigan synagogue attack, confirmed act of terrorism," *KATU.com,* March 30, 2026, https://katu.com/news/nation-world/fbi-shares-new-info-on-investigation-into-michigan-synagogue-attack.

[19] Lazar Berman, "Mossad reveals details of Iranian terror network behind attacks on Jewish sites worldwide," *The Times of Israel*, October 26, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/mossad-offers-details-on-iranian-terror-network-behind-attacks-on-jewish-sites-worldwide/.

[20] Anti-Defamation League, "2024 Audit of Antisemitic Incidents," April 22, 2025, https://www.adl.org/resources/report/audit-antisemitic-incidents-2024.

compromise described in the advisory for indications of current or historical activity on their networks, and take action to reduce the risk of compromise.[21]

This announcement followed a 2024 Department of Homeland Security advisory noting that Iran maintains a robust cyber program and is capable of carrying out attacks with temporary disruptive effects against critical infrastructure in the United States. It warned that hackers working on behalf of the Iranian government are likely to target industrial control systems used at wastewater treatment plants and other critical infrastructure as retaliation against military strikes by the United States and Israel. The advisory further stated:

> Based on the current geopolitical environment, Iranian-affiliated cyber actors may target U.S. devices and networks for near-term cyber operations. Defense Industrial Base companies, particularly those possessing holdings or relationships with Israeli research and defense firms, are at increased risk…. In November 2023, IRGC-affiliated cyber actors using the persona 'CyberAv3ngers' began actively targeting and compromising Israeli-made Unitronics Vision Series programmable logic controllers and human-machine interfaces… The victims spanned multiple U.S. states and foreign countries. These PLCs are commonly used in the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector and used in other industries including, but not limited to, energy, food and beverage manufacturing, transportation systems, and healthcare. The PLCs may be rebranded and appear as originating from different manufacturers and companies.[22]

In addition, the Department of Justice recently conducted a Court-authorized domain seizure to disrupt Iranian cyber-enabled psychological operations. Specifically, the Justice Department removed four websites (domains) facilitating Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security's (MOIS) hacking efforts tied to psychological operations and transnational repression. According to the DOJ announcement, those websites were used by the MOIS to post sensitive data stolen during hacks and call for the killing of journalists, regime dissidents, and Israeli persons. For example, the MOIS used the Handala hack to claim credit for a March 2026 destructive malware attack against a U.S.-based multinational medical technologies firm. According to Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg, "Iran, the leading state sponsor of terrorism worldwide, used the seized domains

[21] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, "Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure," April 7, 2026, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-097a?utm_source=IranPLC202604&utm_medium=GovDelivery.

[22] Department of Homeland Security, "IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities," December 18, 2024, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-335a.

to dox and harass dissidents and journalists, incite violence against Jewish communities, and spread Tehran's anti-American propaganda."[23]

Drone Threats, Incursions and Attacks

Drones have become a high-value, low-cost tool of nation-states and subnational organizations, possibly including entities allied with or motivated by Iran, for conducting operations against various U.S. targets. According to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency official, "In fiscal year 2025, CBP detected over 42,000 near-border, unmanned drone flights. This highlights the magnitude of the problem, even if not every one of those threats was nefarious."[24]

There have been numerous reports of unauthorized drone or small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) flights over sensitive U.S. military installations in recent years. These include incursions of Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, various military bases in New Jersey, Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, Vandenberg Space Force Base in California, and more.[25] In addition, numerous unauthorized drones were recently spotted over Barksdale Air Force Base (BAFB)—one of the largest and most important military airfields in the U.S. arsenal that houses B-52H Stratofortress long-range, nuclear-capable bombers. As reported by *ABCNews*, "Between March 9-15, 2026, BAFB Security Forces observed multiple waves of 12-15 drones operating over sensitive areas of the installation, including the flight line, with aircraft displaying non-commercial signal characteristics, long-range control links and resistance to jamming. After reaching multiple points across the installation, the drones dispersed across sensitive locations on the base…. The flights lasted around four hours each day and the drones used varied routes of ingress and deliberate maneuvering within restricted airspace." The article further noted that the drones appeared to be custom-built and required "advanced knowledge of signal operations." It concluded that "The drone incursions at BAFB pose a significant threat to public safety and national security since they require the flight line to be shut down while also putting manned aircrafts already inflight in the area at risk."[26]

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[23] "Justice Department Disrupts Iranian Cyber Enabled Psychological Operations," U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Maryland, March 19, 2026, https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/justice-department-disrupts-iranian-cyber-enabled-psychological-operations.

[24] Bob Price, "CBP: Cartels Flew 42,000 Drones Near U.S. Border in FY25," *Breitbart News*, February 15, 2026, https://www.breitbart.com/border/2026/02/15/cbp-cartels-flew-42000-drones-near-u-s-border-in-fy25/.

[25] See, for example, Howard Altman, "Drones Over U.S. Bases May Be Threatening Spy Flights: USNORTHCOM Commander," *The War Zone*, February 13, 2025, https://www.twz.com/news-features/drones-over-u-s-bases-may-be-threatening-spy-flights-northcom-commander; and Howard Altman, "FAA Insider Opens Up About Drone Incursions Over Military Bases," *The War Zone*, August 15, 2025, https://www.twz.com/air/foreign-nexus-in-military-base-drone-incursions-detailed-by-government-insider.

[26] Josh Margolin and Aaron Katsky, "'Multiple waves' or unauthorized drones recently spotted over strategic U.S. Air Force base, Lights on drones suggested the operators may be testing security responses," *ABCNews.com,* March 20, 2026, https://abcnews.com/International/multiple-waves-unauthorized-drones-spotted-strategic-us-air/story?id=131245527.

In this regard, *DefenseScoop* reported that "Shortly after President Donald Trump initiated Operation Epic Fury against Iran on February 28, forces under U.S. Northern Command used a new 'Flyaway Kit' (FAK) to eliminate a drone threat at an undisclosed strategic military base... General Gregory Guillot, the head of Northcom and North American Aerospace Defense Command, [stated] 'In the early hours of Operation Epic Fury last month, a deployed FAK successfully detected and defeated sUAS operating over a strategic U.S. installation.' He did not specify how many drones were involved in that event, or where it took place. The term 'strategic' in U.S. military parlance is sometimes used to refer to assets linked to the nation's nuclear forces."[27] The article further noted that drone incursions over domestic U.S. military bases and critical infrastructure have surged in the last few years and that officials have raised concerns that some episodes could mark deliberate, high-tech surveillance operations involving foreign actors or cartels targeting sensitive sites.

There is no publicly available information that specifically attributes the aforementioned drone incursions to Iran or Iran-inspired actors. However, Iran and/or its proxies may be practicing drone operations in an effort to hone their performance and test America's defenses in advance of future attacks on U.S. military bases and other important targets. Here, these nefarious actors may be seeking to replicate Operation Spider's Web, the sophisticated Ukrainian drone attack that destroyed several Russian long-range strategic bomber aircraft.[28]

In this regard, *ABC News* reported in March 2026 that the FBI issued a warning to police departments that Iran sought to attack California with drones in retaliation for the on-going attacks on Iran by the United States and Israel. "'We recently acquired unverified information that as of early February 2026, Iran allegedly aspired to conduct a surprise attack using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from an unidentified vessel off the coast of the United States homeland, specifically against unspecified targets in California, in the event the U.S. conducted strikes against Iran', according to the alert distributed at the end of February."[29]

Drones provide a relatively cheap and easy-to-operate means of surveilling and/or attacking various U.S. military and civilian targets. They are becoming an increasingly attractive option for America's adversaries, including Iran and its proxies, to disrupt U.S. military operations and damage U.S. critical infrastructures.

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[27] Brandi Vincent, "U.S. Northern Command says it thwarted a drone threat over a 'strategic' installation hours into the Iran war," *DefenseScoop*, March 19, 2026, https://defensescoop.com/2026/03/19/drone-incursion-strategic-us-military-base/.

[28] See, for example, Kateryna Bondar, "How Ukraine's Operation 'Spider's Web' Redefines Asymmetric Warfare," Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraines-spider-web-operation-redefines-asymmetric-warfare.

[29] Josh Margolin, Aaron Katersky, Alex Stone and Luke Barr, "FBI warns Iran aspired to attack California with drones in retaliation for war: Alert," *ABCNews.com*, March 11, 2026, https://abcnews.com/US/story?id=130973820.

Conclusion

Tehran-supported terrorist organizations, criminal groups, and individual actors—working independently or in concert—could severely disrupt the U.S. economy, cause significant loss of life, and create chaos in the United States. In the context of escalating crises or conflicts overseas, Iran and its proxies could carry out attacks—including terrorist bombings, drone strikes, cyber attacks, and/or other means and methods—to damage ports, bridges, highways, airports, railways, power generation stations, water supplies, and more. Likewise, they could seek to assassinate Federal, state and local government officials.

The implications of Iranian or Iranian-sponsored and -motivated attacks on America are potentially severe. For example:

- Such attacks could interfere with local, regional and national transportation systems, slow the production and supply of consumer goods thereby significantly damaging the U.S. economy, and cause other serious societal problems.
- Given the razor-thin margins that separate the majority and minority parties in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, a successful effort to kill or debilitate only a few members of the majority political party could result in the minority party taking effective control of one or both houses. Such a scenario would likely inflame domestic tensions and could result in institutional gridlock that inhibits the ability to pass vital legislation.
- Attacks on airports, sea ports, railways, and military bases could dramatically slow the flow of forces and equipment from the U.S. homeland in support of overseas military operations.
- Cyber attacks could greatly damage various U.S. critical infrastructures and impact the livelihood and well-being of millions of Americans.
- The assassination of President Trump and one or more of his key civilian and military advisors could seriously inhibit national-level decision making.

An inwardly-focused America, forced to respond to a series of debilitating attacks in the homeland, could open the door to overt hostilities against U.S. friends, allies and interests across the globe by Russia, China and/or North Korea. As Russian Federation President Putin, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi, and Democratic People's Republic of Korea Supreme Leader Kim must fully appreciate, the U.S. ability to respond in a timely and effective manner to additional foreign crises or conflicts, while U.S. military forces are heavily engaged in the Mideast and America is reeling from multiple attacks on the homeland, would be severely tested.

To address these real and growing threats, Federal, state and local government organizations, together with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, must act expeditiously to strengthen America's homeland security posture. This includes efforts to rapidly harden critical infrastructures, put in place effective defenses of key assets and facilities against missile, drone and cyber attacks, expand law enforcement operations

against known and suspected Iranian and proxy terrorists, and strengthen intelligence collection and analysis of Iranian and other threats to the homeland. As one analyst noted, this will require surging analytic, operational, and counterintelligence resources back toward the Iran problem set "before intent becomes impact in both the physical world and the digital domain."[30]

The stakes for America could not be higher. While important progress has been made in safeguarding the nation against threats from Tehran and its supporters, more work is needed. It's time to defend the homeland against the clear and present danger posed by Iran and its proxies.

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[30] Shapiro, "The Iran Threat is Already Here."

THE COMING WAR IN AMERICA

The remarks below were delivered at a symposium on "The Coming War in America" hosted by the National Institute for Public Policy on January 20, 2026. The symposium assessed various irregular and often underappreciated threats to the United States posed by malicious foreign actors.

David J. Trachtenberg (moderator)
David J. Trachtenberg is Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy and previously served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Generals and other military officials have often been accused of planning to fight the *last* war, rather than the next, by failing to take into account the unconventional threats and non-traditional challenges that are generally unanticipated, yet are at least equally, if not more, serious and dangerous for U.S. security.

We are sometimes told that intelligence shortcomings that lead to unexpected and catastrophic events reflect a "failure of imagination" – in other words, an inability or unwillingness to look beyond traditional threats and familiar patterns of behavior that lead us to discount the possibility that adversaries may seek unusual, unexpected, and asymmetric means to threaten the United States.

Today's webinar focuses on various asymmetric threats and challenges that some may argue are too remote and unlikely to deserve serious consideration by policy makers, yet are often underappreciated in either their possibility or potential consequence.

Specifically, as I noted in the invitation to this event, today's discussion will focus on various scenarios for attacks on the U.S. homeland by a wide variety of nefarious actors, including nation-states Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, as well as various terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations.

We will examine four plausible scenarios, including: 1) Adversary attempts to influence the outcome of the U.S. national elections in November 2028 through a campaign of targeted political violence and assassinations; 2) Adversary operations to disrupt the U.S. economy, including physical and cyber attacks on U.S. critical infrastructures; 3) Adversary attacks to degrade and delay U.S. munitions production and distribution; and 4) Adversary attacks to disrupt or degrade U.S. national decision making and strategic military operations.

Let me briefly comment on each of these scenarios in turn, before turning the floor over to the other panelists whose expertise in these matters is far greater than my own.

First, the prospect of adversary attempts to influence the outcome of the U.S. national elections in November 2028 through a campaign of targeted political violence and assassinations is not as far-fetched as some may prefer to believe. We have seen adversaries like Russia and China seek to sow political division within the United States whenever possible, using propaganda and downright disinformation. And we have also seen attempts to assassinate American politicians on U.S. soil because of their political views. Moreover, the

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Department of Justice has documented multiple cases of foreign agents plotting assassinations in the United States.[1]

Currently, the nation is highly polarized politically and control of the legislative branch of government is up for grabs in this year's midterm elections. Republican majorities are slim in both the House and Senate. The balance of power could easily shift as a result of violence that swings political control from one party to another. This could also have implications for the 2028 presidential elections.

Second, the vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructures to foreign sabotage that disrupts the U.S. economy is a growing concern. Back in 2014, an attack on an electric power station in California knocked out power around San Jose for nearly a month and raised concerns over a possible link to international terrorism.[2] Physical or cyber attacks that take down the energy grid, for example, can have cascading effects that degrade other critical national infrastructures and cause immense economic hardship.

In addition, the risk of an electromagnetic pulse or EMP attack remains possible. If a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, then the nation's vulnerability to EMP is perhaps one of the weakest links, making it potentially attractive for foreign adversaries who may seek to cripple the United States without necessarily causing immediate mass casualties. The EMP risk to the nation is well known and has been well documented for years,[3] but is often considered a "low probability" risk despite its potential "high consequence" effects. Again, such dismissals may be dangerously short-sighted.

Third, attacks on the defense industrial base may seriously cripple the U.S. ability to defend the nation and American interests abroad. The defense industrial base is already struggling to produce sufficient equipment to ensure that the U.S. armed forces can successfully meet the growing challenges to U.S. security posed by great powers and rogue state actors.

The defense acquisition process is arguably a mess and has not operated at the "speed of relevance" for many years. The Congress has sought to improve it on multiple occasions, most recently by passing the so-called "SPEED Act" in the House to "restructure, streamline, and modernize the Department of Defense's (DoD) acquisition system."[4] And the Trump Administration is seeking to overhaul the defense acquisition process, giving the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment a greater role in managing and overseeing the defense contracting process in ways that streamline bureaucratic

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[1] Ryan Lucas, "Series of recent DOJ cases show foreign operatives plotting assassinations in U.S.," *KPBS Morning Edition*, February 25, 2024, https://www.kpbs.org/news/2024/02/25/series-of-recent-doj-cases-show-foreign-operatives-plotting-assassinations-in-u-s.

[2] Mark Memmott, "Sniper Attack On Calif. Power Station Raises Terrorism Fears," *NPR*, February 5, 2014, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/02/05/272015606/sniper-attack-on-calif-power-station-raises-terrorism-fears.

[3] See, for example, the reports of the congressionally-mandated Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack (aka, the "EMP Commission") at https://www.empcommission.org/.

[4] House Armed Services Committee, "The SPEED Act: A Fundamental Reform of the DoD's Broken Acquisition System," 2026, https://armedservices.house.gov/legislation/the-speed-act.htm.

impediments, improve technological innovation, and reduce procurement timelines.[5] Nevertheless, the prospect of adversary attacks on the defense industrial base intended to degrade and delay the procurement of necessary defense articles should not be discounted.

Finally, critical command and control nodes may also be subjected to enemy attack, resulting in the loss of the defense establishment's ability to put force on target as needed. This includes the nuclear command and control infrastructure and enterprise necessary to ensure the effective functioning of deterrence and to execute employment orders should the need arise. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that foreign actors may seek to disrupt or degrade U.S. national decision making and strategic military operations in multiple ways.

Just recently, it was reported that a Chinese intelligence officer owns two golf courses that just happen to be located on both sides of Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, a key strategic bomber installation and part of the Air Force's Global Strike Command.[6] One can only wonder if golf is the only activity taking place there.

Foreign attempts to influence the direction of American policy or damage the American economy are increasingly worrisome. In November, the Department of Justice announced that Chinese nationals – members of the Chinese Communist Party – were arrested for smuggling a biological pathogen into the United States capable of causing severe illness in humans and crop damage costing billions of dollars.[7] In addition, just last week the Royal United Services Institute, or RUSI, released a report noting:

> Sabotage is a key tool of hybrid warfare – and its use is growing. Since 2022, NATO member states have witnessed a marked increase in hybrid operations that have been attributed to Russian military intelligence. There were three times the number of these attacks in 2024 compared with the previous year: the Center for Strategic and International Studies identified 34 incidents of arson or serious sabotage in 2024, compared with 12 in 2023 and just two in 2022….
>
> Russian sabotage covers a range of activity, from intensive operations such as damaging undersea cables to the barrage of low-level attacks against civilian and military targets. Such low-level attacks… are often carried out by ordinary individuals who are recruited via encrypted messaging apps and paid in cryptocurrency.[8]

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[5] Pat Host, "5 Ways Michael Duffey Is Transforming Defense Acquisition," *ExecutiveGov*, January 8, 2026, https://www.executivegov.com/articles/michael-duffey-pentagon-defense-acquisition-transformation.

[6] Andrew Mark Miller, "National security experts sound alarm over CCP-linked land ownership near US military bases: 'Unthinkable'," *Fox News*, January 8, 2026, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/national-security-experts-sound-alarm-over-ccp-linked-land-ownership-near-us-military-bases-unthinkable.

[7] Department of Justice, United States Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Michigan, *Press Release*, "Chinese National Pleads Guilty and is Sentenced for Smuggling a Dangerous Biological Pathogen into the U.S. While Working at a University of Michigan Laboratory," November 12, 2025, https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/chinese-national-pleads-guilty-and-sentenced-smuggling-dangerous-biological-pathogen.

[8] Kinga Redlowska, Marta Popyk and Tom Keatinge, "Responding to Russian Sabotage Financing," Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), January 14, 2026, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/responding-russian-sabotage-

The report cites examples of arson and attacks on civilian infrastructure; parcel bombs and attacks on logistics chains; reconnaissance and vulnerability testing; the vandalizing of symbolic sites and the shaping of local narratives; and the existence of multi-country sabotage networks. And though it focuses on NATO as a whole, it would be shortsighted to assume that these developments do not affect the United States as well.

The point is, regardless of how seriously decision makers wish to consider these threats, or how unlikely we hope they are, there have been numerous incidents that expose the fragility of American infrastructure and the vulnerability of the American economy, political order, and social systems to external actors and interference. These are not trivial concerns.

All of these issues deserve greater attention than they have received. The United States cannot afford another "failure of imagination" if it is to remain the preeminent military power on the planet and maintain the ability to protect and defend the American people and U.S. national security interests.

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Michaela Dodge
Michaela Dodge is Research Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy.

I am delighted at the opportunity to join my colleagues David and Chris in discussing this intriguing topic. My argument is that Russia already is at war with the West and it is our own lack of political will to call Russia's activities war. Calling Russia's activities "gray zone" operations or "hybrid warfare" gives us a false sense of security. It makes it more difficult to foster support for the necessary defense budget increases we need to deter increasingly revisionist adversaries. Hope is a danger's comforter, and we have been much too extravagant in hoping after the end of the Cold War.[9]

The term "hybrid warfare," defined as a set of activities below the level of armed conflict, is not useful to describe Russia's activities against the West. In fact, the term masks the severity of Moscow's actual actions and distracts the West from pursuing the kind of retaliatory measures that would lead Russia to pull back from its campaign against targets in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states. By evoking the term "hybrid warfare"[10] (or its close euphemisms like "gray zone conflict," "shadow war," or activities "below the level of armed conflict") rather than acknowledging that Russia is, by its own account, at war with the West, gives the impression that the situation is less serious than it actually is.

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financing?oref=d_brief_nl&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=The%20D%20Brief:%20January%2014%2C%202026&utm_term=newsletter_d1_dbrief.

[9] Paraphrase from Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, quoted in Joel A. Schlosser, "'Hope, Danger's Comforter': Thucydides' History and the Politics of Hope," *The Journal of Politics,* Vol. 75, No. 1 (2013), pp. 169, https://repository.brynmawr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=polisci_pubs.

[10] The term originates with the 2006 war in Lebanon. In the context of Russia, it was popularized by Mark Galeotti, who has distanced himself from its contemporary usage. See Lawrence Freedman, "Liberal International Isaiah Berlin Lecture," October 2, 2023, https://liberal-international.org/news-articles/2023-liberal-international-isaiah-berlin-lecture-sir-lawrence-freedman/.

We should see Russia's activities against U.S. allies in Europe as an element of its comprehensive warfare against the West. So far, NATO countries have lacked the political will to impose costs that would dissuade Russia to stop its destructive activities that extend well beyond simply the information sphere. Countering Russia's activities demands a comprehensive response beyond the West's contemporary defensive measures.[11]

Even though Russia's attacks predate its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, just since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow has conducted over 150 operations on NATO territory.[12] Russia's activities range from assassinations and murder attempts, attacks against NATO's infrastructure, to acts of vandalism through people recruited by Russian handlers via social media.[13] Russia is becoming bolder, with its drones violating Polish airspace in September 2025.[14] Poland in cooperation with NATO allies shot down several of these drones.[15] Russia's drones found their way to Romania. The more immediate goal of the campaign is to weaken Europe's support for Ukraine and to disrupt supply chains through which aid for Ukraine flows.[16] Russia also wants to weaken NATO and undermine the political consensus within the Alliance. Moreover, Russia is the prime suspect in several operations that resulted in cuts to undersea power and communication cables that run across the bottom of the Baltic Sea.[17] So far, we have not seen increases in allies' political willingness to impose punitive measures against Russia, even as Russia is causing billions of dollars' worth of damage. This lack of a punitive response virtually guarantees Russia will continue if not escalate its activities.

While these are not direct attacks on the U.S. homeland, at least not yet, Russia's objective has always been to peel off U.S. allies. Other adversaries will perhaps want to cause chaos in the United States. Our critical infrastructure is vulnerable to acts of sabotage, but also consider that too many so called smart electronic appliances are made in China. It would not be that hard for China to pollute this supply and when useful, give the appliances a command to overheat at the same time. There are only so many firefighting stations across major metropolitan areas. Chinese-made technologies are embedded in many European states'

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[11] Keir Giles, "Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of Power," *Chatham House*, March 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/2016-03-russia-new-tools-giles.pdf.

[12] Sophia McGrath, "Spotlight on the Shadow War: Inside Russia's Attacks on NATO Territory," The Helsinki Commission, December 2024, p. 3, https://www.csce.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Spotlight-on-the-Shadow-War-Website.pdf.

[13] Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, "'We are here. Join us.' What the trial of two Wagner Group promoters in Poland reveals about Russia's covert campaign in Europe," *Meduza*, April 11, 2025, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/04/11/we-are-here-join-us.

[14] Alan Charlish, Lidia Kelly and Barbara Erling, "Poland downs drones in its airspace, becoming first NATO member to fire during war in Ukraine," *Reuters*, September 10, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/poland-downs-drones-its-airspace-becoming-first-nato-member-fire-during-war-2025-09-10/.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, *International Security and Estonia*, 2025, p. 56, https://raport.valisluureamet.ee/2025/upload/vla_eng-raport_2025_web-002.pdf.

[17] Arno Van Rensbergen, "Hybrid threats: Russia's shadow war escalates across Europe," *The Parliament*, January 21, 2025, https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/hybrid-threats-russias-shadow-war-escalates-across-europe.

infrastructure. One can easily imagine a scenario of these going dark when Russia decides to invade the Baltic states.

Let me end on a quotation: "If the victim does not understand the game, the loss of a pawn here or a knight there does not worry him. If his thoughts are elsewhere, he does not see the traps set for him by his opponent. If his will to win is insufficient, his strength is gradually eroded until, when the tide of combat goes clearly against him, he discovers too late that the price of defeat is intolerably high."[18]

That is why we should call spade a spade, and take our adversaries' word for it—they are at war with us. This is not a Sunday match between your most and least favorite teams. Using clear language will help sustain support for the increased levels of defense spending. It will help our society to become more resilient in the face of threats, thus strengthening deterrence. Punitive retaliatory actions will drain our adversaries' resources and focus and force tradeoffs they otherwise would not have to make.

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[18] Donald Armstrong, *The Reluctant Warriors* (New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), pp. 180-181.

ASSESSING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

The remarks below were delivered at a symposium on "Assessing the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy" hosted by the National Institute for Public Policy on February 24, 2026. The symposium examined the similarities and differences between the Trump Administration's main security strategy documents and those of prior administrations. It also considered the implications for deterrence, extended deterrence, and allied assurance.

David J. Trachtenberg (moderator)
David J. Trachtenberg is Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy and previously served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

There has already been a great deal of commentary on both the NSS and NDS. Some observers have praised the shift in priorities away from long-standing theaters of interest like Europe and toward greater attention on Western Hemisphere security challenges. Other analysts have criticized the documents for downplaying or downgrading U.S. concerns over what has been previously characterized as the return of great power competition. If nothing else, both strategy documents appear to overturn the longstanding bipartisan tradition that saw significant U.S.-led engagement abroad as necessary to ensure security at home.

Both the NSS and NDS essentially repudiate prior U.S. support for a rules-based international order. Both declare that U.S. allies must bear the brunt of providing for their own security, with only limited U.S. support, casting further doubt on the credibility of U.S. extended security guarantees. And both reject the notion that the United States should seek to spread democracy abroad and engage in what has been derogatorily referred to as "nation building."

These shifts stand in stark contrast to the policies of previous Republican and Democratic administrations. For example, in his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared, "it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. The concerted effort of free nations to promote democracy is a prelude to our enemies' defeat."[1]

Likewise, President Biden declared, "I firmly believe that democracy holds the key to freedom, prosperity, peace, and dignity."[2] Nevertheless, in the 2026 NDS, Secretary Hegseth declared that upholding what he referred to as "cloud-castle abstractions like the rules-based international order" led previous administrations to squander U.S. military

[1] The White House, "President Bush's Second Inaugural Address," January 20, 2005, https://www.npr.org/2005/01/20/4460172/president-bushs-second-inaugural-address#:~:text=President%20Bush's%20Second%20Inaugural%20Address.

[2] The White House, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, March 2021, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-PR-PURL-gpo152456/pdf/GOVPUB-PR-PURL-gpo152456.pdf.

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advantages and that the United States would no longer be "distracted" by what he called "grandiose nation-building projects."[3]

Even the Trump Administration's 2017 NSS acknowledged that "America's commitment to liberty, democracy, and the rule of law serves as an inspiration for those living under tyranny."[4] And the 2018 NDS lamented what it called the "decline in the long-standing rules-based international order," noting that this had created "a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory."[5]

In short, the second Trump Administration's NSS and NDS represent a clean break from the bipartisan sinews of American foreign and national security policy established and reinforced over generations.

In addition, I would suggest that neither the NSS nor the NDS are true strategy documents. A true strategy would explain the relationship between ways, means, and ends—in other words, how goals and objectives will be accomplished. Yet, neither document does so. Both appear to be aspirational in nature. In fact, the NDS says "we will" 67 times in a 24-page document, without explaining *how* we will, or describing what is required to accomplish the laundry list of objectives it highlights.

Of course, a strategy cannot be expected to provide every level of detail regarding the resources and programs necessary to implement it. That will flow from the relevant budget submission and implementation guidance. However, there should at least be some foreshadowing of the necessary tradeoffs to be expected in order to accomplish the strategy's goals.

Finally, let me mention that today is the fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And while both the NSS and NDS refer to "Russia's war in Ukraine" and "Russia's invasion of Ukraine," the strategy documents make clear that America's European allies must "tak[e] the lead in supporting Ukraine's defense."[6]

In short, both the NSS and NDS contain language that its supporters can point to to suggest they reflect a "practical" and "hardnosed realism," while its detractors can point out that our allies receive more criticism than our adversaries, and that the lack of language regarding, for example, the importance of extended deterrence, suggests a retreat from traditional U.S. strategic policies. Clearly, as the NDS explicitly declares, the Trump Administration's current strategy reflects "a sharp shift—in approach, focus, and tone" from the prior strategy documents of previous administrations.[7]

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[3] Department of War, *2026 National Defense Strategy*, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF.

[4] The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017, p. 4, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[5] Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, p. 1, https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/18/2002302061/-1/-1/1/2018-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-SUMMARY.PDF.

[6] Department of War, *2026 National Defense Strategy*, op. cit., p. 11.

[7] Ibid., p. 6.

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Michael Rühle
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George Orwell once said that "If thought can corrupt language, language can also corrupt thought." The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) are two sad cases in point.

Both documents are oddities, in terms of style as well as substance. Because of that, they have been widely criticized, not least because they fail the very basic tests of clearly relating means to ends.[8] Both documents are supposed to explain to the world how the United States views its security environment, and how it wants address the main security challenges. They manage to explain the U.S. determination to better prioritize its international commitments. They also make a strong case for maintaining U.S. dominance throughout the Western hemisphere—even though this marks a radical shift with the hierarchy of regions spelled out in previous documents. For a foreign audience, such statements are important pointers in helping to understand the main drivers of U.S. policies and actions.

Beyond these very basic points, however, both papers confuse more than they enlighten. From the viewpoint of an Atlanticist European, both documents feature certain peculiar characteristics that could result in even more transatlantic disagreements.

The first is *style*. The style of national security documents is usually not an issue. Such documents tend to be anodyne and matter-of-fact, and only the President's foreword may stick out as a bit of lofty partisan propaganda. Neither the drafters nor the readers would expect Pulitzer-winning prose.

However, the NSS and the NDS deviate from established patterns. Their drafters are driven by an urge to tell the world about much more than merely the U.S. view of global security challenges. These documents are also manifestos of the MAGA "Weltanschauung." Hence, they oscillate between matter-of-fact observations and highly ideological rants. Moreover, both are extremely sycophantic, with the NDS mentioning President Trump almost 50 times. If one compares these documents to the 2017 NSS, a cynical observer might even argue that they are an authentic reflection of a President whose second Administration is becoming increasingly unhinged. Put differently, in the case of the NSS and NDS, style is substance.

Second, *threats*. Both documents surprise their readers with their timid language on China and Russia. In the 2017 NSS, both countries were characterized as competitors. Since

[8] See, for example, "Unpacking a Trump Twist of the National Security Strategy," Council on Foreign Relations, December 6, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/articles/unpacking-trump-twist-national-security-strategy. For a critical European view of the NDS, see Rafael Loss, "Disintegrated Deterrence: What Trump's National Defense Strategy means for Europe," European Council on Foreign Relations, January 26, 2026, https://ecfr.eu/article/disintegrated-deterrence-what-trumps-national-defense-strategy-means-for-europe/.

then, China's growing military arsenal and assertive policies, and Russia's war against Ukraine should have led the drafters of the new documents to adopt even more dramatic language. Yet the opposite is the case. Both documents play down the threat. The NDS does not even mention Taiwan, and it treats China largely as an economic opportunity. Russia is characterized as a manageable problem that largely can be left for the European allies to deal with. South Korea carries the main responsibility for deterring North Korea, and Iran's nuclear program has been, in the words of the NDS, "obliterated."

According to both documents, the real security challenges are to be found in the Western Hemisphere, which leads the administration to reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine. However, such a shift in emphasis begs the question why the United States requires the world's strongest military—all the more so since stopping narcotics trafficking and illegal immigration are not predominantly military tasks. In sum, the documents' own logic of prioritization sits uneasily with the demand for ever stronger forces.

The third peculiarity of both documents is the way they deal with *allies*. Both the NSS and the NDS contain harsh criticism of U.S. allies, which appears all the more unexpected since both documents are treading softly on China and Russia. The NSS criticizes Europe for being too lenient on immigration, which could lead to its "civilizational erasure." And the NDS indulges in a rant about allies having systematically screwed the U.S. taxpayer. Even worse, the NDS attacks all previous U.S. administrations for having allowed such allied negligence: "Our political establishment reaped the credit while regular Americans paid the bill." According to the NDS, previous administrations "allowed, even enabled, our cunning adversaries to grow more powerful, even as they encouraged our allies to behave as dependents rather than partners, weakening our alliances and leaving us more vulnerable."

This image of wily European allies and an equally wily U.S. "political establishment" may be intended as yet another nod to the MAGA-narrative, i.e. for domestic consumption. However, the obsession with blaming allies is a recurring theme in both documents. This is all the more worrisome given that President Trump can justifiably claim victory on having gotten NATO allies to spend much more on defense. However, if all that the allies get for shaping up is further criticism, one need not wonder why the term "de-risking" is now being used by Europeans when talking about the United States, and not just about China.[9]

Many reviewers have pointed out that both documents do not envisage an isolationist United States.[10] The NDS, for its part, makes it clear that the United States will continue to play a role in NATO. The recent decisions to increase the European footprint in NATO's command structure points in the right direction. Still, the language in both documents does not inspire confidence that this U.S. administration will have the patience to readjust its multilateral defense relationships in a rational way. The Trump Administration will always be tempted to go for "quick fixes."

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[9] Nicholas Vinocur and Zoya Sheftalovich, Europe begins its slow retreat from US dependence, *Politico*, February 2, 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-begins-retreat-united-states-dependence-donald-trump-rocks-transatlantic-relationship/.

[10] Matthew Kroenig, Two Cheers for the National Security Strategy, *Foreign Policy*, December 11, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/11/national-security-strategy-trump-economic-political-democracy/.

President Trump suddenly arguing that the United States had to "own" Greenland is a case in point. This episode has damaged the transatlantic relationship more than any other incident in the past 70 years. Greenland is featured in the NDS, probably as a last-minute addition to give the President's demands a semblance of strategic logic. However, arguing, as President Trump did at the Davos World Economic Forum, that the United States could not defend Greenland "on a lease" would in effect invalidate the very logic of alliances.[11] While these were the president's personal views, European observers still are left to wonder how the U.S. intends to maintain a constructive relationship with its allies on the Old Continent.

The fourth point concerns the *role of the United States* in the international system. A key tenet of both documents is that, in many parts of the globe, the U.S. can maintain stability largely by playing the "enabler" for allies. This is a sensible assumption, provided that the U.S. definition of "enabler" is not too narrow—and that the opponents play along. However, if one considers Ukraine to be a test case of this approach, it already seems to be failing. By trying to be a detached peace broker, while largely accepting the Russian narrative and putting pressure on Ukraine rather than on Russia, the U.S. administration seems oblivious to the stakes involved. Not only does this approach risk to squander U.S. leverage, it also effectively exposes the clarion call of "peace through strength" as an empty slogan. Russia will not be the only country that might interpret a perceived semi-disengagement of the United States from certain regions as an opportunity to test Western "red lines." That is why the stated intention of the NDS, namely to "maintain favorable balances of power in each of the world's key regions," may ultimately be much harder to achieve than the drafters envisage.

Fifth, *extended nuclear deterrence*. From a European perspective, one of the NDS' most striking features is the absence of any reference to "extended deterrence." The document notes the need to modernize U.S. nuclear forces in light of the growing nuclear threats from Russia and North Korea. China's nuclear program deserved no mention at all. The NDS appears to go out of its way to suppress any notion of China as a nuclear rival, even as it deems it "only prudent for the United States and its allies to be prepared for the possibility that one or more potential opponents might act together in a coordinated or opportunistic fashion across multiple theaters." The "Golden Dome" missile defense system will contribute to America's protection against such perils, but it has no role to play beyond defending the U.S. homeland (and Canada, which in President Trump's words, is one of the many "freebies" received by the ungrateful Northern neighbor).[12]

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[11] "And all we're asking for is to get Greenland, including right title and ownership, because you need the ownership to defend it. You can't defend it on a lease." Transcript: President Trump Delivers an Address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, January 21, 2026, https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/trump-transcripts/transcript-president-trump-delivers-an-address-at-the-world-economic-forum-in-davos-12126.

[12] Ibid.

Shortly after the release of the NDS, senior U.S. Government officials delivered speeches to reassure their allies that extended deterrence would remain untouched.[13] However, it is hard to believe that the omissions in the documents were merely an editorial oversight. Nuclear assurances should have been in the document itself, not in speeches that appear like an afterthought and thus have little traction among European audiences. The same holds true for the observation that the strengthening of nuclear sharing in NATO remains on track. While this is a welcome development, it is overshadowed by the dismissive attitude vis-à-vis allies that is on display in both documents. You don't defend what you resent.

Given the way in which the NDS defines away the Chinese nuclear challenge, however, one can only speculate how extended deterrence would have been handled had it been included in the document. The Trump Administration's rhetoric has led to a nervous debate in Europe about pursuing nuclear independence from Washington. Had the NSS and the NDS treated the delicate issue of extended nuclear deterrence with the same dismissive attitude vis-à-vis the allies that these documents reveal in other areas, the damage might have been even greater. In this perspective, the document's silence on whether and how U.S. nuclear forces relate to the deterrence of threats to Europe may not be the worst outcome. Another barrage of criticism of allies only would have deepened the current crisis, adding an additional sense of urgency to efforts of creating a "Euro Deterrent."[14]

Given their peculiar style and their partly contradictory content, it seems likely that the NSS and the NDS will soon fade into the background. President Trump has shown on many occasions that he is not guided by any document, not even by those produced by his own administration(s). His intuitive leadership style does not follow a script. Hence, while the two documents may offer some insights into the Trump Administration's thinking on certain key security issues, they will soon become "period pieces" of a particularly volatile period of U.S. history, both domestic and foreign. European allies will have little influence over these developments, yet they need to continue to engage with Washington, no matter how difficult. Nothing could be worse than if a disappointed Europe were to turn its back on the United States, thereby foregoing any chance of an eventual transatlantic rapprochement. You do not cancel your lease on the mere suspicion that your landlord will soon cancel it anyway.

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[13] "Thus, for the United States, our responsibility is to be clear, candid, and consistent. We will continue to provide the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. And we will also continue, in a more limited and focused fashion, to provide conventional capabilities that contribute to NATO's defense." Remarks by Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby at the NATO Defense Ministerial, February 12, 2026, https://www.war.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4404801/remarks-by-under-secretary-of-war-for-policy-elbridge-colby-at-the-nato-defense/.

[14] Mind the Deterrence Gap: Assessing Europe's Nuclear Options, Report of the European Nuclear Study Group, February 2026, https://securityconference.org/assets/02_Dokumente/01_Publikationen/2026/ENSG/Mind_the_Deterrence_Gap%E2%80%93Report_of_the_ENSG.pdf).

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Although the Trump Administration failed to mention nuclear weapons proliferation or extended deterrence in the *National Security Strategy* or *National Defense Strategy*, the 2026 Iran war illustrates the importance of these two goals and the critical connection between them.

The United States and Israel have justified the latest bombing of Iran largely as a nuclear nonproliferation operation. Meanwhile, the war and President Trump's threats to "take" Greenland have shaken European and Middle Eastern states' faith in American security collaboration. Reflecting this uncertainty are the public determinations by Poland's prime minister and president, Turkey's foreign minister, and Germany's chancellor that their nations' security may ultimately require acquiring nuclear weapons of their own.

This shouldn't be surprising. Throughout the Cold War, hard-headed Western security analysts and officials understood that among the most reliable nuclear nonproliferation incentives for small and medium-sized Western nations were U.S. security guarantees to defend them if necessary with American nuclear arms. Italy, Germany, South Korea, and Japan all either dropped nuclear weapons programs or consideration of such efforts. At the time, American security assurances seemed credible enough to make it unnecessary for these countries to acquire nuclear arms of their own.

In these cases, nonproliferation strengthened extended deterrence as much as extended deterrence strengthened nonproliferation. By extending deterrence to U.S. security allies in Europe and Asia, Washington dissuaded these states from proliferating. This, in turn, helped persuade their neighbors—Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland—that they had no need to seek a nuclear weapon of their own. Similarly, keeping Taiwan, Iraq, and Iran from going nuclear helped increase the credibility of U.S. security pledges to ANZUS and key Middle Eastern states.

Unfortunately, this strategic logic is no longer fashionable. The United States also is now in the business of promoting "peaceful nuclear energy," domestically and abroad. This includes helping states like Saudi Arabia and South Korea to make nuclear fuel—a process that can bring states to the brink of bomb-making.

America also is enjoying a new enthusiasm for security unilateralism. With enough nuclear weapons and extremely effective air and missile defenses, some argue, the United States can dramatically reduce its extended deterrence commitments and even tolerate a certain amount of "friendly" nuclear proliferation.

Meanwhile, some in the academic world (and others, quietly within policy-making circles) insist that more weapons, at least amongst our allies, might be better. Friendly proliferation, they argue, would allow the United States to spend less on America's closest friends' defense—e.g. for South Korea, Japan, Germany, Poland, Turkey, etc.—and encourage "stability" and mutual deterrence with their adversaries in their respective regions.

Perhaps, but such optimism ignores the harsh realities of the 20th century, where various forms of non-nuclear military and diplomatic deterrence failed catastrophically prior to World War I and World War II. It also ignores the strong, historically demonstrated tendency nations have militarily to preempt their neighbors' efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

All of this suggests that maintaining nonproliferation and extended deterrence is still desirable but now would require attention to a number of nettlesome near-term issues. In specific:

1) *Making sure the Ukraine war is properly resolved*. If peace comes at immense expense to Ukraine, it may weaken America's allies' faith that the United States has their back as well. If so, expect Turkey, Poland, Germany, and perhaps other NATO states, to get nuclear weapons of their own. This will only reduce Washington's agency in foreign and military affairs.
2) *Effectively backing Taipei's defense against Communist Chinese absorption*. Certainly, if Beijing succeeds in its efforts, South Korea, Japan, Australia and others may no longer believe America has their back. If so, expect them to get nuclear weapons of their own as well.
3) *Making America's recent offer of security guarantees to Saudi Arabia and Qatar credible*. Will these states hedge their bets by working with a nuclear-armed Pakistan or possibly a future nuclear-armed Turkey to guarantee their security? Or will some of them—e.g., Saudi Arabia—get nuclear weapons of their own?
4) *Extending deterrence convincingly to Turkey*. Ankara continues to signal that it may go nuclear. Can NATO and the United States neutralize these aspirations?
5) *Keeping Saudi and South Korean demands to make nuclear fuel on their soil at bay.* Will the United States delay making a subsequent arrangement with Saudi Arabia to help it make nuclear fuel? Will President Trump insist that South Korea get its enriched uranium from the United States? If so, neither country will acquire a nuclear weapons option as soon as they might otherwise. If not, just the reverse will be the case. This, in turn, will prompt their neighbors to develop nuclear weapons options of their own and significantly reduce their security reliance on the United States.
6) *Countering Chinese and Russian demands that the United States not deploy nuclear weapons in Asia and Europe*. Both Moscow and Beijing insist that these deployments violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Will Washington have a compelling counterargument or counter proposal?
7) *Assuring America's allies that whatever nuclear weapons testing the United States performs is done in accordance with their desires for some form of nuclear restraint.* All of America's Asian and European allies believe yield-producing nuclear testing would violate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which they've all ratified. If the United States conducts yield-producing nuclear testing, will these allies see this as a snub of their own opinion and yet another argument for not relying on security assurances from Washington?

All of these tactical questions demand attention. Answering them, however, won't be enough. In addition, our government must answer a much larger question: how prepared is our military to wage new generation warfare?

Unlike the air war theory of the 1920s—upon which much of our current strategic concepts are based—new generation warfare contends countries can disable their enemies without physically obliterating them. Instead of threatening the physical decimation of a country's industrial and military complexes and population centers, new generation warfare targets to destroy or temporarily disable critical civilian infrastructure and military nodes essential to wage war. Holding these nodes at risk, along with waging effective information campaigns, would aim to break the will of the enemy's population to fight rather than physically flattening enemy states.

As fraught as new generation warfare may be, it promises to be far less bloody-fisted than air war theory-based strategies and nuclear war. It's unclear, however, if the world will be able to get to this less cataclysmic future. The trick will be to transition to new generation warfare quickly enough that reliance on nuclear threats can be pushed into the background before any nuclear arms are again fired in anger. For this, the world needs to buy more time by promoting sound extended deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies.

Proper development of such policies will require answering two questions. First, under what circumstances might a small-or medium-sized nations' use of nuclear weapons catalyze into a global superpower conflict? Second, which, if any, of these scenarios is a lesser included threat to dealing with Russia or China; which ones are not? My center is now focusing on these questions. Other nonprofits and our government should as well.

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ENDING THE THREAT FROM IRAN: POST-OPERATION EPIC FURY

The remarks below were delivered at a symposium on "Ending the Threat from Iran: Post-Operation Epic Fury" hosted by the National Institute for Public Policy on March 24, 2026. The symposium examined the implications for American, regional, and global security of the U.S. and Israeli military strikes on the Islamic Republic, including the role of advanced missile and drone technology and the value of missile defenses.

David J. Trachtenberg (moderator)
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Some of our panelists today coauthored a study we published last October advocating a new approach to dealing with the Iranian threat.[1] That study is available on our website as an *Information Series*, and called for a new policy that supports the Iranian people in their effort to overcome 47 years of oppression and tyranny, including a U.S. messaging strategy that exposes the regime's corruption and internal repression; American support for the democratic opposition; the application of economic sanctions and other forms of pressure, including sanctioning Iran's oil and gas industry; and using the U.S. military presence to deter and defend against Iranian military provocations.

Iran's nuclear program, its ballistic missile program, its use of proxies to attack U.S. and allied interests, and its support for terrorism worldwide have posed significant challenges. Last June, Operation Midnight Hammer dealt a devastating blow to the Iranian nuclear program and contributed to a significant weakening of the Iranian regime's geostrategic ambitions, including its support to terrorist proxies. More recently, the regime has been said to be weaker than at any time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, though that has not stopped it from brutally suppressing domestic protests.

Operation Epic Fury, and Israel's Operation Roaring Lion resulted in the decapitation of much of Iran's ruling leadership, the destruction of much of its residual nuclear capability, significant degradation of the regime's conventional armed forces, including its Navy, and the undermining of Iran's ability to foster and support terrorism in the region and around the world. Epic Fury also sought to end the regime's brutality and oppression of its own people and to create opportunities for a new direction and a complete transformation of the Middle East dynamic.

The conflict has also reinforced the value of missile defenses in protecting societies against the devastating consequences of missile attacks. In addition, Israel's directed energy system—the Iron Beam—was reportedly employed for the first time in combat against

[1] Robert Joseph, Joseph DeTrani, Keith Payne, David Shedd, and Robert Torriceli, "Ending the Threat from Iran," *Information Series*, No. 638 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, October 1, 2025), https://nipp.org/information_series/robert-joseph-joseph-detrani-keith-payne-david-shedd-and-robert-torriceli-ending-the-threat-from-iran-issue-no-638-october-1-2025/.

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Hezbollah strikes from the north and demonstrated the potential utility of directed energy technology in countering drones and small unmanned vehicles, though some have argued that its success has been exaggerated.[2]

And while the United States and Israel have conducted thousands of strikes against more than 7,000 Iranian targets, Iran has also demonstrated the ability to continue fighting and launching missile attacks not only against Israel but against U.S. bases and civilian infrastructure and targets in various Gulf states, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. In a first, Iran reportedly launched two intermediate-range ballistic missiles at Diego Garcia, demonstrating its ability to reach European capitals.[3] Iran has also sought to close the vital Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping, leading to reluctance on the part of shippers to transit the Strait and causing global instability in oil and gas prices.

More than three weeks into Operation Epic Fury, despite the death of Ayatollah Khamenei and many of the regime's leaders, Iran's clerical theocracy remains defiant, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps continues to control the nation's internal and external power structure, the Iranian military continues to launch missile attacks and is unwilling to capitulate, and the popular uprising that was hoped for to overthrow the ruling regime has yet to materialize. President Trump recently stated that the United States would postpone striking Iranian energy sources,[4] declaring that he is considering "winding down" the war as the United States accomplishes its military objectives.[5]

Although Iran's military capabilities and support for its terrorist proxies have been weakened, important questions remain over whether air strikes alone can successfully bring about regime change; whether the Iranian people feel sufficiently empowered to take back their country after 47 years of oppression; whether and how the United States and its allies will support any such uprising; and whether Iran's existing stockpile of enriched nuclear material can be recovered and removed safely. In addition, the conflict raises broader questions about the prospect of nuclear proliferation in the region and elsewhere, as well as shifting political alignments and the future orientation of the greater Middle East.

In light of this, it seems a question worth addressing today is this: Is a cessation of hostilities and a declaration of victory post-Operation Epic Fury sufficient to end the threat from Iran?

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[2] Assaf Gilead, "Iron Beam's limits exposed as Hezbollah drones breach northern Israel's skies," *The Jerusalem Post*, March 12, 2026, https://www.jpost.com/defense-and-tech/article-889677.

[3] Francine Wolfisz and Elizabeth Ivens, "Europe Missile Fears: London, Paris and Berlin ALL 'under threat' from Iranian missiles after Tehran's mullahs 'use space rocket' to target British base on Diego Garcia - as experts warn the regime may have been 'serially underestimated'," *Daily Mail*, March 21, 2026, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-15667165/Iran-missiles-hit-Europe-experts-fear-Diego-Garcia.html?ito=conservative-news.

[4] "Trump says US and Iran in talks after he postpones strikes on power plants," *CNN*, March 23, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-23-26.

[5] Sareen Habeshian, "Trump says he is considering 'winding down' Iran war," *BBC*, March 21, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpd5l00z7n6o.

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When the Iran conflict broke out, like many others, I gave multiple interviews during the first week. In almost every case, there were three questions. The first was what comes next. My answer was that, in the days and perhaps weeks ahead, President Trump has made clear his determination to achieve the stated military objectives of the operation, Epic Fury:

1. To end the ballistic missile threat.
2. To eliminate the naval threat, especially to the Strait of Hormuz.
3. To end the regime's support to terrorist proxies.
4. And to foreclose permanently the pathway to a nuclear weapon.

The President also talked about the need for regime change—not by American boots on the ground but by the Iranian people. Recognizing the people's right to self-determination, he explicitly called for the people to take over the government and promised support.

The second question concerned the justification for American strikes against the regime. Here, my response was twofold. In my view, President Trump was fully justified in using force against Iran. The regime has been at war with the United States since its inception. It has murdered thousands of Americans from Beirut to Iraq and Afghanistan. It has used its terrorist proxies to kill Americans and our allies throughout the region and beyond. Murder and violence are in the DNA of the regime.

Perhaps even more important, the pursuit of nuclear weapons is also in the DNA of the regime. As for the imminence of the threat, the crude attempt to coerce U.S. negotiators by claiming possession of enough 60 percent enriched uranium for eleven nuclear bombs, settles the debate because the last step in enrichment to weapons grade can be measured in days.

For over 20 years, negotiations failed to end the nuclear threat. President Trump sought a diplomatic outcome but, unlike his predecessors, he rejected appeasement and insisted on an effective agreement that would guarantee an end to Iran's nuclear program. The regime rejected the offer, and gave every indication that it was determined to reconstitute its enrichment program, the unmistakable path to a nuclear weapon.

The third question was always who can lead Iran to a democratic, non-nuclear future? The son of the deposed Shah has shown himself to be quite skilled at public relations and self-promotion, despite having little, if any following inside Iran. To me, it is a wonder that any credence would be given to the prospect of reestablishing a discredited monarchy. Remember that the 1979 revolution was aimed at the overthrow of another corrupt and brutal regime—his father. President Trump has taken the measure of the man and has indicated that someone with the support of the people inside Iran should be the next leader. And he is right.

There is an organization that can meet the challenges ahead. And no doubt there are major challenges that will require resolve, capability, and more sacrifices. The NCRI/MEK has the vision, the organization, and the dedicated resistance units on the ground to fight and prevail over the regime.

Now, as the fourth week of military operations against Iran begins, the questions have changed. With such impressive military achievements already accomplished, the first question being asked by the media, and some U.S. leaders, is why hasn't Iran surrendered? The answer, it seems to me, is obvious: surrender means the end of the religious dictatorship to which its most ardent supporters remain bound by ideology and personal riches gained from decades of corruption. More importantly, it also means the exile and, in many cases, the likely death of its remaining leadership. While severely hurting on all fronts and more disparate than at any time since it seized power, the regime places survival above all other concerns. It has no intention of surrendering.

To succeed, it intends to play the same waiting game that succeeded against the French in Algeria, and against the United States in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The strategy is twofold. Externally, increase the pressure on President Trump, primarily by cutting off the oil supply, until he declares victory and withdraws, leaving in place the remaining elements of the regime. And internally, by brutally repressing any sign of dissent or protest. The public executions of the young champion wrestler and two other young men are a deadly warning to all Iranian citizens.

The most important question for the regime is can it hold onto power long enough to outlast President Trump and before the Iranian people rise up again as they did this past January? Closing the Strait of Hormuz and attacking the oil facilities of its Gulf neighbors put both economic and political pressure on the president.

Pain at the gas pump and the precipitous decline in the stock market are causing many Americans to ask when will this war end. Before the conflict, the president repeatedly cited the drop in oil prices and the rise of the market as major wins. No doubt he wants those days to return. And with the midterms coming in November, pressure can only grow. In Trump's view, if either house is won by the Trump-hating Democrats, he will face constant investigations and impeachments. The regime understands the potency of the pressure its actions are placing on the president.

Victory for the regime is simple: when the conflict ends, if it remains in power in any form, it has won. Undoubtedly, there would be strong threats from President Trump that any attempt by Iran to reconstitute its nuclear or missile programs, or to continue its support to its terrorist proxies, or to again close the Strait will be met with severe military responses. But those threats remain credible only as long as President Trump remains in office.

With the next Democrat president, U.S. policy will almost certainly revert to appeasement, the same mistaken policies that created the situation that President Trump inherited from his predecessor. In time, and likely not much time, the regime will be able to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone force and its other military capabilities. It will be able to rebuild its terrorist proxies, and it will resume its 47-year war against the Great Satan.

At home, it will continue its brutal repression with even more thousands of arrests, torture and executions. There will be two important differences based on the lessons of its military defeat. First, Iran must have a nuclear weapon to deter future attacks, to coerce its neighbors, and to prevent adversaries from encouraging and supporting its people to overthrow the regime. And second, it can use its new power to disrupt the global economy. Both are in the very DNA of the regime's leaders, both dead and alive.

The most important question is whether President Trump will finish the job of ending the regime after all the military objectives have been met. For the president, this has rightly never been about regime change by invasion and occupation. Also rightly, he has called for regime change by the Iranian people, the first and foremost victims of the regime.

But revolutions are messy things and seldom unfold in a single predictable direction. They most often take time and sacrifice. While there are signs of the regime fracturing, the full-scale uprising such as witnessed in January when over 30,000 demonstrators were murdered has not yet occurred, perhaps because of the intensity of the bombing. But we know most of the Iranian people want freedom and democracy and are ready to pay the price. Will the United States have the patience and resolve to support them, and thereby achieve our most important national security goals, or will we face the same religious dictatorship in the future, more determined to kill Americans and armed with nuclear weapons?

Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz observed that wars are won or lost based on military prowess and the resolve of leadership. There is no question that the United States has the advantage in capability. Who has the advantage in resolve is yet to be determined.

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Joseph DeTrani
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For the past 47 years, Iran has killed Americans, Iranians and others, while pursuing a nuclear weapons program and building ballistic missiles to deliver nuclear and conventional weapons, all without consequences. Iran viewed the United States for these 47 years as a paper tiger.

Iran killed Americans—and others: In April 1983, Iran, working with its proxy Hezbollah, blew up the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63, of which 17 were Americans. In October 1983, Iran trained and financed the bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Americans and 58 French paratroopers. In June 1996, Iran financed and trained terrorists who bombed the U.S. Air Force housing complex in Dharan, Saudi Arabia killing 19 and injuring over one hundred. Sanctions were imposed that Iran skirted. There were no other consequences.

Iran killed thousands of its own citizens: The 2009 Green Movement with over 100 killed; the 2022 brutal killing of Mahsa Amini for wearing her head scarf improperly, inciting

demonstrations that killed 478 in the "Women, Life, Liberty" protests; and the February 2026 protests demanding an end to clerical rule and economic distress for the people, with the regime killing over 30,000 protesters.

Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons until 2003, according to a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate. That expertise, however, remained in an Iran that was enriching uranium at the 20 percent level and, recently, at the 60 percent purity level, weeks away from the 90 percent level required for nuclear weapons. Moreover, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement with Iran simply delayed the program, conceding that Iran would eventually be permitted to fabricate nuclear weapons. Moreover, through the years, IAEA monitors were denied access to suspect nuclear sites in Iran—at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan.

Iran had an impressive ballistic missile program. Decades ago, Iran received short-range SCUD ballistic missiles and technology from North Korea. Over the years, their short- and medium-range missiles have developed into a potent and sophisticated arsenal of missiles that can target the region and parts of Western Europe. Said missiles use solid fuel, hypersonics, and advanced guidance capabilities. Iran is also working on their long-range missiles that can target the United States and Europe.

Finally, after 47 years, the United States and Israel attacked Iran's nuclear sites in June 2025—at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. And in February 2026, the United States and Israel attacked the whole of Iran, in an effort to remove an evil leadership that killed Americans, Iranians and others, while pursuing nuclear weapons—to destroy Israel and the United States—and ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons of mass destruction.

The United States and Israel should persist with the war until a new government is installed in Tehran that eschews terrorism, ceases to pursue nuclear weapons, and ends its ballistic missile programs—a government that cares for the Iranian people.

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Shmuel Bar

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The main "domestic event" of the Iranian theatre is the death and replacement of the leaders who were killed in the first bombings of the war and in subsequent actions. The formal constitutional process stipulated that a new Supreme Leader is appointed by the Experts Council and until then the country is managed temporarily by a "triumvirate" which consists of the president (Masoud Pezeshkian); the chief justice of the Supreme Court (Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei); and a member of the Guardian Council (Ayatollah Alireza Arafi). None of these, though, truly represent "kingmakers"; they are formal rubber stamps for the decisions made by the real "kingmakers"—the IRGC.

The election of Ali Khamenei's son Mojtaba Khamenei as successor (March 8) may not have been the "election" of a live and functioning person, or the decision of factions in the IRGC who chose to appoint a "virtual" Supreme Leader, under whose "auspices" they could manage the country. Aside from the fact that he may be not alive or not functioning, his candidacy as successor was, in the past, handicapped by the fact that the very idea of a father-son succession (reminiscent of a "monarchial" Shah-like system) was anathema to both the religious elite and the ideologically "orthodox" elements in the IRGC. However, Mojtaba Khamenei was closely affiliated with major elements in the IRGC, which are the more aggressive and militarily activist of the organization. His "election", therefore, reflected the upper hand of that faction.

The Iranian regime, therefore, has metamorphosed from leadership by "Islamic-credentialed" clerics to a classic "praetorian regime" ruled by military officers and guided by their own organizational and economic interests. The IRGC predominance guides Iran away from some level of practical prudence and religious constraints that restrained Ali Khamenei towards a more radical and confrontational "Iranian Nationalist" approach. The willingness to "break the rules" and to confront the Arab Gulf states, much of the Muslim world and Europe may be linked to this shift. This faction will view concessions to the current U.S. demands (nuclear, missiles, proxies, Hormuz, subversion, terrorism) as unacceptable "capitulation." Moreover, the fact that the regime decided to ignore all its traditional constraints in regard to its neighbours demonstrates how it views the current war as a true "Armageddon" for its very existence.

Along with the "virtual" Supreme Leader, additional figures have emerged as "negotiators" with the United States. The two main figures are Majles Speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and the new head of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr. Both are IRGC veterans and hardliners and may have played an important role in the "election" of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader. The source of their authority to hold these negotiations, though, is not clear. They, of course, claim to have their authority from the new "Supreme Leader" but in order to make any strategic decisions, need the agreement of the key figures in the IRGC leadership. The extent of their authority to make concessions therefore may vary according to the balance of power in the struggle between the different IRGC factions and between themselves. The decision after the 12-Day War to adopt a "Mosaic doctrine" that allows local commanders and units freedom of operation will also make any agreement difficult to enforce.

The Iranian domestic theatre remains dormant until the end of the actual bombing. This reflects mainly the natural "instinct" of civilians to keep out of war zones (and streets) during hostilities. In the light of the weakening of the IRGC and Basij forces, and the interests of the Arab Gulf states to weaken the current Iranian regime even more, the local opposition and ethnic elements (Kurds, Azeris, Baluchis, Arabs) are likely to take advantage of the situation. The economic situation and the massive killing of civilians are likely to precipitate this. The regime will further focus on survival, extreme means, and could precipitate a new crisis. The possibility that Iran will tear at the seams is not far-fetched. Even countries that have been ruled centrally for ages have fallen apart. In any case, no matter what President Trump

decides in the short range, the war has created a fundamental change in the region. If the United States neutralizes the Iranian threat, it will have enhanced its position in the region and, due to its control over the export of oil from the Arab (no longer Persian) Gulf, will have new leverage over China, leaving Russia, again, a "superpower" with no "super powers" to aid its valuable allies.

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Ilan Beman
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As the Iran conflict has progressed, a great deal of speculation has taken hold both in Washington and beyond. One pervasive narrative has been that the Iranian regime is winning, and that the United States should pack up and go home. That conclusion, though fundamentally flawed, is rooted in a key political question that as yet remains unanswered by the Trump Administration: what, precisely, is its "theory of victory"?

At the operational level, the military plans outlined by officials like Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Brad Cooper are comprehensive, systematic and progressing well. However, at the political level, the end state of the conflict remains considerably murkier as a result of erratic official messaging. That tension helps explain the degree of turbulence we have all observed in the media environment in recent weeks.

Defining an acceptable end state, though, depends on several variables.

The first is the need to situate the current conflict within a proper global context. There is a persistent temptation to understand the Iran war as a strictly bilateral affair. However, it is not, because recent years have seen a clear convergence between Iran and other members of what has been called the "axis of upheaval," including the Communist Party of China, Vladimir Putin's Russia, the Kim dynasty in North Korea, and (until recently) the Maduro regime in Venezuela. These actors have been cooperating extensively across multiple domains in recent years, ranging from economic coordination to military exercises to disinformation. Current developments in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, and the disposition of the Iranian regime writ large, therefore have a direct bearing on the cohesiveness of this broader axis.

In Washington, there has been a heated debate in recent months regarding this construct. Some have argued that the contemporary threats posed by Russia, China and Iran represent distinct problem sets that should be addressed separately. However, recent developments (such as the ouster of Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro) suggest that where it matters, in the Oval Office itself, there is an emerging view that these threats should be addressed as part of a cohesive whole. This, in turn, has implications for how success is defined in the context of Iran—because the U.S. campaign will need to be prosecuted in a way that diminishes not only Iran but the Islamic Republic's strategic partners as well.

The second variable is the Iranian opposition. The Iranian opposition "wave" is highly varied, and can be understood to be made up of two wings: an internal opposition that has

engaged in cycles of protest with increasing frequency, and an external opposition consisting of more organized groups, including the NCRI and supporters of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. For both, however, the present moment is "do or die." There may indeed be a signal for the Iranian people to come out and reclaim their country in coming days, as President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu have pledged. However, there remains the possibility that such mobilization does not occur at all—or doesn't take place in sufficient fashion to change the situation on the ground in a fundamental way. This, in turn, would lead the United States to conclude that it has no alternative but to hammer out a deal with the remnants of the current regime in Tehran.

The third variable is the extent to which the conflict constitutes an information war. Iran, with assistance from its strategic partners in Moscow and Beijing, has demonstrated the capacity to isolate its domestic population from the outside world, as well as to significantly manipulate perceptions in the West. This has had the effect of eroding the appetite for continued conflict among publics in Europe and the United States. The contemporary media environment, characterized by immediacy and impatience, only serves to reinforce this dynamic, with major effects. Expectations of rapid results could contribute to declining support for sustained military operations—something that only benefits Iran and its allies.

The fourth variable concerns the range of possible outcomes to the current conflict. The optimal one, from the U.S. standpoint, would involve a fundamentally changed Iran that transitions back to being a reliable American ally (as the country was pre-1979). However, a range of political and economic factors—including domestic electoral considerations and the influence of energy markets—may result in movement by the Trump Administration toward a tactical compromise with a residual regime before that happens. Such an outcome, in turn, would leave the current regime intact without fundamental change, despite indications that a significant portion of the Iranian population opposes the Islamic Republic.

This scenario would generate two dynamics. First, it would greatly increase the likelihood of future cycles of protest—since a military regime run by the IRGC or some other remnant of the Islamic Republic would be rejected by the population at large. Second, it would create incentives for the United States to make concessions to Tehran, because the regime is cognizant of its lack of legitimacy at home and therefore will naturally seek to reinforce its position vis-à-vis its domestic population. Indeed, this dynamic is reflected in the Iranian government's current, maximalist demands toward the United States.

At the same time, Iran has pursued an external strategy of applying pressure to American allies in the Gulf in an effort to influence the scope of military operations. This approach has proven to be a double-edged sword, however. Rather than constraining U.S. freedom of action, it has contributed to increasing pressure on it from regional governments, including Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, to further dismantle and degrade the Iranian regime.

This dynamic underscores the importance of erecting a durable assurance architecture in the region. Prior discussions of a Middle East Security Alliance (MESA), as well as a Middle East Missile Defense Alliance, reflected recognition on the part of past administrations that America's Mideast partners face continued direct exposure to the Iranian threat. These

efforts, however, have remained mostly conceptual in nature. What is needed now, therefore, is greater focus on the part of the United States on things like integrated air defenses and stepped-up maritime security arrangements. The stakes here are high. The manner in which the conflict concludes, particularly if the regime remains intact in some form, will have significant implications for both the regional threat environment and the durability of America's alliance structure in the region.

In this sense, the conflict should be understood not only in terms of its immediate objectives, but also in terms of its broader implications for global competition and regional order.

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CYBER THREATS AND THE NEW *CYBER STRATEGY FOR AMERICA*

The remarks below were delivered at a symposium on "Cyber Threats and the New Cyber Strategy for America*" hosted by the National Institute for Public Policy on April 29, 2026. The symposium examined the growing threat of cyber warfare, the difficulties of attribution, and how the United States and allies should respond to cyber attacks. It also assessed the recently released March 2026 White House* Cyber Strategy for America *and how it compares and contrasts to previous cyber strategies, including the Biden Administration's 2023* National Cybersecurity Strategy *and the first Trump Administration's 2018* National Cyber Strategy*.*

David J. Trachtenberg (moderator)
David J. Trachtenberg is Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy and previously served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Cyber threats have become an inescapable part of the strategic environment and the landscape of the 21st century battlefield. And cyber security is more important today than ever before. I doubt there is anyone on this call who has not been affected in one way or another by cyber intrusions or hacking by malicious actors. Data breaches, phishing attempts, malware, ransomware, and other dangerous and destructive behaviors are now a growing part of the contemporary electronic information space.

They are also a tool for adversaries like Russia and China to use against the United States, its allies, and partners. For example, Ukraine's government, financial, and energy sectors, as well as satellite networks, have been targeted by Russian cyber attacks.[1] And the head of U.S. Cyber Command testified yesterday that foreign adversaries will likely try to interfere in this year's midterm elections.[2]

As a recent report noted, cyber attacks against U.S. critical infrastructures—presumably by pro-Iranian groups—have increased in number and severity in the wake of Operation Epic Fury. In March, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority was breached, leading officials to shut down a part of its control network.[3]

Last week, the Chairman of the House Cyber, Information Technologies, and Innovation Subcommittee noted increased cyber targeting of telecommunications and other critical U.S. infrastructures. He also highlighted U.S. efforts to address these concerns, including growth

[1] Antony J. Blinken, Press Statement, "Attribution of Russia's Malicious Cyber Activity Against Ukraine," Department of State, May 10, 2022, https://2021-2025.state.gov/attribution-of-russias-malicious-cyber-activity-against-ukraine/.

[2] Martin Matishak, "Cyber Command, NSA chief warns foreign adversaries likely to target midterms," *Recorded Future News* (*The Record)*, April 28, 2026, https://therecord.media/cyber-command-nsa-chief-midterm-election-threat.

[3] Chris Teale, "Pro-Iran hackers appear to increase critical infrastructure cyberattacks," *Defense One*, April 17, 2026, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2026/04/iran-hackers-infrastructure-cyberattacks/412941/.

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in the DoD Cyber Mission Force and establishment of an Assistant Secretary for Cyber Policy.[4]

Last month, the White House released *President Trump's Cyber Strategy for America*, which called for "unprecedented coordination across government and the private sector" and for making "the most of America's cyber capabilities for both offensive and defensive missions."[5] Along with the release of the cyber strategy, the president signed an Executive Order on "Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens."[6] And the National Cyber Director recently stated that President Trump is expected to sign additional Executive Orders on cyber security in the near future.[7]

The unclassified strategy is only 4 pages long (excluding the president's cover letter) and does not name any adversaries that are known to engage in cyber warfare. This is a departure from the 2018 *National Cyber Strategy*, which stated, "Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea all use cyberspace as a means to challenge the United States, its allies, and partners, often with a recklessness they would never consider in other domains."[8] It lists six "pillars of action" intended to: shape adversary behavior; streamline regulations; modernize government networks; secure critical infrastructure; sustain American technological superiority; and build talent in the cyber workforce.

Some of these pillars seemingly align with the 2018 strategy and the five pillars of the Biden Administration's 2023 *National Cybersecurity Strategy*, which also prioritized defending critical U.S. infrastructure and disrupting adversary cyber threats. While the Biden *National Cybersecurity Strategy* superseded the 2018 *National Cyber Strategy* issued by the first Trump Administration, it acknowledged "continue[d] momentum on many of its [the Trump Administration's] priorities…."[9]

The 2023 *National Cybersecurity Strategy* and the *2024 Report on the Cybersecurity Posture of the United States* also suggested the need to deal with cyber threats by working with and strengthening the resilience of allies and partners—a theme only tangentially referenced in the new 2026 *Cyber Strategy*. While noting that "Defending cyberspace and safeguarding freedom is a collective effort," the 2026 strategy asserts that "the distribution

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[4] Opening Statement of Rep. Don Bacon (R-NE), "Bacon: We're in a New Era of Cyber Warfare," House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies, and Innovation, Hearing on the Cyber Posture of the Department of Defense, April 21, 2026, https://armedservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=6527.

[5] The White House, *President Trump's Cyber Strategy for America*, March 2026, p. 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/president-trumps-cyber-strategy-for-america.pdf.

[6] The White House, Executive Order on "Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens," March 6, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/03/combating-cybercrime-fraud-and-predatory-schemes-against-american-citizens/.

[7] David Dimolfetta, "Expect more cybersecurity executive orders soon, national cyber director says," *NextGov/FCW*, April 15, 2026, https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2026/04/expect-more-cybersecurity-executive-orders-soon-national-cyber-director-says/412861/?oref=ng-author-river.

[8] The White House, *National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2018, p. 2, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf.

[9] The White House, *National Cybersecurity Strategy*, March 2023, p. 6, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf.

of cost and responsibility must be fair across the U.S. and allies who share our democratic values."[10]

In addition, although the 2026 strategy states that the United States "will deploy the full suite of U.S. government defensive and offensive cyber operations,"[11] it is left to the reader to imagine when, how, against whom, and under what circumstances offensive cyber operations will be considered or employed, though recent U.S. actions in Venezuela and Iran may provide a hint. On the other hand, despite its economy of words, the document does telegraph a forward-leaning approach, declaring that the United States will act "proactively" to counter cyber threats and "will not confine our responses to the 'cyber' realm."[12]

Of course, a strategy document cannot be expected to outline every detail on how the strategy will be implemented. But it should at least suggest how the administration will seek to align means with ends. By contrast, the 2024 report included a list of three dozen implementation initiatives and the agencies responsible for implementing them. How the 2026 strategy will be implemented, however, remains to be seen; though reportedly there is a classified implementation plan.[13]

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Mathew Ferren
***Matthew Ferren is an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and previously served at the Office of the National Cyber Director, where he contributed to the 2023* National Cybersecurity Strategy.**

Thank you for the invitation. It is a privilege to be here.

The 2026 *National Cybersecurity Strategy* is more of a vision statement than a strategy. It sets out high-level aspirations, but offers little clarity on how to achieve them. A strategy is supposed to align clear end states with the resources and authorities required to reach them, organized around specific lines of effort. By that standard, the document falls short.

To some extent, the brevity is intentional. The administration has signaled that specific executive actions, such as the recent executive order on cybercrime, will follow and give the strategy operational content. That is a reasonable approach in principle. In practice, set against the cuts to United States cyber agencies and the absence of strong leadership at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, there is little reason to expect that the follow-on actions will add up to significant progress. That is a problem, because the threat landscape is getting worse.

The strategy does not name China as the most significant cyber threat the United States faces. That omission is concerning because China is the only true strategic threat we face.

[10] The White House, *President Trump's Cyber Strategy for America*, op. cit., p. 5.

[11] Ibid., p. 4.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Emily Harding, "What Does the New Cyber Strategy Really Mean?," Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 9, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-new-cyber-strategy-really-mean.

That is not to diminish the capabilities of Russia, Iran, and North Korea, or the very real consequences of ransomware and other cybercriminal activity, but they are not strategic threats in the same sense. They are economic and operational problems. China is the only adversary capable of using its advantages in cyberspace to generate cross-domain leverage that can alter or constrain U.S. decision-making. The strategy does not need to include a detailed threat analysis, which is better suited for the Annual Threat Assessment and other classified products. It does need to convey awareness of the nature and magnitude of the challenge, and this one does not.

The strategy's central move is to treat cyber offense as the principal tool of cyber defense. I do not think that approach will be sufficient, particularly against China, for three reasons.

First, the primary constraint on scaling offensive cyber operations is not political will, legal restrictions, or interagency process. It is access. Operations require time and persistent access to adversary networks to develop capabilities and produce effects. China is a hard target. It is not impenetrable, but Chinese authorities take cybersecurity seriously, and gaining and holding access to systems of consequence is difficult. Demanding that U.S. Cyber Command increase its operational tempo will not automatically deliver high-impact outcomes.

What it will deliver is one of two undesirable results. Either operators generate churn to demonstrate activity, with little tangible effect on adversary campaigns, or they take risks that compromise infrastructure, expose tradecraft, and degrade their ability to execute in the future. Better use of private sector partners and artificial intelligence may help at the margins, but neither changes the underlying constraint.

Second, the strategy does not articulate a clear strategic objective or end state. China's cyber apparatus is enormous. Between the People's Liberation Army, the Ministry of State Security, and the private sector contractors that enable both, the country can reconstitute operations and infrastructure faster than the United States can disrupt them. We are not going to stop Chinese cyber activity through offensive operations. At best, U.S. offensive operations buy time to make the structural changes and long-term investments that would actually improve U.S. security.

The trouble is that this strategy walks back many of the regulatory and market-shaping measures the previous administration was trying to use to drive those structural changes. The 2023 strategy treated critical infrastructure cybersecurity as a market failure: businesses will not invest up to the level required for national security and public safety, and government intervention is therefore necessary. It pursued that intervention along several lines at once. Sector-specific, outcome-oriented regulations, paired with regulatory harmonization where necessary. Software liability reform to shift responsibility upstream, toward the vendors that produce insecure code, and away from the downstream operators least able to fix it. Procurement requirements, product labeling, insurance, and utility-rate mechanisms to mobilize private capital toward security investment. The 2026 strategy retains the harmonization piece, recast as deregulation, and abandons the rest. We cannot play whack-a-mole forever and call it a strategy.

Third, U.S. military cyber operators have a growing responsibility to support conventional military operations, and the strategy's emphasis on persistent engagement risks crowding out that mission. We have already seen cyber and other non-kinetic capabilities employed in operations in Venezuela and against Iran. This is what modern warfare looks like.

Doing the same against China would be considerably harder. Chinese networks are hard to penetrate, and it is capable of doing to U.S. command and control, weapons systems, and civilian infrastructure what we would seek to do to its own. The priority for U.S. military cyber forces should be protecting U.S. command and control and weapons platforms against adversary disruption. The second is using cyber capabilities, alongside other non-kinetic effects, to enable joint fires and maneuver. Both require sustained investment in planning, exercising, and capability development today, for the peer conflict we may face tomorrow. If we over-prioritize persistent engagement against ongoing intrusions, we will not make those investments.

Strategies are ultimately about hard choices, coordination, and execution. This one looks for an easy button in cyber offense and avoids the costly investments in security and resilience that real progress would require. Even where the strategy does identify the right priorities, it is not clear that the Office of the National Cyber Director, as currently resourced and positioned, can drive the coordination across the interagency that implementation would demand. That was a hard problem under the previous administration, with a confirmed director and a fully staffed office. It is harder now. A serious strategy would name the threat, accept the limits of offense, and commit to the structural work that the United States has been deferring for a decade. This document does not do that. The follow-on executive actions may yet improve the picture. I would not count on it.

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Annie Fixler
Annie Fixler is Director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Thanks, David, for convening this group today. I'm glad to bat clean-up, which means I'll hit on some points again that you heard from Mark and Matt and raise a couple additional ideas for our audience's consideration.

First, I have to admit something embarrassing—I've never seen Clint Eastwood's *The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly*. I blame my parents. But still I'm going to use that framing to talk about the *National Cyber Strategy*. As with all administration's cyber strategies, there is some good, some bad, and some ugly.

The Good

First the good. The strategy is focused on action. "Pillars of Action" to be precise. David went over these, but let's list them again. They are:

1) Shape Adversary Behavior
2) Promote Common Sense Regulation
3) Modernize and Secure Federal Government Networks
4) Secure Critical Infrastructure
5) Sustain Superiority in Critical and Emerging Technologies
6) Build Talent and Capacity

I'd challenge anyone to say that these are not good priority action areas. Let's go through them briefly pillar by pillar.

Within the first pillar of shaping adversary behavior, the strategy articulates that this requires both better defense and better offense. Of particular note, the strategy pledges not only to disrupt and defeat adversarial activities but degrade the capabilities of our adversaries to launch attacks. I think we focus too heavily on detecting, mitigating, and defeating attacks themselves. That is, we have to do that too, but why stop there? Shouldn't we be actively undermining not just individual attacks but the capability of our adversaries to conduct attacks at all?

The strategy also uses this type of language to talk about criminal actors. We need to—and now I'm quoting—"uproot criminal infrastructure."

In pillar two, it rightfully notes that too much of cybersecurity has become a series of compliance checklists disconnected from actual security or resilience.

Pillar three—modernize and secure federal government networks—might simply be restated as "Doctor, heal thyself."

In pillar four, I particularly appreciate the statement that "we must be able to recover quickly." For many of us in the cyber policy community, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission's March 2020 report remains a touchstone. So let me paraphrase that report. Planning—and practicing—to ensure a quick recovery after an attack is necessary to demonstrate to our adversaries that we will survive and defeat them; that if they hit us, we will stand back up and punch back harder.

Pillar five—the prioritization of emerging technologies, particularly AI and Quantum—is vital. The intelligence community's annual threat assessment came out about a week after the *National Cyber Strategy*. Others can check my math, but I believe this was the first threat assessment that included an entire section devoted to technological challenges. Other assessments had cyber sections. This one had a cyber section but also a technology section where the assessment noted—and again, I'm quoting—"Leadership in emerging technologies is increasingly defining global power and influence."

The last pillar, pillar six of the strategy, prioritizes America's cyber workforce, calling it "an asset worthy of great investment and essential to our nation's economic prosperity and

security." America's cyber workforce is essential to each of the pillars of the strategy. Cyber and technology are fundamentally people problems. They are man-made problems with man-made solutions.

The Bad

But the strategy is not all good.

It is decisive. Across just four pages of text, the strategy uses the phrase "we will" 45 times. And yet, I'm not convinced it ever quite articulates the goal. The strategy talks about the importance of cyberspace to achieving American economic, technological, and military leadership. It affirms that President Trump will defend U.S. interests in cyberspace and punish adversaries for threatening those interests. But what is the affirmative statement of what we want to achieve?

The Biden Administration's strategy explicitly stated a goal. It read, "Our goal is a defensible, resilient digital ecosystem where it is costlier to attack systems than defend them, where sensitive or private information is secure and protected, and where neither incidents nor errors cascade into catastrophic, systemic consequences."

The Trump Administration's strategy never states a goal. Not to get too philosophical, but if a man knows not to which port he sails, no wind is favorable.

But even though the strategy doesn't expressly state it, I think we all understand that this president's goal might simply be to win in cyberspace. What that means is that we will be stronger than and prevail over our adversaries.

The bigger problem with the strategy—as everyone has mentioned—is that it doesn't actually articulate who those adversaries are. Across the *National Security Strategy*, *National Defense Strategy*, and now the *National Cyber Strategy*, it seems this administration cannot articulate precisely who the bad guys are.

The Ugly

But now comes the really ugly part. It is not clear that the Trump Administration has any of the capabilities necessary to implement its strategy. Over the past year, the Trump Administration has systematically stripped away many of the federal government's cyber capabilities and so, I'm left responding to each of the administration's declarative statements about what it will do with the retort, "oh yeah? You and what army?"

But let's dig into the specifics so we can see how ugly the situation truly is.

I'm going to start with pillar four—secure critical infrastructure—because it is near and dear to my heart.

Securing critical infrastructure is fundamentally an issue of public-private collaboration. The private sector owns and operates the infrastructure. The federal government cannot unilaterally secure that which it does not operate—and frankly, does not really know how to operate. What it must do is provide owners and operators the information, tools, and—sometimes—resources they need to secure themselves.

Over the past year, the administration has gutted the mechanisms of public-private collaboration.

Here are a couple acronyms to throw at you—First, CIPAC—the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council. When the Trump Administration assumed office, they purged advisory councils across the federal government. This is standard stuff. The new guy gets rid of people the old guy appointed and then appoints his own people. The problem is, the Trump Administration hasn't appointed new people.

Actually, the real problem is that CIPAC wasn't like other advisory councils. It was more than an advisory council. It was the convening authority that allowed sector coordinating councils—industry groups of specific critical infrastructure sectors—to come together and talk to the government about risks and threats without anti-trust or Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) concerns.

Another acronym: CISA 2015. Not CISA the agency but CISA the law. That is, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act. The law provided protections for sharing cyber threat information with the government. But it expired in September 2025, and has been limping along with temporary, short-term extensions since then. Technically, this is Congress' fault, not the administration's, but if the administration cares about public-private collaboration, it would work with Congress to get this done.

Let's talk about securing federal government networks. While all departments have their own CISOs and CIOs, the federal agency responsible for the cybersecurity of the ".gov" domain is CISA, the agency—the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The Trump Administration has repeatedly attempted to slash the agency's budget. Last year, the president's budget called for a half billion-dollar reduction. This year, they asked for a $700 million cut. If Congress agrees, this would put CISA's budget at the level it was back in 2021, undoing years of growth and development of the agency.

How do we sustain U.S. leadership in emerging technology when we've fired or forced out technology experts across the federal government? Over the past few years, the federal government has rapidly hired technology experts. But using expedited processes meant that these experts were probationary employees, which was one of the first groups of federal employees that the administration targeted with workforce cuts. One metric to keep in mind: the federal government has a Center on AI Standards and Innovation. It has about 20 full-time staff. Britain's equivalent organization has about 200. It is hard to advance policies that foster U.S. innovation and encourage federal uptake of technology if you have very few technologists in government.

I could keep going. I'm concerned about the restructuring of cyber capabilities within the State Department. Three years ago, Congress consolidated what was then disparate cyber, technology, and digital infrastructure expertise into a single Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy to work with partners and allies to secure their information and communication infrastructure, promote cyber norms that align with U.S. interests and security, and thwart U.S. adversaries. This past summer, as part of its reorganization of the department writ large, the Trump Administration reverted back to a situation of fractured and siloed expertise.

Ultimately, the problem with the administration's *National Cyber Strategy* seems to be that while it mostly says the right things—minus of course the inability to call out our adversaries by name—it is intent on ignoring the lessons of the past five years and relearning how to work with the private sector and resource itself appropriately for the fight in cyberspace.

I'll end on that somewhat somber note but look forward to the discussion and questions.

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Edward N. Luttwak and Eithan Shamir, *The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the Israel Defense Forces* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2023), 288 pp.

In their masterful book, *The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the Israel Defense Forces*, authors Edward N. Luttwak and Eithan Shamir trace the origins of the culture of innovation within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). If necessity is the mother of invention, and innovations proved necessary given how outgunned and outnumbered the Jewish state found itself in 1948, it does not make Israel's culture of innovation any less impressive.

The authors, well-versed in the IDF's culture from first-hand experience, discuss several factors that have contributed to Israel's agile and bureaucratically lean system of military research, development, and procurement that other countries might envy. Initially, Israel had to build its forces from scratch while being invaded by numerically and technologically superior Arab armies. At the time, the economy and the small number of people in Israel could not support a professional standing army, and so was born the reserve-centric organization of the IDF that prevails to this day. That most Israelis have military experience (military service is mandatory for large parts of population, including women) continues to be a powerful source of innovation, because general familiarity with practical problems that IDF faces inspires solutions that might save brothers and sisters, friends, and neighbors. Shared experience and contacts also make a wider acceptance of particularly well thought-through solutions to such problems easier to implement on a broad scale (personal contacts reign supreme).

The scarcity of people and resources has forced innovation to counter Israel's ever-present threats, including under conditions of an arms embargo in the first decade after Israel' founding. The IDF had to be comfortable with taking risks in its research, development, and deployment decisions that would be intolerable in other militaries. The forces have not had the luxury to spend time practicing proper salutes or parade-ground drills, contributing to the IDF's informal culture. Yet, as the book convincingly illustrates, the IDF learned that the pay offs of risk-taking and making the IDF more approachable have vastly outweighed the occasional setbacks of high-risk taking strategies.

The recent short development and deployment time of the Iron Dome system, some two years from the proper contract for a "technology demonstrator" to the first operational deployment in 2011, would be unthinkable in the United States. The government's risk-averse bureaucracy (or bureaucracies as the case might be) usually slows down the system development to the point of components being obsolete by the time the system gets closer to the deployment phase. This obsolescence leads to further delays in the system's development. Moreover, U.S. strategic depth allows the nation the luxury of "admiring problems" for extended periods of time rather than solving them as a matter of existential priority.

The IDF began as and continues to be a one-service military, and includes land, air, and naval forces. The IDF's relatively young and lean officer corps enables bottom-up innovation;

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Israel's difficult omnipresent adversaries require it if the Jewish state is to prevail. Lean officer corps discourages micromanagement; there simply aren't enough hours in the day and enough people to generate the kind of detailed orders that border on micromanagement and impede bottom-up thinking and discourage initiatives. Specialized teams come together to solve specific problems and disband when they are successful, even though their *esprit de corps* continues to shape the IDF.

The ever-present theme in the IDF's ability to innovate is its continued effort to assess, analyze, and learn from failure, processes quintessential for innovation. One cannot but feel discouraged thinking about the U.S. inability to learn from its national security failures, and repeating similar mistakes several times over. A worsening threat environment could end up catching up with the U.S. lackadaisical approach to its weapon development, hopefully not before it is impossible to prevail. The book is a must-read for any national security practitioners wanting to do better before it is too late.

Reviewed by Michaela Dodge
National Institute for Public Policy

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Herman Pirchner, Jr. and Ilan Berman, *The New Imperialists: How China, Russia and Iran are trying to remake the world,* American Foreign Policy Council (Estes Park, CO: Armin Lear Press, Inc., 2025), 112 pp.

The United States today faces a dangerous consortium of adversaries, acting independently and in concert, to undermine American security and global interests. This consortium, often referred to as an "Axis of Authoritarians," consists primarily of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Understanding the historical and cultural roots that motivate the aggressive behavior of these state actors is the first step toward developing sound American foreign and national security policies that can effectively deter and counter their malicious machinations.

The New Imperialists serves this purpose. Written by two of the foremost experts in the field—Herman Pirchner, the founding President of the American Foreign Policy Council, and Ilan Berman, Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council—the book clearly and comprehensively explains the worldviews of these authoritarian powers and how their histories influence the behavior of these anti-Western regimes.

Pirchner and Berman are on solid ground when describing what motivates the imperial drives of the Chinese and Russian leaderships. They note that "No other country in the world can match China's thousand-year history of imperialism," citing Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as an effort by China "to establish an empire of dependence with itself at the center." Indeed, although BRI now encompasses agreements with more than 140 countries, some countries that have been lured into the BRI debt trap have had second thoughts about the wisdom of ceding sovereignty or control over critical national infrastructures to China and expanding Chinese investments in their national economies. For example, both Italy and

the Philippines withdrew from BRI in 2023, and India and Brazil have expressed reservations about joining.

With respect to Russia, the authors note that "Moscow's continued embrace of imperial ideology is unique among Europe's major powers," and characterize Russia's aggressive moves against some of its former Soviet republics as evidence of a "reinvigorated drive for a Greater Slavic State." Moscow's "informational onslaught" has not only been directed against former Soviet republics such as Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova, but has also sought to undermine the sovereignty of and increase Russian influence in NATO states such as Poland, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.

Iran is also described as having "an Islamist impulse for expansion" with the Ayatollah Khomeini's 1979 revolution codifying a "religious-based imperialism." The authors explain Tehran's use of proxy forces and other means of influence to dominate several Middle East countries, including Syria and Iraq. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have also been under pressure from Iran. And Qatar is described as "a geopolitical and geoeconomic captive of the Islamic Republic." The historical background presented by the authors succinctly explains the rationale for Iran's moves to impinge on the sovereignty of its Gulf neighbors, its support for destabilizing proxy forces in the region, the malign intentions of the clerical Islamic leadership, and the desire to establish what is essentially a *Pax Irannica* in the region.

Despite the valuable historical and cultural contexts that underpin the authors' assessments of the dangerous activities of these authoritarian regimes, occasionally real-world events change the geo-strategic landscape in unanticipated ways. Since the book's publication, Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Epic Fury (along with Israel's Operation Roaring Lion) decapitated much of the Iranian leadership and decimated Iran's military capabilities. Yet, concerns over the future direction of the Islamic Republic remain, as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei was apparently replaced by his son, another staunch anti-Western Islamicist; the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) remains the dominant power center in the country; and the hoped for popular uprising to restore democracy has, at the time of this writing, yet to materialize.

The New Imperialists also assesses the role of "fellow travelers" North Korea and Venezuela in supporting Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran's efforts to diminish U.S. global influence and create a world order decidedly in their favor. While North Korea remains solidly in the "Axis of Authoritarians," the capture and extradition to the United States of Nicolas Maduro and the changes in Venezuela since the success of Operation Absolute Resolve and the application of the "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine may alter the dynamic of Venezuela's relationship with the United States, lessen Venezuela's imperial appetite for much of neighboring Guyana, and diminish, if not eliminate, Caracas' efforts to align with the anti-democratic forces seeking to overturn American primacy in world affairs.

Despite these recent changes in the geo-strategic landscape, the authors draw conclusions that are of enduring value for deterring aggression against U.S. interests. They correctly note that "The United States today faces the most complex deterrence challenge since the Cold War" and that successful deterrence "depends not only on raw military strength but on whether that power is believed to be useable and sustainable." They also

argue that America's global alliances provide the United States with its "greatest asymmetric advantage," though they properly call for greater burden sharing among allies, asserting that Europe remains "dangerously reliant on American leadership and material." Finally, they argue that the United States "will need to tailor its strategies to the unique political, cultural, and military contexts of each of today's potential adversaries in order to shape their "internal political calculations." This tailored deterrence approach is perhaps the most significant and insightful recommendation that flows from the authors' analysis.

To implement such a strategy, *The New Imperialists* recommends common sense actions, including adopting a "whole-of-nation" approach to deterrence, including mobilizing the U.S. defense industrial base and reversing the drastic decline in U.S. public diplomacy and messaging to counter adversary disinformation. It is not too late to push back against the coordinated efforts of America's adversaries, but time is growing short.

Pirchner and Berman have performed a public service in clearly explaining the imperialist tendencies of America's most pernicious adversaries and what must be done to counter them. Hopefully, their analysis and the recommendations that flow from it will not fall on deaf ears.

Reviewed by David J. Trachtenberg
National Institute for Public Policy

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The Documentation Section includes Assistant Secretary of War (ND-CBD) Robert Kadlec's statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Hearing on Fiscal Year 2027 Strategic Forces Posture. Next, the section provides select excerpts from the recent testimony of U.S. Strategic Command Commander Admiral Richard Correll. The testimony outlines the Strategic Command's priorities and discusses adversaries' threat developments. The third feature is excerpts from the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, the intelligence community's consensus agreement on threats to U.S. homeland and interests around the world. The 2026 assessment lists transnational organized crime as the top threat to U.S. homeland, warns of modernization of other states' nuclear weapons, and discusses region-specific threats. The fourth document is a statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Christopher Yeaw, to the Conference on Disarmament from February 2026, in which he discusses the future of arms control and provides more information on China's nuclear testing.

Document No. 1. Statement by Dr. Robert Kadlec, Assistant Secretary of War (ND-CBD), Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Hearing on Fiscal Year 2027 Strategic Forces Posture, March 17, 2026.

U.S. strategy is at a critical inflection point, driven by a confluence of stark realities. First and foremost, China's strategic nuclear breakout means we now face the unprecedented challenge of deterring two nuclear peers, China and Russia, simultaneously. This is not a distant problem; it is the central, organizing challenge for our defense strategy today. Compounding this external pressure are two other factors: the immense budgetary, industrial, and programmatic strains of modernizing all three legs of our nuclear triad and its command and control at once, and the expiration of the New START Treaty this past February.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) correctly identifies this new, more dangerous environment. My purpose today is to outline how our nuclear posture must be adapted to support that strategy. The reality is that our nuclear forces, while foundational, are not a panacea. They are a necessary but insufficient component of a defense strategy focused on denial. Our primary goal must be to convince adversaries—first and foremost the People's Republic of China (China)—that they cannot succeed in using military force to achieve their objectives. Our nuclear posture must be a credible backstop to that denial strategy, not a substitute for it.

We must be rigorously clear-eyed about the threats we face. China represents the most significant and comprehensive challenge to U.S. national security. China is engaged in the most rapid and opaque nuclear expansion in history. In 2020, the Department assessed China's stockpile of operational nuclear warheads as being in the low 200s. Today it exceeds 600, and is on track to surpass 1,000 by 2030, with capabilities enabling the majority ng to reach the U.S. Homeland. This nuclear buildup is coupled with a massive investment in theater-range delivery systems, like the DF-26, designed to hold U.S. forces and allies and partners at risk in the Indo-Pacific region. The purpose of this expansion is clear: to create a

strategic shield behind which the People's Liberation Army can conduct regional aggression, particularly against Taiwan. A force of this size and sophistication provides China with a spectrum of nuclear options to try to deter U.S. intervention and coerce a resolution to a conflict on China's terms.

Russia remains a formidable nuclear power with the world's largest arsenal and a doctrine that explicitly integrates nuclear weapons for regional coercion. Its ongoing modernization and development of novel systems, like Poseidon and Burevestnik, underscore its continued reliance on nuclear forces to offset conventional weaknesses. While the primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe must rest with our wealthy and capable European allies, the U.S. nuclear extended deterrence provides a critical backstop. This cannot, however, be the primary solution for European security. A credible deterrent in Europe requires a robust, in-theater conventional denial force, fielded overwhelmingly by the Europeans themselves.

We must now plan for the concrete possibility of coordinated or opportunistic aggression across multiple theaters. An American focus on a crisis in the Indo-Pacific region could be seen by Russia as an opportunity in Europe, just as a crisis in Europe could be seen as an opportunity for China. Our force structure, posture, and nuclear strategy must be robust enough to deter both peers simultaneously, even if we were to be engaged in a major conventional conflict with one. This does not mean we must match their combined arsenals warhead for warhead. It means we require a nuclear force sufficient to inflict unacceptable costs on both adversaries under any contingency, ensuring neither believes they can exploit a crisis elsewhere for their own gain.

We must never be left vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. It is the Department's responsibility to provide the President with a credible nuclear strategy to defend our vital interests and the forces to support it. This means we require a strong and effective nuclear arsenal adapted to the nation's overall defense strategy. This arsenal must enable a strategy to deter nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks on the American homeland. This is important not only for deterring aggression but also to provide the President options to favorably manage escalation and achieve other objectives in the event of a conflict across the globe. For too long, America's nuclear strategy has been considered a separate, almost theological, enterprise. Now, our nuclear strategy must be coherently and rigorously integrated into our overall defense strategy.

Our nuclear strategy, therefore, must be subordinate to and supportive of our overall defense strategy. The NDS rightly prioritizes defending the Homeland and deterring China. The most effective way to do so is through a strategy of denial—convincing an adversary that their military aggression will fail to achieve its objectives. In the Indo-Pacific, this means fielding a conventional force, alongside our allies and partners, capable of deterring a conflict in the region, ideally by preserving military overmatch. The role of our nuclear arsenal in this context is not to fight and win a nuclear war, but to deter China from escalating to the nuclear level in the first place, or from believing it can use its nuclear arsenal to coerce us into accepting a *fait accompli*. Our nuclear forces must provide the President with credible options to manage escalation, demonstrating that any nuclear use will be met with a

response that leaves the adversary worse off. This requires a flexible and modern nuclear posture.

A solvent defense strategy also requires our allies and partners to carry their fair share of the conventional burden. U.S. nuclear extended deterrence is a powerful enabler of this, providing our allies in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific region the security backstop they need to invest in their own conventional denial capabilities. But it must be a backstop, not a crutch. In the Indo-Pacific region, allies like the Republic of Korea and Japan must take the lead in building the conventional forces needed to deny regional aggression. Our nuclear umbrella makes it possible for them to do so without pursuing their own nuclear arsenals, but it does not absolve them of the primary responsibility for their own defense.

President Trump's "Golden Dome for America" initiative is a vital complement to our deterrent posture. It is not a replacement for our offensive nuclear forces. By strengthening our defense against missile attack, we demonstrate that coercion will fail, strengthening the President's hand in a crisis. Deterrence by denial (through missile defense) and deterrence by punishment (through nuclear response) are two sides of the same coin.

To execute our strategy, modernization programs are not optional; they are an urgent necessity. The transition from our legacy systems to a modernized triad occurs during a period of maximum geopolitical risk. There is no room for error. We must accelerate the Sentinel ICBM, the COLUMBIA-class submarine, and the B-21 bomber with its LRSO cruise missile. Critically, we must also field flexible, theater-range nuclear options. The SLCM-N is essential. It provides a persistent, survivable, and non-strategic nuclear presence in key regions, reducing reliance on land-based assets and providing the President with a credible deterrent against limited nuclear use. It is a vital tool for managing escalation in a conflict with a peer competitor.

We are entering a new, more dangerous era. The luxury of assuming a single major adversary is gone. The NDS provides a sound framework for this new reality, but a strategy is only as good as the will and resources committed to its execution. The cost of modernizing our nuclear deterrent and fielding the conventional forces to support a denial strategy is significant. But the cost of failing to do so is incalculably greater. Congress's continued support is essential to ensuring we have the deterrent we need to protect our nation and its interests.

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Document No. 2. Statement of Richard A. Correll, Commander, United States Strategic Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on Strategic Forces, March 17, 2020 (select excerpts)

[…] The People's Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the Islamic Republic of Iran are seeking to undermine global and regional balances of power while strengthening ties and collaboration. […] Technological advances in artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), autonomous systems,

quantum communications, and quantum sensors are reshaping the character of war. Evolving threat vectors—cyber, a contested electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), counter-U.S. space capabilities, novel missile systems, and supply chain challenges—continue to impact our decision calculus and planning practices. The development of nuclear weapons with smaller yields, improved precision, and increased range increases strategic ambiguity and the possibility for coercive use by potential adversaries.

People's Republic of China

[…] The People's Liberation Army (PLA) seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multi-megaton yields. China has now surpassed 600 deliverable nuclear warheads and is forecasted to have more than 1,000 by 2030.

The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) continues to expand its silo-based ICBM force, including construction of 320 silos for the solid-fueled CSS-10 (DF-31) and up to 50 silos for the liquid-fueled CSS-4 (DF-5). The PLARF is also fielding additional mobile CSS-10 (DF-31) and CSS-20 (DF-41) ICBMs capable of targeting the continental United States.

The PLA Navy's (PLAN) sea-based nuclear deterrent consists of six JIN-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The PLAN's JIN-class SSBNs are each equipped to carry up to 12 JL-2 (CSS-N-14s) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) or the newer JL-3 (CSS-N-20) SLBMs—capable of targeting the continental United States.

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is operationally fielding refuellable H-6N bombers, capable of carrying a nuclear air-launched ballistic missile. The PLAAF is also developing a strategic stealth bomber, the H-20, which may debut sometime in the next decade. […]

PLA senior leaders also recognize the evolving EMS landscape, seeking rapid maturation of PLA electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO), in scale and sophistication, tailored to contest U.S. EMS superiority in the future operational environment. Over the last two decades, the PLAAF has almost doubled its dedicated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)/electromagnetic warfare (EW) aircraft inventory with newer and fully operational jamming platforms.

China's continued endeavors to challenge U.S. global posture and presence has also expanded into the space domain with increasing offensive space capabilities, including a concentrated effort to undermine U.S. NC3 capabilities. These efforts include direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons capable of destroying satellites in orbit and advanced jamming technologies aimed at disrupting encrypted satellite communication links.

Russian Federation

Moscow views its nuclear weapons program as the cornerstone of Russian sovereignty and its military doctrine allows for nuclear use and signaling to manage perceived existential nuclear and conventional threats, to forestall theater defeat, and to compel an end to conflict on terms acceptable to Russia—the most recent example is employing nuclear coercion in the war in Ukraine. […] Russia's nuclear warhead arsenal consists of approximately 4,600 nuclear warheads; 2,600 are intended for its strategic triad and up to 2,000 are warheads intended for theater nuclear weapons not accounted for under the now expired New START Treaty.

Russia's Strategic Rocket Force maintains a mix of road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs. […] Russia announced the successful test of a delivery system in October 2025, the SSC-X-9 Skyfall, a nuclear-powered vehicle capable of delivering a nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missile. This system could enable strikes on North American targets via unconventional and challenging-to-defend attack vectors.

The naval component of Russia's nuclear triad consists of 10 SSBNs under the operational control of the Naval High Command. This fleet includes Delta IV-class submarines armed with SS-N-23 SLBMs and the more advanced, quieter Dolgorukiy I- and II-class submarines equipped with SS-N-32 SLBMs. While Russia's SSBN modernization program has faced delays, it remains on track to be completed by the early 2030s. In addition to its SSBN fleet, Moscow is developing—and recently tested—the Poseidon, a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed underwater vehicle representing a unique and unconventional delivery system designed to devastate coastal areas.

Russia is also modernizing the Long-Range Aviation fleets of Tu-95 Bear-H and Tu-160 Blackjack primary strategic bombers. Upgrades aim to equip the bombers with more advanced cruise missiles, longer ranges, and extended operational lifespans. Additionally, Moscow has announced plans to resume production of Tu-160 bombers and complete development of a next-generation strategic bomber, designated PAK-DA, within the next decade.

Russia's war in Ukraine highlights the critical role EMS plays in modern warfare, particularly the need for resilient communications, ISR, and navigation in a protracted and spectrum-contested conflict. Moscow's forces have developed new EW capabilities to test and adapt its tactics, techniques, and procedures intended to achieve warfighting advantage. […]

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The DPRK continues to view its nuclear weapons program as the guarantor of state security and regime survival. Pyongyang is focused on improving its capabilities to strike the U.S.

Homeland with nuclear warheads and is pursuing novel capabilities, such as underwater drones, while increasing its stockpile of weapons grade uranium and plutonium in support of its nuclear program. Since 2016, Pyongyang has displayed three separate nuclear warhead designs, including a purported 5-kiloton warhead suitable for use with numerous systems—likely optimized for theater employment.

[…] In October 2025, North Korea displayed the solid-propellant Hwasong-20, reportedly its most powerful ICBM system to date. Solid propellant systems are easier to maintain and can be launched on short notice with little to no indications and warning, reducing the time window for response. The DPRK also displayed possible hypersonic glide vehicles intended to avoid ballistic missile defenses. Recognizing shortfalls in its conventional military capability, Pyongyang's asymmetric military strategy also includes EW as a key component, primarily focused on disrupting enemy communications and navigation systems, with recurring global positioning system (GPS) signal jamming used against South Korean civilian and military targets.

Growing Relations Between Adversaries

In September 2025, China's President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un appeared together publicly during a military parade in Beijing. This high-profile meeting suggests a shared ambition to reshape the global balance of power. Despite underlying tensions and divergent national interest amongst these nation-states, each sees advantage in challenging post-Cold War security arrangements and countering U.S. interests abroad. The United States and its allies must be prepared for the possibility that one or more potential opponents might act together in a coordinated or opportunistic fashion across multiple theaters.

China has sought to preserve its close ties with Russia while promoting its own image as a responsible great power, projecting public "neutrality" in the Russo-Ukrainian War while economically enabling Russia's war efforts. China also remains one of North Korea's principal supporters. In its December 2025 National Security White Paper, China omitted its long-standing policy request for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. […]

The June 2024 Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang highlights this growing relationship; Russia gains munitions and manpower for the war in Ukraine, while North Korea gains financial inflows and potentially technology in support of its nuclear and missile programs. Tehran is also contributing to the war in Ukraine by supplying Moscow with armed drones and short-range ballistic missiles, facilitating reconstitution of Russia's conventional forces. […]

DETERRENCE—STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

[…] JEMSO [Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations], a critical enabler, ensures spectrum superiority and supports the integration of strategic capabilities across all domains. Together with the ongoing modernization of the NC3 enterprise, these efforts reinforce the United States' ability to defend the Homeland, deter aggression, assure allies and partners, and hold adversaries at risk anytime and anyplace to achieve Presidential objectives if deterrence fails. […]

Land-Based Triad Component

[…] The Minuteman III (MMIII) missile was initially deployed over 50 years ago with a planned 10-year service life. It continues to achieve a 98% Mission Capable rate with missiles on alert 24/7/365. Increasing sustainment and maintenance costs continue as defense industry partners contend with obsolete parts, aging support equipment, and a reduction in specialized manufacturing capabilities.

Sentinel development and deployment remain top priorities for the Air Force and USSTRATCOM. Every opportunity is being explored to expedite Sentinel program deliverables. The forthcoming Milestone B recertification (scheduled for not later than 2026) will provide a more concrete deployment timeline. […] Any further delay to the Sentinel program will have cascading negative impacts across the triad, driving increased risk to strategic deterrence. […]

Sea-Based Triad Component

The sea-leg is the most survivable leg of the triad, representing 70% of our Nation's day-to-day nuclear capabilities and providing a credible assured second-strike capability. […] On-time delivery of the COLUMBIA-class and Trident II D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) remains a top priority to sustain U.S. dominance in the sea-based strategic deterrence capability. […]

The COLUMBIA-class SSBN will incorporate numerous advancements, including a life-of-hull reactor, electric drive propulsion, significant acoustic improvements, and state-of-the-art combat control systems, delivering unparalleled operational capabilities to ensure our SSBN fleet maintains its strategic advantage in the undersea domain. The COLUMBIA-class remains one of USSTRATCOM's highest priorities and will achieve its first strategic deterrent patrol no later than 2031. The Navy is assessing potential opportunities to recover schedule in post-delivery activities to meet USSTRATCOM's required initial operational capability, and continued submarine industrial base investment remains vital to meeting the demand of the COLUMBIA-class as it enters full rate serial production.

Sustaining acoustic superiority in the undersea domain through the transition from OHIO- to COLUMBIA-class submarines and beyond necessitates investment in advanced large vertical arrays, cutting-edge materials science, coatings, continued regular modernization of the tactical SSBN combat system, and other initiatives within the Acoustic Superiority Program. The Integrated Undersea Surveillance System and its planned recapitalization efforts deliver real-time intelligence on submarine and surface ship operations, allowing Combatant Commanders to strategically position forces to support deterrence patrols and combat operations.

Air-Based Triad Component

[…] In 2025, our Bomber Task Force (BTF) demonstrated its global reach with over 243 days of overseas presence, conducting more than 100 missions in partnership with all CCMDs [Combatant Commands], integrating with 27 ally and partner nations. The demand for bomber support continues to strain the fleet, presenting maintenance and aircrew challenges that will not be cured solely by the future B-21. The continued funding of bomber modernization programs and improving critical parts availability will be critical to ensuring a capable long-range strike bomber fleet that will deter potential adversaries and assure our allies and partners. […]

The Air Force is modernizing the B-1B with new weapons and improving its networking capabilities for seamless integration in a joint, all-domain environment while simultaneously ensuring the B-2 remains operationally relevant with upgrades to radar absorbent materials, weapons integration capabilities, multi-function displays, GPS reception, and communication systems. Sustainment remains essential to maintaining a favorable conventional military balance until the B-21 achieves operational mass; depot throughput, parts funding, and aircrew retention directly affect near-term deterrent credibility.

The B-21 will serve as the premier long-range penetrating bomber and command and communications enabler. Fielding success depends on early investment in installation infrastructure, workforce development, and nuclear certification resourcing at operational Wings. The B-21's open architecture will allow for rapid integration of new technologies and capabilities, ensuring it remains at the forefront of long-range strike airpower for decades to come. The current program of record (POR) calls for 100 B-21 bombers; however, last year, USSTRATCOM, along with other Combatant Commanders, advocated to continue assessing the POR to meet global warfighting demands. We continue to work with the Air Force and the DoW [Department of War] on assessments to determine the final procurement quantity.

While upgrades extended its service life, the AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missile is approaching obsolescence. To maintain our strategic advantage, we must deliver the AGM-181 Long Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon, a modern replacement of the nuclear air-launched cruise missile with greater targeting flexibility and enhanced capability to penetrate

defended areas. […] Compared to other nuclear modernization efforts, the LRSO program has consistently met its milestones and has been on track to meet planned delivery dates.

Our bombers rely on tankers; the tanker fleet serves as the foundation of our air-based global strike capabilities. Across the Joint Force, CCMD demand for these global reach assets is increasing. The declining availability of the aging KC-135 requires the acceleration of tanker modernization and recapitalization. Increasing connectivity and survivability are paramount, and USSTRATCOM fully supports Air Mobility Command's efforts with the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center to certify the KC-46 for nuclear operations.

Nuclear Command, Control, And Communications (NC3) Enterprise

[…] Pursuant to the DoW's initiative to cultivate an "AI-first" workforce, AI and ML are now integral to USSTRATCOM's mission, enabling the analysis and interpretation of vast data streams. […]

We are also integrating Golden Dome for America (GDA) into USSTRATCOM's deterrence and Homeland defense posture by strengthening strategic capability, reinforcing nuclear command and control, and advancing a layered defense architecture. Other key focus areas for USSTRATCOM include the Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC), E-130J Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) recapitalization, replacement of the E-6B Airborne Command Post (LOOKING GLASS), resilient satellite communications, survivable missile warning and tracking systems, ground-based NC3 components, securing cyberspace data processes, and harnessing AI, ML [machine learning], and other leading-edge technologies to enhance operational effectiveness.

Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO)

[…] USSTRATCOM integrates JEMSO explicitly into long-range strike mission planning and low-observable employment to elevate bomber survivability in contested EM environments. In 2024, USSTRATCOM coordinated with the Under Secretary of War for Intelligence & Security and the intelligence community to focus on potential adversary use of the EMS to ensure we have a comprehensive understanding of the threat. Subsequently, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise established a new Complex Analytic Issue for EMSO to increase analysis of potential adversary EMS-dependent systems, emerging threats to the EMS, and development of countermeasures.

Integrated Planning and Operations

[…] The ELITE CONSTELLATION 25 (EC25) Campaign, the first iteration of a Joint Staff-led fiscal year (FY) 2024-2027 initiative, provided a critical platform to enhance Joint Force warfighting capabilities. Conducted in partnership with eight other CCMDs, interagency

partners, allies, and partner nations, EC25 focused on advancing joint integrated operations. Following this success, USSTRATCOM conducted GLOBAL THUNDER 26, a field training and command post exercise centered on nuclear mission execution addressing the employment of strategic assets, nuclear deterrence and assurance, and escalation dynamics, while refining layered defensive strategies for the NC3 enterprise. […]

In 2025, USSTRATCOM conducted combined operations with 31 allies and partners—from BTF [Bomber Task Force] missions to SSBN port visits. USSTRATCOM also participates in the U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue, the U.S.-Australia Strategic Policy Dialogue, and the U.S.-Republic of Korea Nuclear Consultative Group to strengthen extended deterrence with our allies and enhance strategic and operational planning in joint/combined environments.

CNI is the seamless planning and operation of joint and combined conventional and nuclear forces, in sequence and in parallel across the competition continuum. CNI extends beyond conventional kinetic support to nuclear operations, emphasizing the incorporation of non-kinetic and influence operations to complement, amplify, or enhance nuclear capabilities. USSTRATCOM continues to advocate for conventional, long-range, precision strike weapons systems capable of holding distant, defended, and time-sensitive targets at risk. As potential adversary military capabilities expand, this capability becomes increasingly critical. To accelerate the technological maturation process, USSTRATCOM continues to advocate for partnerships with commercial infrastructure and launch vehicle providers to enhance U.S. capacity for ground and flight testing of hypersonic technologies.

China, Russia, and North Korea are actively developing theater-range nuclear weapons to counterbalance the conventional military advantage of the United States and its allies and partners. Addressing these efforts requires theater nuclear capabilities that provide credible deterrence options and incentivize off-ramps. To this end, USSTRATCOM is collaborating with USINDOPACOM, USEUCOM, Nuclear Weapons Council partners in the DoW, and the Department of Energy to identify the most effective strategies for deploying future TNF [Theater Nuclear Forces].

The Joint Force Requirements Council (formerly the Joint Requirements Oversight Council) validated USSTRATCOM's requirements for TNF, which outlines the need for a diverse set of enduring, multi-domain theater nuclear capabilities. Key components of this portfolio include deployed gravity weapons in Europe and the planned fielding of the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N). SLCM-N will provide an additional at-sea nuclear deterrent capability with limited operational deployment in FY 2032 and initial operational capability in FY 2034. This program will deliver a low-yield, non-ballistic theater nuclear option to support Presidential objectives, providing additional range, flexibility, and survivability.

These capabilities enable flexible force posture to expand the President's decision-making space and enhance the ability to manage nuclear risks across the conflict continuum. […]

DELIVERING WARFIGHTING ADVANTAGE— INDUSTRY, INFRASTRUCTURE & SECURITY

The USSTRATCOM portfolio relies on a robust and modernized national and defense industrial base, nuclear stockpile, and security infrastructure to address evolving threats and maintain global stability. Stringent nuclear security measures are also necessary, requiring investments in early warning systems and rapid response capabilities.

National And Defense Industrial Base

A nation that builds is a nation that wins. […] For USSTRATCOM, the DIB [defense industrial base] acts as a force multiplier, with production serving as a signal of U.S. readiness and resolve to potential adversaries. This includes public and private organizations that supply the DoW with critical materials and services—extending beyond the United States to allies like Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea.

Stockpile And Weapons Infrastructure

[…] The current nuclear weapons modernization program of record is absolutely necessary to field the world's most robust, credible, and modern nuclear deterrent. However, our supporting infrastructure for nuclear modernization is challenged to meet the demands of the evolving global security environment. To address these challenges, the United States must shift from incremental extensions to the next generation of nuclear forces with new and modern capabilities, underpinned by a flexible, capable, and efficient nuclear security enterprise. Future weapon designs will prioritize adaptability, allowing for integration of new technologies throughout their lifecycles. […]

Major programs to address plutonium pit production, high explosives formulation and manufacturing, uranium and lithium processing, radiation case production, and strategic radiation hardened component manufacturing are all experiencing schedule pressure and will be challenged to meet expanding modernization requirements. […]

Nuclear Security

USSTRATCOM warfighting posture differs significantly from other CCMDs due to our continuous alert status and force generation requirements. DoW policy mandates stringent protection and security for U.S. nuclear weapons and platforms, recognizing their political

and military significance, destructive potential, and the catastrophic ramifications of unauthorized access. […]

Ukraine's June 2025 drone strike against Russian combat support airfields, Operation SPIDERWEB, demonstrated the disproportionate lethality Unmanned Systems (UxS) can achieve against strategic forces at a fraction of the cost of traditional weapon systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust countermeasures, especially within the Homeland. […]

In accordance with the GDA Executive Order, and in close collaboration with USNORTHCOM and other DoW stakeholders, USSTRATCOM is actively assessing strategic missile threats and prioritizing locations for defense against attacks by nuclear-armed adversaries. […] GDA strengthens deterrence by denial while reinforcing the credibility of U.S. strategic forces. By integrating space-based sensors, ground-based interceptors, and advanced command and control into a coherent Homeland defense architecture, GDA enhances the Joint Force's ability to defend North America and safeguard U.S. global interests, including the Arctic. […]

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Document No. 3. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* (March 2026), select excerpts.[1]

FOREWORD

[…] The global security environment is becoming more complex. The risk of global economic fragmentation is rising, and emerging technologies such as AI and quantum computing are expected to have a significant impact on national security. Furthermore, armed conflict is becoming more common globally, major power competition continues, and military capabilities among state and nonstate actors are improving. Intensifying competition over supply chains and technological primacy, more diverse threats in key domains, and unresolved or potential regional conflicts create interconnected risks. However, we should be cautious about thinking that every problem in the world directly threatens us or is of equal importance to the U.S. In a more complex world, it is especially important that we think prudently and prioritize our efforts, that we find opportunities to advance peace and mutually beneficial solutions to problems, while also not underrating those threats that do impinge on our freedom and our interests. […]

[1] The full unclassified assessment can be found at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2026-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

HOMELAND

The IC assesses that the Homeland faces a variety of threats in the coming year, including our top concerns: transnational organized crime, illicit drug trafficking, migration, the threat of Islamist ideology and terrorism, major power competition, and WMD threats. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are smuggling illegal drugs into the U.S., engaging in financial fraud, and laundering money through international financial institutions. […] Meanwhile, Russia, and China to a lesser extent, are expanding their interest and presence in the Arctic to counter perceived U.S. inroads and advance their strategic interests. China, Russia, and North Korea are also developing new, novel, or advanced delivery systems to increase or obtain a capability to strike the Homeland.

BORDER SECURITY

Foreign Illicit Drug Actors

Mexico-based TCOs involved in illicit drug production and trafficking bound for the U.S. endanger the health and safety of millions of Americans and contribute to regional instability. […]

- Mexico-based TCOs—including the Sinaloa Cartel and the New Generation Jalisco Cartel (CJNG)—are the dominant producers and suppliers of illicit drugs, including fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, and South America-sourced cocaine, for the U.S. market. […]
- Colombia-based TCOs and illegal armed groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), are responsible for producing and trafficking large volumes of cocaine to the U.S. and European markets. […]

While there has been noticeable improvement, ***China and India remain the primary source countries for illicit fentanyl precursor chemicals and pill pressing equipment.*** […]

Other Transnational Criminals

Transnational gangs in the Western Hemisphere, some of which are involved in the U.S.-bound drug trade, threaten public health and safety in the Homeland and the well-being of civilians and partners abroad through their violent criminal activities and expansion efforts. […]

Migration

Foreign public perceptions of stricter U.S. migration policies and U.S. and regional border security enforcement have contributed to a sharp decrease in migrant encounters at the U.S.–Mexico border since early 2025. […]

TERORISM

The U.S. continues to face a complex and evolving threat landscape with a geographically diverse set of Islamist terrorist actors seeking to propagate their ideology globally and harm Americans, even as al-Qa'ida and ISIS are significantly weaker than at their respective peaks during the early 2000s and mid-2010s. […]

The spread of Islamist ideology—in some cases led by individuals and organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood who have provided financial and other forms of material support to terrorist groups such as HAMAS and Hizballah—poses a fundamental threat to freedom and foundational principles that underpin Western Civilization. […] At the extreme end are groups that endorse the violent imposition of Sharia in governance, directly undermining fundamental Western freedoms of speech and religion, with the ultimate aim of establishing an Islamist caliphate. There are growing examples of this in various European countries such as Austria, Germany, and the UK. The designation of Muslim Brotherhood chapters that fund and promote violence as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) is a mechanism to secure Americans against this threat. […]

- […] We face, however, an enduring challenge of detecting individuals who might seek to commit acts of terror after entering the Homeland, including from the population of tens of thousands of asylees and Afghan evacuees who entered the U.S. during the past few years. Since January, U.S. officials have only had a handful of encounters at our southern or northern borders with individuals associated with terrorist groups with a strategic intent to attack the Homeland, such as al-Qa'ida and ISIS. […]

In recent years, al-Qa'ida and ISIS plotters intent on targeting the Homeland have focused more on virtually recruiting U.S.-based aspirants to encourage and enable potential attacks. […]

While al-Qa'ida and ISIS maintain the intent to launch operations targeting the U.S., the most likely terrorist attack scenario in the Homeland involves U.S.-based lone offenders […]. These individuals take inspiration from foreign terrorist ideologies and propaganda that often exploit world events such as the Gaza conflict to fuel radicalization and mobilization. Al-Qa'ida and ISIS release media encouraging U.S.-based supporters to conduct attacks and often offer tactical guidance. […]

Jihadist ideology and influencers play a key role in mobilizing individuals to violence by advancing anti-Western and pro-militant narratives. Such narratives have influenced most U.S.-based Sunni violent extremist attacks in recent years. Those promoting Islamist ideology have been able to appeal to broader and younger audiences through their use of technology, and in recent years have increasingly focused on emotionally evocative and grievance-based narratives rather than on traditional jihadist scholarship and ideological writings. Moreover, migrants who were already influenced by Islamism before they arrived, particularly in Europe, create risks that could increase given the deteriorating security environment in some countries. […]

Al-Qa'ida and ISIS pose the biggest threat to U.S. interests overseas in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, where these groups operate. […]

We are continuing to assess how the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict will affect the worldwide terrorism landscape during the coming year. Iran and Iranian-aligned terrorist actors—including HAMAS and Lebanese Hizballah—have been severely degraded by Israeli-led operations, U.S. intelligence and weapons support to Israel, and U.S. operations in the region following HAMAS's attack against Israel in October 2023 through the current U.S. and Israeli-led military campaign. […]

- Iran has proven capable of developing lethal operations against Americans at home and abroad and probably will attempt to pursue such efforts again if the current government remains in power and is able to rebuild. Hizballah and HAMAS probably are still able to conduct attacks outside the Middle East, but Israel intends to continue to degrade their capabilities. The Huthis and Iraqi Shia militias probably remain resilient and are likely to continue to threaten U.S. and allied interests in the Middle East. During Operation Epic Fury, some Iraqi Shia militias responded to Iran's call to attack U.S. bases, causing some damage and demonstrating their continued threat to U.S. interests and to Iraq's security and stability. […]

HOMELAND DEFENSE

The U.S.'s secure nuclear deterrent capability continues to ensure our safety here at home. However, China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan have been researching and developing an array of novel, advanced, or traditional missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads, that can strike the Homeland. The IC projects threats to the Homeland will expand to more than 16,000 missiles by 2035, from the current figure of more than 3,000 missiles.

- North Korea has successfully tested ICBMs capable of reaching the entire Homeland, and prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran had developed space-launch vehicles that it could use to develop a military-viable ICBM by 2035 should Tehran decide to do so.

- In spite of the growing proliferation of one-way attack UAVs that perform missile-like functions, China, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia will continue to prioritize advanced missiles that can threaten the U.S. However, their militaries almost certainly will plan to pair their high-end missiles with cheaper, expendable systems to stress U.S. missile defenses.

Adversaries will seek to understand U.S. plans for advanced missile defense for the Homeland, almost certainly for the purposes of shaping their own missile development programs and assessing U.S. intentions regarding deterrence. China, Russia, and North Korea almost certainly will continue enhancing their own missile and counterspace capabilities during the next five years.

- Chinese officials probably fear that the Golden Dome for America will reduce Washington's threshold for initiating military action against Beijing in a crisis, which is likely driving China to focus on using international arms control discussions, particularly on its space-based elements.

ARCTIC

Russia has the largest Arctic coastline and views itself as part of the neighborhood. Russia is our primary challenge in the Arctic as it aims to further its interests in the region as part of broader global balance-of-power competition. Moscow is seeking to expand and deepen its presence in the Arctic through increased maritime trade, natural resource extraction, and military activity. In addition to its own domestic economic and security concerns, this activity is aimed at countering a perceived growing U.S. emphasis on expanding its influence and presence in the Arctic as a key national security strategic objective. [...]

While Russia has enhanced its ability to operate in the Arctic by focusing on combat readiness and using dual-use technologies and facilities for defense, its war with Ukraine has limited its ability to fully achieve its Arctic ambitions.

- The bulk of Russia's Arctic forces are concentrated in the Kola Peninsula, which hosts about two-thirds of Russia's second-strike nuclear capabilities. The area is home to Russia's Northern Fleet, including seven of the country's nuclear-armed ballistic missile strategic submarines. Russia has made major investments in the fleet, including adding long-range missiles, UAVs, and underwater drones. Russia has at least three air bases on the Kola Peninsula that host fighter jets, surveillance, and transport aircraft.
- In January 2025, Russian President Putin emphasized that Moscow was intensifying its efforts to develop its icebreaker fleet, which is already the world's largest. The Russian Arctic Fleet has 42 icebreakers, including eight nuclear and 34 diesel-

electric. Russia is building what could become the most powerful nuclear icebreaker in the world, which is reported to be operational by 2030.

China describes itself as a polar power and is seeking to expand its presence in the Arctic including plans to incorporate the "Polar Silk Road" into its Belt and Road Initiative as shipping lanes become more accessible and economically viable. Beijing seeks to expand its Arctic presence using scientific research, investments, and commercial ventures along the Northern Sea Route. Russia has invited China to cooperate at times in the Arctic, including conducting joint patrols.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

Leadership in emerging technologies is increasingly defining global power and influence. For technology powers such as the U.S. and China, AI and quantum information science— especially quantum computing—are at the center of this leadership competition. These technologies will foster broad new capabilities during the coming years that will impact economies and countries' national security advantages. At the same time, these technologies open up new risks across the spectrum of domestic and national security interests that require serious analysis and mitigation from the outset.

AI

AI is a defining technology for the 21st century, enabling computers and machines to simulate human learning, comprehension, problem solving, creativity, and autonomy. Recent developments in generative AI—or models capable of creating original content such as long form text, high-quality images, and realistic video and audio—have sparked global interest in AI that shows no signs of slowing. […]

Maintaining a global leadership role in AI provides the U.S. with first-mover advantage. Other global powers' robust progress in AI is challenging U.S. economic competitiveness and national security advantages.

- AI's growing impact on all industries and domains will increase during the coming years. In the defense industry, AI has already been employed in recent conflicts to influence targeting and streamline decisionmaking, marking a significant shift in the nature of modern warfare. AI also has the potential to aid in weapons and systems design, influence offensive and defensive cyber operations, and increase the autonomy of uncrewed vehicles. In the intelligence domain, AI allows analysts to rapidly make sense of immense datasets and generate novel ideas and insights on complex national security issues. These applications, however, also carry risks that require careful human engineering to appropriately mitigate risk of AI autonomy before they are broadly deployed.

Advanced semiconductors, also known as advanced chips, underpin the most advanced AI R&D, allowing the largest and most expensive models to train on massive datasets at speeds and scales that might otherwise be impossible. Because advanced chip R&D and manufacturing is concentrated in few regions, and demands deep expertise and precision, the ability to design and produce these chips domestically is both an economic and geopolitical priority for the U.S., China, and other countries. […]

China is the most capable competitor in the AI space, and aims to displace the U.S. as the global AI leader by 2030. China is driving AI adoption at scale—both domestically and internationally—by using its sizeable talent pool, extensive datasets, government funding, and burgeoning global partnerships.

QUANTUM COMPUTING

Early developers in quantum computers will give their countries an extraordinary technological advantage over others in terms of the ability to both quickly process national security information and break current encryption methodology. […] Indeed, quantum computing may revolutionize human abilities to solve problems that are hard to address with even the largest supercomputers. […]

The timeframe for transitioning to quantum computing is unclear due to a multitude of challenges. These include the need for more effective private-public coordination, scaling qubits and the overall quantum computer architecture, and R&D in foundational areas such as advanced software and algorithms, materials, hardware, and standards and benchmarks, at a minimum. The U.S., China, EU, Japan, and the UK are all investing billions of dollars to overcome these challenges and secure a first-mover advantage in this emerging field.

DIVERSE THREAT VECTORS

The global security landscape is volatile and complex, with armed conflict growing more common and posing potential threats to U.S. interests. Strategic competition and regional and smaller powers becoming more willing to use force to pursue their interests heighten the risk of conflict. The space domain is becoming increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counterspace capabilities to challenge our own space efforts and U.S. dominance more generally. The threats of nuclear proliferation and chemical and biological warfare capabilities continue to grow.

MILITARY

Armed conflict across the globe may pose a threat to U.S. interests and forces through the end of the decade. […] This dynamic stems from a combination of major power competition, state and nonstate actors choosing to use force to achieve their goals, instability

within states and regions, and increasing military and unconventional capabilities of both state and nonstate actors.

- In 2024, there were 61 active state-based conflicts across the world, the highest number since the end of World War II, according to the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. These conflicts resulted in about 129,000 battle-related deaths, the fourth highest of any year since the end of the Cold War, and were superseded only by 2021, 2022, and 2023.
- The risk of conflict is heightened by major power competition. Beijing and Moscow view Washington and its allies and partners as aggressors, and hostile toward their interests in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. They could respond with force should they determine there are critical threats to their core interests.
- Even if the great powers refrain from conflict, many regional and smaller powers are growing much more willing to use force to pursue their interests. Countries such as Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, and the UAE are using a mix of lethal aid, proxy forces, or their own military assets to provoke or undermine their rivals or to tilt nearby conflicts in their favor.
- Many countries are now more willing to use deniable, coercive, or violent approaches below the threshold of war. These include acts of sabotage, assassinations, detentions, non-lethal attacks, and the use of migration as a weapon.

The fundamental principles of warfare are unchanged, and combatants are likely to blend many "tried and true" approaches with innovative technologies and techniques.

- Future warfare will require rapid adaptation, both on the offense and defense. In particular, the proliferation of remotely operated or autonomous weapons systems on the battlefield in Ukraine has shortened timelines for tactical adaptation, with both sides of the conflict devising new measures and countermeasures in the span of weeks.
- Future warfare will require a balance between quality and quantity. Exquisite, high-end capabilities—expensive and slow to manufacture—cannot be continually replenished at scale in a lengthy, high-intensity conflict. Alternatively, some combatants have mass produced cheap and low-tech weapons whose sheer numbers make up for their lack of sophistication.
- […] Uncrewed systems are already ubiquitous on the battlefield, and these will make real-time surveillance and targeting achievable for many militaries, particularly when teamed with commercial imagery and AI or machine learning systems. Proliferation of commercial networks, personal devices, and extensive video recording capabilities will provide additional vectors to gain intelligence insights.
- Future battlefields are more likely to be urban given the steady growth of cities worldwide as well as their political and economic significance.

SPACE

Rapid advances in space technology, lower barriers to entry, the deployment of counterspace systems, and the expansion of civilian and military applications have solidified the space domain as a key arena for strategic competition and future conflicts. Decreasing costs for space launches and satellite manufacturing have enabled a greater number of actors—both state and nonstate entities—to develop or to exploit others' space capabilities. A broader range of actors can now use space capabilities to threaten U.S. and allied military operations, expose sensitive U.S. intelligence activities, and facilitate illicit activities such as drug trafficking and terrorism.

- China has eclipsed Russia as the key U.S. competitor in space. Beijing's rapid deployment of space capabilities positions it to use space to advance its foreign policy goals, challenge U.S. military and technological superiority in space, and project power on a global scale. Russia remains a capable space power, even while its space industry suffers from systemic underfunding, quality control issues, international sanctions, and export controls.
- The evolution of the Russia–Ukraine war has heightened global awareness of the impact that space services have on military operations. Ukraine demonstrated for the first time that a nation without its own space infrastructure can integrate commercial and partner space services to defend against an adversary with established space systems and decades of military space operations experience.

Competitor threats to U.S. space architectures are growing in scale and complexity as nations prioritize the development of extensive counterspace capabilities to contest U.S. space dominance. Architecture improvements aimed at making satellites and constellations safer and more capable will pose a security dilemma to U.S. competitors, and probably will incentivize them to pursue new weapons and more aggressive strategies that introduce new escalatory risks. […]

Nuclear weapons are a growing threat to satellites. Russia is developing a new satellite meant to carry a nuclear weapon as an antisatellite capability. […]

CYBER

Cyber actors from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ransomware groups will continue to pose critical threats to U.S. networks and critical infrastructure. These global cyber actors almost certainly will continue malicious cyber activities because they gain unmatched intelligence collection value and financial incentives from these operations. These cyber adversaries also have the ability to pre-position or execute disruptive and destructive attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure and other targets. […]

China is the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. Government, private-sector, and critical infrastructure networks, while Russia poses a persistent, advanced cyber attack and foreign intelligence threat. […]

Iran poses a threat to U.S. networks and critical infrastructure in the form of cyber espionage and cyber attacks. Iran's cyber operators previously have used cyber attacks to effect against poorly defended targets and weaker opponents, such as Albania. […] We note that Iranian proxies and hacktivists outside of Iran will also seek cyber-enabled operations against U.S. targets but these probably will be less technically advanced. […]

North Korea's cyber program—combined with Pyongyang's use of IT workers with falsified credentials to gain employment with unwitting companies—is sophisticated and agile, and North Korea is capable of conducting espionage, cybercrime, and cyber attacks. It is focused on evading financial sanctions, stealing funds to support its military, and conducting cyber espionage to fill gaps in the regime's weapons programs. Pyongyang's cyber forces are capable of achieving a variety of strategic objectives against diverse targets, including in the U.S. and South Korea, while its growing use of human insider access to circumvent cyber security measures threatens targets with stronger defensive measures. Cryptocurrency heists and other financial crimes also continue to net at least $1 billion each year to fund the regime's weapons programs. […]

Financially or ideologically motivated nonstate actors such as ransomware groups, other cyber criminals, and hacktivists are taking more aggressive cyber attack postures. […]

WMD

Governments' respective threat perceptions and competition with other states will continue to drive WMD modernization, expansion, and testing efforts. […]

- Beijing views nuclear modernization as critical for strategic competition with the U.S. For its part, Moscow views U.S. long-range precision-strike systems and future developments in U.S. missile defenses as threats to its nuclear deterrent. In addition, North Korea is investing in nuclear-capable systems to deter the U.S., challenge regional missile defenses, and hold targets in South Korea at risk. […]

Countries with WMD capabilities are modernizing, expanding, and testing those capabilities and delivery systems. […] The ongoing development and inclusion of these dual-use technologies also challenge the IC's ability to collect on and detect their emergence or developmental progress, including for WMD efforts, as well as identify ways to counter the development and production of these capabilities.

- With varying degrees of success, China, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia probably will continue to research, develop, and field delivery systems that will increase their ranges and accuracy, challenge U.S. missile defenses, and provide new WMD-use options. India also is developing new and longer-range nuclear delivery systems.
- Russia has the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile and is modernizing its nuclear weapons capabilities in the face of multiple failed tests of new systems. China remains intent on modernizing, diversifying, and expanding its nuclear posture for strategic rivalry with the U.S. Both countries are continuing to develop nuclear-capable systems meant to penetrate or bypass U.S. missile defenses. North Korea is strongly committed to expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal, as shown by its pace of flight tests and publicized uranium enrichment capabilities.
- Prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran was pursuing increasingly capable missile systems, was non-compliant with its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations, had not abandoned its intention to conduct R&D of biological agents and toxins for offensive purposes, was intending to try to recover from the devastation of its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-Day War, and refused to live up to its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, including refusing to allow IAEA access to key nuclear facilities. […]

Most states with CBW programs have developed these weapons for tactical use such as targeted killings, special military operations, and CT or counterintelligence operations, and probably will continue these investments during the next several years. […] China, North Korea, and Russia probably maintain the knowledge and capability to produce and employ traditional biological pathogens and toxins, and historically have pursued—or, in the case of North Korea, continues to pursue—pathogens that cause highly infectious or contagious diseases.

- Russia's scientists continue developing new CBW capabilities. Its intelligence services have used Novichok nerve agents twice since 2018 in assassination attempts, and its military has used chemicals in thousands of attacks against Ukrainian forces since 2022. China probably possesses CBW capabilities that threaten U.S., allied, and partner forces as well as civilian populations. North Korea maintains its CW capabilities, and Pyongyang may use such weapons during a conflict or in an unconventional or clandestine attack.
- State programs are pursuing advanced technologies to develop military capabilities, such as novel industrial processes and bioenergy sources, which may also support the creation of antiagriculture, antimaterial, and antipersonnel agents. […]

Arms Control

Some countries will continue to challenge arms control regimes and normative behavior regarding WMD development by avoiding, abandoning, or subverting existing or future agreements; using perceived tolerance of small-scale use and testing; and developing asymmetric capabilities. Russia, in particular, has undermined arms control agreements during the last five years and used chemical weapons in Ukraine, although Moscow probably will continue to abide by the longstanding norm against the large-scale use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons absent a significant shift in its conflict with Kyiv.

Since the start of its war in Ukraine, Russia has levied nuclear threats against the U.S. and NATO, declared that it deployed nuclear weapons in Belarus, and unilaterally suspended its data exchanges required by the New START Treaty, while holding to its central numeric limitations. Moscow has also deratified its participation in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In addition, Moscow is developing space-based antisatellite nuclear weapons, which, if deployed, would be inconsistent with its obligations under the Outer Space Treaty.

REGIONAL CHALLENGES

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea view the U.S. as a strategic competitor and potential adversary, perceiving it as a threat to their respective interests and ambitions, and seek to counter and undermine U.S. influence and power through a range of diplomatic, economic, and military means. China aims to dominate its region and challenge Washington's leadership, promote its own multilateral and economic influence, and strengthen its military while viewing the U.S. as its main strategic competitor. Russia continues to challenge U.S. interests and power, seeking to restore its influence in the former Soviet space, particularly Ukraine. Iran's strategic position faces extreme challenges as it attempts to address potentially regime-threatening conflict and the ongoing risk of domestic unrest. For now, it retains the ability to project power in the region and to suppress internal threats to the regime's hold on power. North Korea is committed to expanding its strategic weapons programs, including missiles and nuclear warheads, to solidify its deterrent capability. However, even in an era of major power competition, these powers will sometimes have common or overlapping interests where they can cooperate for mutual benefit, as we saw recently between the U.S. and China with the Busan Agreement.

Selective cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, driven by the common goal of balancing U.S. efforts and actions and supporting their own strategies, is bolstering the threat that each of them poses to the U.S. However, the relationships are limited and primarily bilateral, and the concept of "adversary alignment" overstates the depth of cooperation that is currently occurring. China's economic support for Russia and Iran and their increasing trade has helped Moscow and Tehran to each withstand U.S.-led international sanctions. North Korea's and Iran's military support to Russia have helped

Moscow in its war against Ukraine, which is in turn bolstered by Western support. These four countries are likely to continue to look for opportunities to increase their cooperation, although enduring divergent interests as well as concerns over directly confronting the U.S. will constrain the actual scale and scope of their relationships.

Western Hemisphere

Flagging economies, high crime rates, pervasive organized crime, migration flows, corruption, and narcotics trafficking present continuing risks to U.S. interests, while strategic competitors seek greater influence in the region that challenges Washington. [...]

- China, Russia, and Iran are seeking to sustain economic, political, and military engagement with Latin America that may conflict with U.S. interests in the region. China's demand for raw materials is likely to drive continued economic outreach to Latin America, while Russia probably wants to expand its current security and diplomatic ties with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

Asia

China Strategic Overview

President Xi and his government aim to achieve "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" by 2049. China will seek to increase its power and influence to shape its region and world events; create an environment favorable to Chinese interests; overcome perceived containment efforts by the U.S.; secure its freedom of movement at sea; reduce U.S. military presence and operations on its periphery; and fend off challenges to its reputation, legitimacy, and capabilities at home and abroad. China also sees benefits to and is prioritizing a productive, stable economic relationship with the U.S., as evinced by its approach to the Busan Agreement with the Trump administration.

- Beijing has been deeply suspicious of Washington's intentions and has long viewed the U.S. as pursuing a coordinated effort to contain China's development and rise, undermine Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule, and prevent the country from achieving its aims.
- At the same time, Chinese leaders will seek to reduce tension with Washington when they believe that such efforts benefit Beijing, protect China's core interests, and buy time to strengthen its position.
- Beijing will continue to strengthen its conventional military capabilities and strategic forces, intensify competition in space, and sustain its industrial- and technology-intensive economic strategy to compete with U.S. economic power, making advances in the "Global South" in advanced manufacturing and the

exportation of goods. China will likely continue working to maintain U.S. dependence on sectors such as critical minerals, energy storage systems, pharmaceutical ingredients, and UAVs, while accelerating efforts to reduce China's dependence on the U.S. in sensitive or strategic areas, such as semiconductors and AI. In addition, China has shown its ability to compromise U.S. infrastructure through formidable cyber capabilities for both espionage and strategic advantage in the event of a conflict.

- China's engagement with Russia substantially strengthens Moscow's ability to sustain the war in Ukraine and resist external pressure. China's imports of Russian oil and natural gas provide key sources of revenue for Moscow, helping it weather international sanctions. China's exports of dual-use goods and technology to Russia help sustain Moscow's defense production while reducing its incentives to reach a cease-fire in Ukraine.

China–Taiwan

In 2026, Beijing probably will continue seeking to set the conditions for eventual unification with Taiwan short of conflict. China, despite its threat to use force to compel unification if necessary and to counter what it sees as a U.S. attempt to use Taiwan to undermine China's rise, prefers to achieve unification without the use of force, if possible. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) also continues to develop military plans and capabilities for attempting to achieve unification using military force if directed to do so. […]

- The IC assesses that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification. However, China publicly insists that unification with Taiwan is required to achieve its goal of "national rejuvenation" by 2049—the 100th year anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). […]
- Chinese officials recognize that an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be extremely challenging and carry a high risk of failure, especially in the event of U.S. intervention.

A conflict between China and Taiwan may disrupt U.S. access to trade and semiconductor technology critical to the global economy. If the U.S. were to intervene, it probably would face significant but recoverable disruptions to its transportation sector from Chinese cyber attacks. Even without Washington's involvement, U.S. and global economic and security interests would face significant and costly consequences, with tech supply chains disrupted and investor fear across markets. In addition, a protracted war with the U.S. risks unprecedented economic costs to the U.S., Chinese, and global economies.

China–East Asia

China seeks to advance political and military control of its claimed territory in the South China Sea. During the past year, China has advanced its control over disputed maritime territory in the South China Sea, particularly at the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, through persistent military and coast guard patrols and diplomatic and legal actions. […]

China–Japan tensions increased significantly in November 2025 following comments made by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi describing a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan as a "survival threatening situation" for Japan. In response, China is employing multidomain coercive pressure that probably will intensify through 2026, aimed both at punishing Japan and deterring other countries from making similar statements about their potential involvement in a Taiwan crisis. […]

- China's initial actions have included aggressive official rhetoric, the cancellation of flights and cultural exchanges, and the reimposition of its ban on Japanese seafood imports. Beijing probably will escalate to additional coercive economic measures if tensions increase.
- China probably will also increase military and coast guard activity around the Senkaku Islands—disputed territory administered by Japan but claimed by China—to signal displeasure and test Japanese responses. These activities could increase the risk of accidents or miscalculation leading to inadvertent escalation.

North Korea Strategic Overview

North Korea remains committed to expanding its strategic weapons programs, including missiles and nuclear warheads, and to solidifying its deterrent capability. North Korea's WMD, conventional military capabilities, illicit cyber activities, and demonstrated willingness to use asymmetric capabilities to attack South Korea and the U.S. pose significant threats to the U.S. and its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. Increased trade after the pandemic, income from selling munitions to Russia, and illicit cyber activities including cryptocurrency thefts have boosted North Korea's foreign currency revenue generation to its highest levels since before extensive sanctions were imposed in 2018. North Korea's partnership with Russia is growing, and in 2025, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un took steps to improve ties to China—still North Korea's most important trading partner and economic benefactor—after the relationship had cooled because of Beijing's earlier opposition to Pyongyang's nuclear and missile tests.

- A more confident North Korea continues to reject direct engagement with South Korea and refers to Seoul as its "main enemy."

- The benefits that North Korea receives for its support for Russia in the war against Ukraine have increased North Korean capabilities. North Korean military forces have gained valuable combat experience in 21st Century warfare along with equipment. North Korea's ability to institutionalize lessons learned and consolidate gains from Russia will determine how valuable it will be. However, North Korea is likely to remain deterred by U.S. and allied forces.
- In 2024, North Korea deployed more than 11,000 troops to Russia to support combat operations in Kursk. North Korea has also provided artillery munitions, military equipment, and ballistic missiles to Russia during the course of the conflict.

South Asia

During the past year, South Asia remained a source of enduring security challenges for the U.S. India–Pakistan relations remain a risk for nuclear conflict given past conflicts where these two nuclear states squared off, creating the danger of escalation. […]

- ISIS-K maintains a foothold in the region and aspires to conduct external attacks, but the Taliban is improving its security services and has taken aggressive action against it. The Taliban has conducted extensive raids against ISIS-K targets, probably thwarted some attacks, and driven some ISIS-K leaders to relocate to neighboring countries.
- Pakistan continues to develop increasingly sophisticated missile technology that provides its military the means to develop missile systems with the capability to strike targets beyond South Asia, and if these trends continue, ICBMs that would threaten the U.S.
- Relations between Pakistan and the Taliban have been tense, with intermittent cross-border clashes, as Islamabad has become increasingly frustrated with anti-Pakistan terrorist groups' presence in Afghanistan while Islamabad faces growing terrorist violence. […]

Europe-Eurasia

Europe

As the primary economic and military partners of the U.S., the strength and resiliency of European countries have clear implications for U.S. interests and national security. European leaders have taken action to reverse decades of underinvestment in defense and national security and are increasing defense spending. At the same time, much of Europe faces challenges or capacity limitations that inhibit robust security cooperation in the near term. Several EU members face mounting levels of national debt, coupled with anemic growth. In

addition, many countries across the continent are contending with the effects of large-scale migration, to include Islamist radicalization within some immigrant communities.

- Demographic trends indicate that EU members, including Italy, Germany, and many countries in Eastern Europe, will face serious fiscal challenges as waves of retirees strain public pension systems, with fewer young workers available to replace them. Much of Europe has relied on low-skilled immigration to ease labor shortages, particularly as the continent's median age surpasses 47. However, various factors, including a lack of effective assimilation, have limited the capacity to absorb new arrivals, and different values systems have fueled social tensions. […]

The lack of social integration and limited employment opportunities in some EU member countries, coupled with contrasting cultural and religious values, have made some immigrant youth more susceptible to political and religious radicalization—or they arrive having already been radicalized. […] One of the effects of these trends is unsurprisingly greater anti-immigration sentiment among many European voting constituencies.

- Many European political parties seek to curtail the tide of non-European immigration that has endured during the past 20 years. Polls suggest that most Europeans see non-European immigration as creating problems for their countries, and in the spring of 2025, European respondents ranked immigration as the top noneconomic problem facing their countries. […]

Most European countries regard Russia as their greatest and most enduring adversary. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, employment of gray zone tactics against industry and civil society in Europe, and efforts to fuel frozen conflicts have galvanized European attitudes and strengthened Europe's focus on defense. NATO and EU member states are eager to see the war in Ukraine resolved in a way that not only preserves Ukrainian sovereignty, but also deters future Russian aggression in Europe.

- Russia's war in Ukraine revived fears of ethnic conflict and reinforced political fault lines in the Western Balkans between Russia and the West. Russia fuels instability between Serbia—which it favors—and Kosovo over Kosovo's statehood, and backs the separation of Serb entity Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia also uses state-sponsored nongovernmental entities to direct campaigns with the goal of obstructing NATO and the EU, highlighting Serb victimhood and promoting ties to Russia, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, which have large ethnic Serb populations.
- Disruptions to Europe's critical infrastructure by state-affiliated actors have the potential to cause loss of life, harm U.S. and European commercial interests, and affect Ukrainian military supplies. For example, European countries are increasing spending on capabilities to detect, track, identify, and counter small UAVs and other threats.

Eurasia

Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally by military and nonmilitary means. Its robust, advanced conventional and nuclear forces are an enduring threat to the Homeland, U.S. allies and partners, and U.S. forces abroad. The most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict such as Ukraine or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including nuclear exchanges. Russia has also cultivated partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea to further its own interests, and makes use of an array of tools that fall into the gray zone of geopolitical competition below the level of direct armed conflict. At the same time, Russia's aspirations for multipolarity could allow for selective collaboration with the U.S. if Moscow's threat perceptions regarding Washington were to diminish.

- Even with wartime attrition, Russia's ground forces have grown, and its air and naval forces are intact and arguably more capable than before the full-scale invasion. Russia has advanced systems, including counterspace weapons, hypersonic missiles, and undersea capabilities designed to negate U.S. military advantages. Russia is also building novel nuclear weapons platforms to supplement its already formidable nuclear air, land, and sea-based triad, complicating U.S. nuclear deterrence calculus.
- Russia is likely to remain resilient against Western sanctions and export controls, although at the cost of expanding budget deficits and underinvestment in the civilian economy that increase the risk of long-term economic stagnation and deepening dependence on China. Moscow relies on its partnerships with other U.S. adversaries to evade sanctions. It also is attempting to evade sanctions by setting up alternate payment systems.
- Russia's gray zone tools include cyber attacks, disinformation and influence operations, energy market manipulation, military intimidation, and sabotage. Russia often hides and denies its role, complicating U.S. efforts to counter it. […]

Russia–Ukraine

During the past year, Russia has maintained the upper hand in its war against Ukraine and sees little reason to stop fighting so long as its forces continue to gain ground. Moscow almost certainly remains confident that it will prevail on the battlefield in Ukraine and force a settlement on its terms. However, U.S. efforts to forge peace hold the potential to change this dynamic and ameliorate some of the conflict's regional effects. A durable settlement to the war in Ukraine could open the door for a thaw in U.S.–Russia relations and an improved bilateral geostrategic and commercial relationship.

- The continuation of the war increases the risk of both inadvertent and deliberate escalation to direct conflict between Russia and NATO forces. Russia's continued

willingness to use sabotage against U.S. and European allies to disrupt their support for Ukraine—for example, the railway explosion in Poland in November 2025—exemplifies this threat.

- Similarly, Russia's use of nuclear threats and combat use of dual-capable intermediate range ballistic missile systems in Ukraine raises the specter of a regional conflict expanding to an existential threat to the Homeland.
- The war also will continue to have spillover effects in other parts of the globe, as shown with North Korean troops gaining valuable warfighting experience and military technology from Russia for participating in combat operations against Ukraine.

Russia Strategic Overview

Russia views itself as a key geostrategic competitor of the U.S. and seeks a multipolar world order in which Russia reaches and maintains a privileged position, equal to that of the U.S. and other great powers, including China. […] Russia probably will continue selectively confronting the U.S. and its partners globally with its full range of capabilities where it sees opportunities to gain an advantage, driven in part by its longstanding perception that the U.S. poses a significant threat to its interests. Russia is also likely to continue collaborating with other powers, including U.S. adversaries, to jointly oppose the U.S. where their respective interests overlap.

Regional developments in the post-Soviet space, particularly the South Caucasus and Central Asia, pose both challenges and opportunities for the U.S. The region contains substantial reserves of key resources, including critical minerals, oil, and gas. Opportunities also exist for U.S. investment in diversified transit corridors connecting the Eurasian landmass with global markets and commercial opportunities. However, Russian political and economic influence in many of these countries presents an obstacle for U.S. private-sector engagement, as does pervasive corruption. Growing Chinese economic and political influence—often at Russia's expense—poses similar difficulties while also threatening to divert critical resources to the Chinese market. The region also remains a hub for drug trafficking and jihadist terrorist activity, which continues to pose a threat to the U.S. and our allies and partners. Ongoing U.S. engagement to resolve regional conflicts, such as between Armenia and Azerbaijan, can improve U.S. access to the region and facilitate strategic investments and commercial opportunities.

Middle East

In the Middle East during the next year, conflict and instability will shape security, political, and economic dynamics in a variety of ways. […]

Simultaneously, Israel's tolerance for persistent threats on its border has eroded and its policy of projecting military force beyond its borders to address emerging or potential threats has created domestic pressure on Arab leaders, challenged Gulf economic plans, and made overt Arab partnerships with Israel more challenging.

- Israeli leaders this year are likely to continue using proactive and sometimes provocative military action in a bid to undermine and deter regional adversaries. If the regime in Tehran survives, Israel is likely to use all available means to prevent Iran from rebuilding its capabilities devastated during the 12-Day War and Operation Epic Fury. It will also seek additional ways to undermine the regime. Iran, meanwhile, will try to recover and rebuild its influence, including maintaining its ability to project power and pose a viable retaliatory threat to Israeli and U.S. interests.
- Meanwhile, leaders across the region, and particularly in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and the West Bank, are facing substantial political and socioeconomic strains that are exacerbated by regional conflict. […]
- The conflict with Iran has at least temporarily smoothed the tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which emerged in part over divergent visions for Yemen, as they seek to present a united front against Iran's aggression, avoid extensive damage, and preserve their economic transformation agendas. In the aftermath of the conflict, these tensions could reemerge, with implications for a broad range of regional issues.
- Syria's Government is focused on asserting control over the vast territory formerly controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and advancing President Ahmad al-Shara's goal of unifying Syria. Shara' is likely to try to integrate Druze-controlled southern Syria next. His success will be shaped by his ability to establish security, govern, rebuild economic opportunities, and develop trust with skeptical domestic and foreign audiences. Syrians, for their part, hold entrenched and often conflicting visions for their country's future, and are concerned about hardline Islamist terrorist elements within the Syrian Government, a major hurdle to establishing a stable and inclusive government.

When the conflict with Iran concludes, the region's key players are likely to reexamine longstanding assumptions and alliances as they determine how best to advance their interests in the changing region. Among the key decisions will be how the emerging balance of power between Jerusalem and Tehran affects the desirability of partnership with Israel and their levels of commitment to the U.S.-backed peace plan for Gaza, which represents additional opportunities for regional security and economic cooperation.

With Iran weakened and focused on survival, Axis of Resistance members are on the back foot. Israel has seriously weakened the conventional military capabilities of these groups, which are likely to lean into asymmetric methods to threaten Israeli and U.S.

interests in the region and beyond. In the meantime, non-Iran affiliated terror groups will seek opportunities to drive and take advantage of instability in the Middle East. [...]

We expect that HAMAS will accept some degree of disarmament but will seek the minimum level that it considers necessary to preserve the cease-fire while allowing it to remain the dominant force in Gaza. Israel may increase attacks against HAMAS during the coming months, depending on its progress against other adversaries, if it believes that the group is slow-rolling disarming.

Lebanese Hizballah's decision to attack Israel on behalf of Iran has exposed the group to new military pressure from Israel at the same time that support from Iran appears uncertain going forward. The group had been trying to rebuild its military capabilities and revive its political influence in Lebanon, but renewed conflict with Israel almost certainly will further weaken the group and lead to internal debate about its future. Hizballah's actions have also prompted Lebanon's leaders to declare its military activities to be illegal, but Hizballah is prepared to resist domestic attempts to disarm. Meanwhile, Israel is likely to continue striking Hizballah targets and maintain its bases in southern Lebanon until it perceives that the group no longer poses a threat.

The Huthis in Yemen remain a resilient challenger to U.S. and partner interests in the region, and their military capabilities and strategic location on the Red Sea allow them to try to extort concessions from the international community. [...]

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Document No. 4. Statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, The Honorable Dr. Christopher Yeaw, to the Conference on Disarmament, February 23, 2026.

(as delivered)

Ministers, Excellencies, Mr. President, thank you for hosting me today. And thank you to Ambassador Zniber for Morocco's leadership of the CD presidency and stewardship of this year's High-Level Segment.

A few weeks ago, U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno visited the CD to deliver a very important message on a topic that has been at the top of mind for many: what is next for nuclear arms control?

As U/S DiNanno stated, we have now shifted into a new era of nuclear arms control—one that actually addresses the realities of our current security environment.

New START expired on February 5, 2026.

Signed nearly 16 years ago, its numerical limits on warheads and launchers were no longer relevant by the time of its expiration.

For one, Russia violated the treaty from 2022 through to the treaty's end and stopped implementing the treaty in 2023.

And Russia likely exceeded New START's central limits at various times over the past few years.

The treaty also did not address Russia's large arsenal of nonstrategic, or theater, nuclear weapons. This arsenal numbers up to 2,000 warheads and has been a longtime concern for the United States and our allies.

Neither did New START address Russia's dangerous novel nuclear weapons systems. These include the nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed Skyfall cruise missile and the nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed Poseidon torpedo.

But perhaps its greatest flaw was that New START did not account for the unprecedented, deliberate, rapid, and opaque nuclear weapons buildup by China.

Despite its claims to the contrary, China has deliberately, and without constraint, massively expanded its nuclear arsenal. Without transparency or any indication of China's intent or endpoint—including in its most recent white paper—we believe China may achieve parity within the next four or five years.

How can we take China's claim of a no-first-use doctrine seriously, which can in no way be verified, in the midst of such a massive, non-transparent buildup? Similarly, how are we to understand Beijing's calculation of a "minimum deterrent necessary" if its numbers keep increasing?

China has claimed in the past that it cannot engage the United States in risk reduction because of a lack of trust, yet it expects us and the world to trust that it would not use nuclear weapons first.

At the time of New START's signing, China had only around 200 nuclear weapons. Now, Beijing is on track to have the fissile material necessary for more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.

This threat is made worse by Russian assistance to China's CFR-600 reactors, whereby Russia is transferring highly enriched uranium fuel assemblies to the program that can produce fissile material China needs to help expand its nuclear arsenal.

With China being the only P5 country without a moratorium on fissile material production for weapons purposes, we can see how this could be a problem.

All this to say, New START's expiration arrived at a fortuitous time – not just for the United States; not even just for the nuclear weapon states – but for all countries, as it allows us to take a renewed push toward President Trump's ultimate goal of a better agreement.

We could not accept an offer to maintain some of New START's central limits; asking the United States to confine itself to bilateral limits with Russia—especially while Moscow helps boost Beijing's capacity to increase its arsenal size and thereby putting upward pressure on U.S. requirements—is the definition of a bad deal.

A few weeks have now gone by since the Treaty's end. And I think it important to emphasize to you all here today that the Treaty's expiration—and the absence of any nuclear arms control treaty right now—does not mean the United States is walking away from or ignoring arms control. In fact, quite the opposite is true. It has been President Trump calling

for a better agreement. We should all ask ourselves: why have we not seen the rest of the nuclear weapons states joining that call?

The United States is proposing modernized, multilateral strategic stability and arms control discussions. But how we get there can take a variety of forms – there are many different approaches we can take that lead us to our ultimate objective, and we will not foreclose any of those options.

After decades of agreements between the United States and Russia, this transition to a multilateral format is a natural, necessary next step for arms control.

The multilateral approach can prevent an unmitigated nuclear arms race, limit the build-up of nuclear arms, and, as appropriate, address issues surrounding non-NPT states with nuclear weapons.

President Trump has made it clear that other countries have a responsibility to ensure strategic stability, none more so than China, and has kept open the possibility for the involvement of other nuclear-armed states in this effort. He has also made clear that our endpoint—our goal—is a better agreement toward a world with fewer nuclear weapons.

The term "multilateral" can refer to several different venues in which strategic stability and arms control dialogue could take place, and to be frank, as I said, no options are off the table.

The United States is entering this new era with no preconditions, no preconceptions.

We already have one forum, the P5, where NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon States already meet to discuss matters of strategic importance. So we can—and do—talk to each other.

After all, every NPT State Party has an obligation to negotiate in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. Article VI does not say that only those states with the largest arsenals have that responsibility—all five nuclear-weapon States to the NPT share the same obligation.

Since Under Secretary DiNanno's address, we have received widespread support for this new effort, for which I express my deep appreciation.

We are looking to all of you to help encourage nuclear-weapon States like China and Russia to engage meaningfully in a multilateral process.

Our next steps will be partly informed by how the world responds to our call.

In addition to this new proposal, Under Secretary DiNanno also shared for the first time information about China's history of nuclear testing. I would like to take this opportunity to further elaborate on his remarks.

As I indicated last week at the Hudson Institute, a probable explosion was detected near the Lop Nur underground nuclear test area as a magnitude 2.75 seismic event at 09:18 Greenwich Mean Time, identified using seismic data from Primary Seismic Station 23—or PS-23 for short—of the International Monitoring System (IMS) network at Makanchi, Kazakhstan.



Waveform comparison of historic Lop Nur earthquakes and the probable explosion event that occurred near the Lop Nur underground nuclear test area on 22 June 2020 as observed at Primary Seismic Station 23 (PS-23) at Makanchi, Kazakhstan.

It was a probable explosion based upon comparisons between historic explosions and earthquakes.

The seismic signals were indicative of a single fire explosion, not typical of mining explosions.

The estimated yield of the event was a 10 tons nuclear explosion—or 5 tons conventional equivalent—which assumes the explosion was fully coupled in hard rock, below the water table, and at the standard scaled depth of burial.

Any deviations from the assumed emplacement conditions (i.e., if the explosion were decoupled or otherwise concealed) would only increase this yield estimate.

Under Secretary DiNanno also shared that we know China has conducted nuclear explosive tests and that we know this test on June 22, 2020, was one such yield-producing nuclear test.

I appreciate that some in this room will not trust U.S. assessments, others will call for more information—and I believe more will be coming—and others know that what I have presented here today is true.

At the end of the day, what matters is that the U.S. government provided information which will help shine light on China's behavior and spur a discussion on how we all approach responsible nuclear testing behavior going forward.

In addition, China, from the outset, has sought to make it difficult for the international community to monitor China's testing activities.

During CTBT negotiations on the configuration of the International Monitoring System, Beijing rejected allowing seismic stations to be placed at a comparable distance to its Lop Nur testing site as those the United States permitted near its test site in Nevada. In fact, China required all IMS seismic stations to be located in its east, far from the nuclear test site.

China also delayed certification of two Primary Seismic stations for nearly 20 years and, to date, has not allowed its four Auxiliary Seismic stations to be certified even though they

were installed and have been in operation since the 1980s with assistance and collaboration from the United States.

These concerning activities are not the actions of a country that wishes to be transparent about its activities.

In my closing, I want to recognize the role the Conference on Disarmament has historically played in debating and negotiating the concepts and then the elements of arms control arrangements.

Perhaps the CD can once again play a role, if it can only get past what has plagued it for decades: deadlock and an inability to make meaningful progress.

While a treaty limiting nuclear weapons can only come from a negotiation among sovereign states with nuclear weapons, such an agreement affects all of our security.

We are optimistic that CD Member States will rise to the challenge and use the 2026 CD session to recognize the opportunity of today and today's security environment and how we may all benefit from President Trump's renewed push for strategic stability.

Ministers and Excellencies, thank you for your attention.

The From the Archive section of this issue offers President George W. Bush's December 2001 remarks announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In his announcement, President Bush emphasized both cooperative changes in the relationship with Russia and an increase in a threat from terrorists and rogue states that prompted the administration to reevaluate U.S. continued participation in the treaty. The second speech by President George H. W. Bush reflects Washington's optimism, idealism, and, in hindsight, naivete following the end of the Cold War. In it, the president announces sweeping reductions to U.S. nuclear and conventional posture; reductions that have left the United States and its allies less capable to counter revisionist adversaries, including Russia.

Document No. 1. President George W. Bush, Remarks Announcing the United States Withdrawal From the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, December 13, 2001

Good morning. I've just concluded a meeting of my National Security Council. We reviewed what I discussed with my friend President Vladimir Putin over the course of many meetings, many months. And that is the need for America to move beyond the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Today I have given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30-year-old treaty. I have concluded the ABM Treaty hinders our Government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.

The 1972 ABM Treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at a much different time, in a vastly different world. One of the signatories, the Soviet Union, no longer exists, and neither does the hostility that once led both our countries to keep thousands of nuclear weapons on hair trigger alert, pointed at each other. The grim theory was that neither side would launch a nuclear attack because it knew the other would respond, thereby destroying both.

Today, as the events of September the 11th made all too clear, the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other or other big powers in the world but from terrorists who strike without warning or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction.

We know that the terrorists and some of those who support them seek the ability to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via missile. And we must have the freedom and the flexibility to develop effective defenses against those attacks. Defending the American people is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.

At the same time, the United States and Russia have developed a new, much more hopeful and constructive relationship. We are moving to replace mutually assured destruction with mutual cooperation. Beginning in Ljubljana and continuing in meetings in Genoa, Shanghai, Washington, and Crawford, President Putin and I developed common ground for a new strategic relationship. Russia is in the midst of a transition to free

markets and democracy. We are committed to forging strong economic ties between Russia and the United States and new bonds between Russia and our partners in NATO. NATO has made clear its desire to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20.

I look forward to visiting Moscow to continue our discussions as we seek a formal way to express a new strategic relationship that will last long beyond our individual administrations, providing a foundation for peace for the years to come.

We're already working closely together as the world rallies in the war against terrorism. I appreciate so much President Putin's important advice and cooperation as we fight to dismantle the Al Qaida network in Afghanistan. I appreciate his commitment to reduce Russia's offensive nuclear weapons. I reiterate our pledge to reduce our own nuclear arsenal between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. President Putin and I have also agreed that my decision to withdraw from the treaty will not, in any way, undermine our new relationship or Russian security.

As President Putin said in Crawford, we are on the path to a fundamentally different relationship. The cold war is long gone. Today we leave behind one of its last vestiges. But this is not a day for looking back. This is a day for looking forward with hope and anticipation of greater prosperity and peace for Russians, for Americans, and for the entire world.

Thank you.

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Document No. 2. President George H. W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, September 27, 1991

Good evening.

Tonight I'd like to speak with you about our future and the future of the generations to come.

The world has changed at a fantastic pace, with each day writing a fresh page of history before yesterday's ink has even dried. And most recently, we've seen the peoples of the Soviet Union turn to democracy and freedom, and discard a system of government based on oppression and fear.

Like the East Europeans before them, they face the daunting challenge of building fresh political structures, based on human rights, democratic principles, and market economies. Their task is far from easy and far from over. They will need our help, and they will get it.

But these dramatic changes challenge our Nation as well. Our country has always stood for freedom and democracy. And when the newly elected leaders of Eastern Europe grappled with forming their new governments, they looked to the United States. They looked to American democratic principles in building their own free societies. Even the leaders of the U.S.S.R. Republics are reading The Federalist Papers, written by America's founders, to find new ideas and inspiration.

Today, America must lead again, as it always has, as only it can. And we will. We must also provide the inspiration for lasting peace. And we will do that, too. We can now take steps in response to these dramatic developments, steps that can help the Soviet peoples in their quest for peace and prosperity. More importantly, we can now take steps to make the world a less dangerous place than ever before in the nuclear age.

A year ago, I described a new strategy for American defenses, reflecting the world's changing security environment. That strategy shifted our focus away from the fear that preoccupied us for 40 years, the prospect of a global confrontation. Instead, it concentrated more on regional conflicts, such as the one we just faced in the Persian Gulf.

I spelled out a strategic concept, guided by the need to maintain the forces required to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively in crises, to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, and to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should that be needed.

We are now moving to reshape the U.S. military to reflect that concept. The new base force will be smaller by half a million than today's military, with fewer Army divisions, Air Force wings, Navy ships, and strategic nuclear forces. This new force will be versatile, able to respond around the world to challenges, old and new.

As I just mentioned, the changes that allowed us to adjust our security strategy a year ago have greatly accelerated. The prospect of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe, launched with little or no warning, is no longer a realistic threat. The Warsaw Pact has crumbled. In the Soviet Union, the advocates of democracy triumphed over a coup that would have restored the old system of repression. The reformers are now starting to fashion their own futures, moving even faster toward democracy's horizon.

New leaders in the Kremlin and the Republics are now questioning the need for their huge nuclear arsenal. The Soviet nuclear stockpile now seems less an instrument of national security, and more of a burden. As a result, we now have an unparalleled opportunity to change the nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps—some on our own, some on their own, some together—we can dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons. We can more effectively discourage the spread of nuclear weapons. We can rely more on defensive measures in our strategic relationship. We can enhance stability and actually reduce the risk of nuclear war. Now is the time to seize this opportunity.

After careful study and consultations with my senior advisers and after considering valuable counsel from Prime Minister Major, President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, and other allied leaders, I am announcing today a series of sweeping initiatives affecting every aspect of our nuclear forces on land, on ships, and on aircraft. I met again today with our Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I can tell you they wholeheartedly endorse each of these steps.

I will begin with the category in which we will make the most fundamental change in nuclear forces in over 40 years, nonstrategic or theater weapons.

Last year, I cancelled U.S. plans to modernize our ground-launched theater nuclear weapons. Later, our NATO allies joined us in announcing that the alliance would propose the mutual elimination of all nuclear artillery shells from Europe, as soon as short-range

nuclear force negotiations began with the Soviets. But starting these talks now would only perpetuate these systems, while we engage in lengthy negotiations. Last month's events not only permit, but indeed demand swifter, bolder action.

I am therefore directing that the United States eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range, that is, theater nuclear weapons. We will bring home and destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads. We will, of course, ensure that we preserve an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe. That is essential to NATO's security.

In turn, I have asked the Soviets to go down this road with us, to destroy their entire inventory of ground-launched theater nuclear weapons: not only their nuclear artillery, and nuclear warheads for short-range ballistic missiles, but also the theater systems the U.S. no longer has, systems like nuclear warheads for air-defense missiles, and nuclear land mines.

Recognizing further the major changes in the international military landscape, the United States will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships and attack submarines, as well as those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft. This means removing all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. ships and submarines, as well as nuclear bombs aboard aircraft carriers. The bottom line is that under normal circumstances, our ships will not carry tactical nuclear weapons.

Many of these land and sea-based warheads will be dismantled and destroyed. Those remaining will be secured in central areas where they would be available if necessary in a future crisis.

Again, there is every reason for the Soviet Union to match our actions: by removing all tactical nuclear weapons from its ships and attack submarines; by withdrawing nuclear weapons for land-based naval aircraft; and by destroying many of them and consolidating what remains at central locations. I urge them to do so.

No category of nuclear weapons has received more attention than those in our strategic arsenals. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, which President Gorbachev and I signed last July was the culmination of almost a decade's work. It calls for substantial stabilizing reductions and effective verification. Prompt ratification by both parties is essential.

But I also believe the time is right to use START as a springboard to achieve additional stabilizing changes.

First, to further reduce tensions, I am directing that all United States strategic bombers immediately standdown from their alert posture. As a comparable gesture, I call upon the Soviet Union to confine its mobile missiles to their garrisons, where they will be safer and more secure.

Second, the United States will immediately standdown from alert all intercontinental ballistic missiles scheduled for deactivation under START. Rather than waiting for the treaty's reduction plan to run its full 7 year course, we will accelerate elimination of these systems, once START is ratified. I call upon the Soviet Union to do the same.

Third, I am terminating the development of the mobile Peacekeeper ICBM as well as the mobile portions of the small ICBM program. The small single-warhead ICBM will be our only remaining ICBM modernization program. And I call upon the Soviets to terminate any and all programs for future ICBM's with more than one warhead, and to limit ICBM modernization to one type of single warhead missile, just as we have done.

Fourth, I am cancelling the current program to build a replacement for the nuclear short-range attack missile for our strategic bombers.

Fifth, as a result of the strategic nuclear weapons adjustments that I've just outlined, the United States will streamline its command and control procedures, allowing us to more effectively manage our strategic nuclear forces.

As the system works now, the Navy commands the submarine part of our strategic deterrent, while the Air Force commands the bomber and land-based elements. But as we reduce our strategic forces, the operational command structure must be as direct as possible. And I have therefore approved the recommendation of Secretary Cheney and the Joint Chiefs to consolidate operational command of these forces into a U.S. strategic command under one commander with participation from both services.

Since the 1970's, the most vulnerable and unstable part of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces has been intercontinental missiles with more than one warhead. Both sides have these ICBM's in fixed silos in the ground where they are more vulnerable than missiles on submarines.

I propose that the U.S. and the Soviet Union seek early agreement to eliminate from their inventories all ICBM's with multiple warheads. After developing a timetable acceptable to both sides, we could rapidly move to modify or eliminate these systems under procedures already established in the START agreement. In short, such an action would take away the single most unstable part of our nuclear arsenals.

But there is more to do. The United States and the Soviet Union are not the only nations with ballistic missiles. Some 15 nations have them now, and in less than a decade that number could grow to 20. The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf demonstrates in no uncertain terms that the time has come for strong action on this growing threat to world peace.

Accordingly, I am calling on the Soviet leadership to join us in taking immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of nonnuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source, without undermining the credibility of existing deterrent forces. And we will intensify our effort to curb nuclear and missile proliferation. These two efforts will be mutually reinforcing. To foster cooperation, the United States soon will propose additional initiatives in the area of ballistic missile early warning.

Finally, let me discuss yet another opportunity for cooperation that can make our world safer.

During last month's attempted coup in Moscow, many Americans asked me if I thought Soviet nuclear weapons were under adequate control. I do not believe that America was at increased risk of nuclear attack during those tense days. But I do believe more can be done

to ensure the safe handling and dismantling of Soviet nuclear weapons. Therefore, I propose that we begin discussions with the Soviet Union to explore cooperation in three areas: First, we should explore joint technical cooperation on the safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction of nuclear warheads. Second, we should discuss existing arrangements for the physical security and safety of nuclear weapons and how these might be enhanced. And third, we should discuss nuclear command and control arrangements, and how these might be improved to provide more protection against the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons.

My friend, French President Mitterrand, offered a similar idea a short while ago. After further consultations with the alliance and when the leadership in the U.S.S.R. is ready, we will begin this effort.

The initiatives that I'm announcing build on the new defense strategy that I set out a year ago, one that shifted our focus away from the prospect of global confrontation. We're consulting with our allies on the implementation of many of these steps which fit well with the new post cold war strategy and force posture that we've developed in NATO.

As we implement these initiatives we will closely watch how the new Soviet leadership responds. We expect our bold initiatives to meet with equally bold steps on the Soviet side. If this happens, further cooperation is inevitable. If it does not, then an historic opportunity will have been lost. Regardless, let no one doubt we will still retain the necessary strength to protect our security and that of our allies and to respond as necessary.

In addition, regional instabilities, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and as we saw during the conflict in the Gulf, territorial ambitions of power-hungry tyrants, still require us to maintain a strong military to protect our national interests and to honor commitments to our allies.

Therefore, we must implement a coherent plan for a significantly smaller but fully capable military, one that enhances stability but is still sufficient to convince any potential adversary that the cost of aggression would exceed any possible gain.

We can safely afford to take the steps I've announced today, steps that are designed to reduce the dangers of miscalculation in a crisis. But to do so, we must also pursue vigorously those elements of our strategic modernization program that serve the same purpose. We must fully fund the B - 2 and SDI program. We can make radical changes in the nuclear postures of both sides to make them smaller, safer, and more stable. But the United States must maintain modern nuclear forces including the strategic triad and thus ensure the credibility of our deterrent.

Some will say that these initiatives call for a budget windfall for domestic programs. But the peace dividend I seek is not measured in dollars but in greater security. In the near term, some of these steps may even cost money. Given the ambitious plan I have already proposed to reduce U.S. defense spending by 25 percent, we cannot afforded to make any unwise or unwarranted cuts in the defense budget that I have submitted to Congress. I am counting on congressional support to ensure we have the funds necessary to restructure our forces prudently and implement the decisions that I have outlined tonight.

Twenty years ago when I had the opportunity to serve this country as Ambassador to the United Nations. I once talked about the vision that was in the minds of the U.N.'s founders, how they dreamed of a new age when the great powers of the world would cooperate in peace as they had as allies in war.

Today I consulted with President Gorbachev. And while he hasn't had time to absorb the details, I believe the Soviet response will clearly be positive. I also spoke with President Yeltsin, and he had a similar reaction, positive, hopeful.

Now, the Soviet people and their leaders can shed the heavy burden of a dangerous and costly nuclear arsenal which has threatened world peace for the past five decades. They can join us in these dramatic moves toward a new world of peace and security.

Tonight, as I see the drama of democracy unfolding around the globe, perhaps we are closer to that new world then every before. The future is ours to influence, to shape, to mold. While we must not gamble that future, neither can we forfeit the historic opportunity now before us.

It has been said, "Destiny is not a matter of chance. It is a matter of choice. It is not a thing to be waited for. It's a thing to be achieved." The United States has always stood where duty required us to stand. Now let them say that we led where destiny required us to lead, to a more peaceful, hopeful future. We cannot give a more precious gift to the children of the world.

Thank you, good night, and God bless the United States of America.