

Bush Administration Strategic Policy: A Reality Check

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The outlines of the Bush administration's strategic policy direction were visible in some of the relatively early statements on the subject by the newly-elected president. For example, in his speech at the National Defense University on 1 May 2001, President Bush stated that given the nature of the new post-Cold War threats:

Cold War deterrence is no longer enough. To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us. This is an important opportunity for the world to re-think the unthinkable, and to find new ways to keep the peace . . . Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation.¹

President Bush went on to call for the development of a new, more cooperative relationship with Russia and the reduction of US nuclear weapons to the lowest level possible, consistent with security needs.

In such public statements, the president openly signaled his dissatisfaction with continuation of a strategic policy centered almost exclusively on deterrence via the nuclear 'balance of terror'. The Cold War strategic environment had given rise to that particular approach to deterrence; it was a reflection of the peculiar conditions and continuities of the Cold War in virtually every way. While that strategic environment had changed dramatically by the early 1990s, US strategic policy continued to reflect its old Cold War moorings. This was evident in the repeated references by the

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Clinton administration to the ABM Treaty as the ‘cornerstone of strategic stability’. The new president’s earliest statements called for the changes in strategic policy necessary to align it with the new realities of the post-Cold War strategic environment.

The Department of Defense’s 2001 *Nuclear Posture Review* (NPR) provided more form and clarity to the new features of US strategic policy. And, senior US political and military leaders publicly described these new features, particularly in their open testimony on the NPR.²

Nevertheless, much of the subsequent popular commentary grossly mischaracterized Bush administration strategic policy, only to find fault with it. Some of this mischaracterization was for obvious partisan political purposes, particularly as the 2004 election cycle began in earnest. This was part and parcel of the usual game of scoring political points by setting up a straw man of the opposition, only to knock it down with ease and gusto. One might hope that US nuclear policy would be exempt from such games, but that was not to be the case.

That there existed an unclassified body of material by senior officials describing the actual directions in Bush administration strategic policy did not prevent the mischaracterizations from taking on a life of their own. Like reverberations within an echo chamber, they were repeated frequently in prominent print media, and occasionally by noted commentators on the subject. In many circles these mischaracterizations, as opposed to the reality, mistakenly came to be seen as Bush administration policy. More often than not, commentary on Bush policy consisted of criticism, expressed in grave terms, of directions that it did not take, or for not taking directions that it did take.

This particular train of events might well be dismissed with a casual reply, ‘life is unfair, get over it’. But it is material to this discussion of Lawrence Freedman’s new book, *Deterrence*. Simply put, the book is a useful contribution to the field, as befits another foray into the subject by so prominent an expert as Lawrence Freedman. That contribution, however, is marred by a description and assessment of Bush administration strategic policy that reflects its common, popular mischaracterization, not its actual content. In the case of this book, that mischaracterization is not a side issue, but the foundation for much of the author’s subsequent critique of Bush administration strategic policy.

For example, Professor Freedman devotes considerable attention to a discussion of preemption, generally contrasting it unfavorably with deterrence. The backdrop for this critique is his obvious distaste for what he believes to be the Bush administration’s adoption of a new strategic policy centered on, ‘a radical shift in US security policy, from deterrence to preemption’.³ Professor Freedman explains that, ‘As far as the United States was concerned, two events—the collapse of Soviet power (and Russia’s new friendship with the United States) followed by

the apparent rise of superterrorism – together suggested that deterrence was no longer relevant as a strategy. Instead, “pre-emption” was offered as a more appropriate alternative’.⁴ In the elaboration of this critique, he proceeds to explain the timing and chain of events that led to the administration’s supposed rejection of deterrence in favor of preemption.

The fact, however, is that administration policy most certainly does not reject deterrence as a fundamental goal and a strategy, and never did. Indeed, much of its new strategic direction is for the very purpose of strengthening deterrence against new threats in a dramatically changed strategic environment, and moving away from outdated Cold War deterrence concepts and maxims applicable to an enemy that no longer exists. It is no secret that deterrence remains a central goal of US defense policy; it was presented as such in the Department of Defense’s 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review*, in virtually all official public speeches and Congressional testimonies on the 2001 NPR, the authoritative *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, and in the pertinent available Presidential decision documents.

For example, Professor Freedman states that deterrence was not identified as an expressed basis for the decision to deploy strategic missile defense,⁵ presumably to help illustrate his point that the administration had abandoned deterrence. Yet, the White House’s 17 December 2002 Statement by the President announcing the decision to deploy strategic missile defense states explicitly that, ‘We have adopted a new concept of deterrence that recognizes that missile defenses will add to our ability to deter those who may contemplate attacking us with missiles’. The related, unclassified *National Security Presidential Directive 23* (NSPD-23), dated 16 December 2002, elaborates in considerable detail how and why missile defense will contribute to the US post-Cold War approach to deterrence.⁶ The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* presents the matter concisely: ‘Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends’.⁷ In the parlance of deterrence theory, this is well-recognized as deterrence by denial rather than the Cold War’s punitive balance of terror approach to deterrence.

This was a new direction: the dominant Cold War conceptualization of deterrence left little room for missile defense, deeming it ‘destabilizing’ because it might undermine the mutual vulnerability that gave meaning to the balance of terror. But the incorporation of missile defense into a different deterrence concept to address new threats does not constitute a rejection of deterrence. Rather, in seeking to align US strategic policy, including deterrence, with new post-Cold War

circumstances, the administration was unapologetic in declaring its embrace of new concepts of deterrence and its rejection of old balance of terror related adages, including the notion that missile defense is incompatible with deterrence.

In the 1 May 2002 NDU speech noted above, President Bush explicitly states:

We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use. We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces.⁸

The strengthening of deterrence for a new strategic environment, not its rejection, was central to the 2001 NPR. The unclassified *Foreword* to the NPR signed by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, emphasizes that much of the NPR's policy direction is to 'improve our ability to deter attack', while also reducing 'our dependence on nuclear weapons' to do so. Similarly, in open testimony before the Senate and various public statements, senior leaders, including Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith, Assistant Secretary J.D. Crouch, National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator John Gordon, and the Commander of the US Strategic Command, Admiral James Ellis, repeatedly emphasized that the NPR's directions were to strengthen deterrence for the post-Cold War strategic environment.⁹

Deterrence, of course, is not the only US strategic goal; it never has been. Neither is it the only tool of statecraft: deterrence will not be the appropriate answer to every post-Cold War threat and contingency. As Professor Freedman rightly notes, the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* discusses preemption as a possible tool in combating terrorism: 'We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country'.¹⁰ But, as Elaine Bunn of the US National Defense University notes regarding this discussion of preemption: 'Preemption is not a new option. U.S. officials have contemplated preemptive military actions against WMD several times, usually without taking action. What is new is open discussion of preemption'.¹¹

Discussing the option of preemption for counterterrorism, on an 'if necessary basis', does not reflect the abandonment of deterrence. The same 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* repeatedly discusses the continuing US commitment to deterrence,¹² not to the Cold War's balance of terror form of deterrence, but to

deterrence policies suited to the new strategic environment. President Bush's then National Security Advisor, Dr Condoleezza Rice, publicly emphasized this point: 'The National Security Strategy does not overturn five decades and jettison either containment or deterrence. These strategic concepts can and will continue to be employed where appropriate'.¹³

There surely are substantive strategic policy issues worthy of further review and consideration, including how best to strengthen deterrence vis-à-vis post-Cold War threats. But voicing the notion that the Bush administration has rejected deterrence in favor of preemption contributes only to the continuing reverberation of misinformation about US strategic policy.¹⁴

US strategic policy, when understood for what it actually is in the words of those responsible for it, appears quite compatible with many of Professor Freedman's own observations and recommendations regarding deterrence. For example, he concludes that deterrence threats should be informed by a well-rounded understanding of opponent and circumstances, and thereby 'tailored' for the opponent and occasion. Why? Because the opposing leadership's particular emotions, values, motivations, will, perceptions and, yes, social and cultural norms will shape how it interprets and responds to deterrence threats.¹⁵ Absent an understanding of how these factors may uniquely influence attempts to deter a specific opponent and occasion, the actual practice of deterrence is likely to be an uncertain business indeed, with no basis for confidence in its outcome. As Professor Freedman rightly notes, general propositions provide, 'little reliable guidance for policy other than to suggest that close attention is paid to the specifics of a situation rather than a reliance on vague generalizations'.¹⁶ The NPR pointed precisely to this need to better understand opponents' intentions and capabilities to, 'tailor [US] deterrence strategies to the greatest effect'.¹⁷ As Stephen Cambone, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, observed in open testimony in this regard, 'Deterring future adversaries will require a detailed understanding of their goals, motivations, history, networks, relationships, and all the dimensions of human political behavior, on a scale broader and deeper than today's'.¹⁸

Professor Freedman's observation regarding the need for the practice of deterrence to be informed by an understanding of the opponent and occasion, including the norms that will be a dynamic for behavior, is wholly consistent with the new direction in US strategic policy. Professor Freedman admonishes that when uncertainties arise about an opponent's prospective behavior, rather than rejecting deterrence, 'more care' should go into trying to make it work.¹⁹ Yes indeed; and in large measure, strengthening deterrence in the post-Cold War circumstances of greater uncertainty is what the NPR was about.²⁰

On each of these major points, Professor Freedman and Bush administration strategic policy are in sync. Where there appears to some divergence is in the Bush administration's break with past confidence in 'existential' nuclear deterrence, that is, the notion that severe nuclear threats will deter rational decision-makers reliably and predictably, even 'existentially'. McGeorge Bundy's 1969 description of the concept remains the best: 'In the light of the certain prospect of retaliation there has been literally no chance at all that any sane political authority, in either the United States or the Soviet Union, would consciously choose to start a nuclear war. This proposition is true for the past, the present and the foreseeable future. For sane men on both sides, the balance of terror is overwhelmingly persuasive'.²¹ Bundy believed that the mutual fear of nuclear destruction was so powerful, that nuclear deterrence had become 'existential', and that any residual ambiguity about rational behavior serves to buttress the reliable functioning of deterrence. During the Cold War that proposition was extraordinarily powerful and popular in the US and elsewhere, possibly because its promise is so comforting and convenient: the threat of nuclear war can be controlled with certainty and relative ease.

Whether nuclear deterrence was, in fact, existential during the Cold War is open to serious question. More to the point for this discussion is that there are significant uncertainties surrounding the functioning of deterrence in the post-Cold War strategic environment. Critics of Bush administration strategic policy, including Professor Freedman in the pages of *Deterrence*, frequently claim that the rationale underlying this newly-felt uncertainty is a sophomoric presumption that so-called rogue leaders are irrational or unintelligent.²² Again, this simply is a misreading of the readily available official discussions of the subject.

For example, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith identified in open testimony new uncertainties and how they can work against the reliable, predictable functioning of deterrence:

The continuities of the past US-Soviet relationship have been replaced by the unpredictability of potential opponents who are motivated by goals and values we often do not share nor well understand, and who move in directions we may not anticipate . . . brutal leaders who have few institutional or moral constraints and are motivated by an extreme hatred of the United States and the personal freedoms and liberties we hold dear.

Consequently, in contrast to the past overwhelming confidence that nuclear deterrence could be made existential, now there can be little confidence that 'opponents will be deterred in predictable ways'.²³ The Department of Defense's unclassified *Strategic Deterrence Joint*

Operating Concept elaborates at great length on why the functioning of deterrence is less than certain, and specifically states in this regard that the problem stems not from a heightened risk of irrationality: 'Nearly all adversary decision-makers will act in accordance with the logic of rational self-interest...Irrational actors are extremely rare'.²⁴ The unclassified NSPD 23 similarly points not to irrationality, but to the potential risk tolerance of new, hostile leaderships, and the fact that the absence of 'mutual understandings' and 'reliable lines of communication' render deterrence a less certain business.²⁵ This conclusion points not only to the need for strategic policy to strengthen deterrence as much as is possible, but also to prepare defensively for its possible failure.²⁶

In contrast, Professor Freedman appears to have continuing confidence that the combination of rationality and nuclear threat provides predictable deterrent effect, that is, existential deterrence: 'Nuclear weapons fit unambiguously into the WMD category and may always provide a degree of deterrence for those who have them... Nuclear weapons remain the most awesome disciplinary instrument around, but the unimaginable consequences of their use still acts as a powerful inhibition'.²⁷ This proposition may be true on some occasions, but not on others, and discerning the difference in advance may not be possible in practice. If consistently true, there would be little need for the US to work to strengthen deterrence or to prepare for its possible failure via additional tools, such as active and passive defense and consideration of preemption; hedging against its failure would be unnecessary.²⁸

The problem with the formula that rationality plus nuclear threat equals predictable deterrent effect, however, is that there are numerous potential factors that can disrupt that happy outcome, even in the face of rational decision-making, including distorted lines of communication or the existence of unhelpful cultural and social norms. Rationality plus severe threat simply is an insufficient basis on which to assume a reliable, predictable deterrent effect at any level. The fact of a severe threat, for example, may be immaterial to decision-making if that fact does not fit the leadership's 'mental structures' or 'narratives' that frame its understanding of the world. Shaping behavior reliably and predictably requires much more than generally rational cognition and recognition of a severe threat, which may help explain why 90 per cent of coronary patients reportedly do not switch to a healthier lifestyle even following bypass grafting.²⁹ It may also help explain why the Cuban leadership sought a nuclear war during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and why in 1945 Japanese War Minister Korechiki Anami, even after the initial atomic attack, continued to prefer national destruction to surrender.³⁰

The predictability of deterrent effect may seem an obscure point on which to focus, but therein lies the heart of this discussion. The Bush administration did not abandon deterrence, in general, or as a tool vis-à-vis Iraq, as claimed by Professor Freedman.³¹ It did identify new, post-Cold War circumstances that exacerbate the intrinsic uncertainties of deterrence, and consequently initiated efforts both to strengthen deterrence, and to make provision for its failure or irrelevance. Professor Freedman essentially dismisses US concern about uncertainty by attributing to it foolish motives, and then is highly critical of steps taken to strengthen it and to hedge against its failure, apparently because he continues to believe that it is possible to deduce deterrence behavior with confidence if the opponent is informed and ‘display[s] a modicum of rationality’.³² But rationality is not necessarily the issue. The broader question is whether it is possible, with confidence, to communicate with an opponent, and to understand how even a rational opponent perceives and attributes credibility to threats, and decides what is reasonable with regard to will, goals, values (tangible and intangible), costs and risks, *inter alia*. How an opponent interprets one or more of those qualities may have nothing to do with its rationality per se, but can be decisive in determining how it responds to even severe threats, that is, whether deterrence ‘works’. There are, in fact, numerous uncertainties intrinsic to this process unrelated to rationality. As a result, to the extent feasible, strengthening deterrence and hedging against its possible failure are appropriate.

Professor Freedman appears to mistake seriously one of the additional strategic policy goals of the Bush administration, that is, dissuasion, casting it provocatively in preventive war terms:

If it was the case, as Condoleezza Rice had suggested, that an objective of American policy was to ‘dissuade’ any potential adversary from pursuing a military build-up in the hope of surpassing, or equalling the power of the United States and our allies’ – that is, sustain its military hegemony – then that would be a recipe for continual preventive wars, potentially leading to ever more desperate measures by those with reason to fear such wars.³³

Freedman’s particular interpretation of dissuasion fits his main theme, that the US has abandoned the more benign strategic policy tools of containment and deterrence in favor of the more aggressive tools of preemption and preventive war. The problem with his interpretation, however, is that it distorts the actual concept of dissuasion, as defined by senior officials in their public presentations. They have linked dissuasion not to preventive war or the use of force, as suggested by Professor Freedman, but to the dampening effect that

the existence of US military capabilities, both deployed and potential, including ‘the demonstrable capabilities of the [US] defense scientific, technical and manufacturing infrastructure’,³⁴ can have to discourage an opponent from undertaking a competitive military buildup, including ‘starting a competition in nuclear armaments’.³⁵ As Secretary Rumsfeld observed publicly regarding dissuasion:

Our goal is not simply to fight and win wars, it is to try to prevent wars. To do so, we need to find ways to influence the decision-makers of potential adversaries, to deter them not only from using existing weapons, but to the extent possible, try to dissuade them from building dangerous new capabilities in the first place. Just as the existence of the US Navy dissuades others from investing in competing navies – because it would truly cost a fortune and would not succeed in providing a margin of military advantage – we must develop new capabilities that merely by our possessing them will dissuade adversaries from trying to compete.³⁶

Dissuading an opponent from choosing to pursue an arms buildup ‘merely by our possessing’ capabilities, and the manifest potential of the US defense infrastructure to deny the value of a buildup, and not through the employment of US military force, does not fit with Professor Freedman’s theme of a dramatic US shift to preemptive and preventive war. In fact, dissuasion, as actually presented by US officials, would seem to be quite compatible with his preference for strategic measures, such as deterrence, that address threats by affecting opponents’ decision-making short of conflict. That is the character of dissuasion in US policy as actually presented by US officials, not the ‘recipe for continual preventive wars’ advanced in *Deterrence*.

In contrast to Professor Freedman’s discussions of US strategic policy, deterrence and dissuasion, his exploration of norms and their significance for deterrence is original, insightful and useful. There simply is no doubt that he is on target in emphasizing the importance of norms in considerations of deterrence. Professor Freedman has shed light on a factor of importance that may be as much in the purview of psychology, anthropology and sociology as it is political science. His discussion of norms suggests again the extent to which the study of deterrence must extend well beyond the disciplines that have traditionally claimed special expertise on the subject.

In particular, unless one is willing to bank on good luck, the actual practice of deterrence should be informed as much as possible by an understanding of how norms may shape an opponent’s behavior and contribute to a moderate or an aggressive response to a given threat and set of circumstances. This is a potentially critical element in the

well-rounded understanding of the opponent and occasion recommended by Professor Freedman, and another reason to be highly skeptical of generalizations such as existential deterrence. Of late, some parts of the US defense analytic community have openly undertaken this type of study – consistent with the Bush administration’s efforts to strengthen deterrence; this activity deserves to be expanded and recognized as integral to an informed understanding of how to deter.

By focusing attention on the potential significance of norms for deterrence, Professor Freedman has, by extension, raised new and important questions on the subject. For example, how might powerful norms be established or transferred to societies and cultures when, at least initially, they are viewed as foreign? Can ‘international norms’ play a facilitating or decisive role for deterrence on those occasions when deterrence might actually be tested severely?

In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy’s view of the essential character of US behavior worked powerfully to moderate his decision-making. Kennedy strongly resisted moving the US in the direction of a ‘sneak attack’ so soon within memory of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The good ‘Sheriff’, to use Colin Gray’s apt metaphor,³⁷ does not engage in such behavior. President Kennedy’s view of the US was a powerful, internalized norm that fitted with long-held, ‘home-grown’ images of the US.

In contrast, the well-established international norm regarding the rights of neutrals was insufficiently powerful in 1914 to prevent the German violation of Belgian neutrality. German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg did not attempt to obfuscate the violation, but simply told the Reichstag on 4 August 1914:

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity and necessity knows no law. Our troops have already entered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law... He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through.³⁸

Similarly, in April 1939, Britain violated Norwegian neutrality. Prime Minister Winston Churchill provided the rationale to the Cabinet:

We have a right, indeed are bound in duty, to abrogate for a space some of the conventions of the very laws we seek to consolidate and reaffirm. Small nations must not tie our hand when we are fighting for their rights and freedom. The letter of the law must not in supreme emergency constrict those who are charged with its protection and enforcement. It would not be right or rational...³⁹

There are many similar examples, ancient and modern. Common to the German and British actions described above was an appeal to the imperative of security. The power of the international norm, under the circumstances of the times, was insufficient to deter its violation. These cases, of course, do not demonstrate that international norms must fail to moderate behavior, either alone or in conjunction with other incentives or disincentives. They do, however, illustrate how powerful can be the incentives to act, when action appears necessary. And, given that countries frequently interpret as right and rational that which is wholly self-serving,⁴⁰ a worthy goal is to examine the circumstances under which international norms may facilitate the functioning of deterrence, alone or in conjunction with other measures. Professor Freedman's work sets the stage for further analyses to shed light on if and under what conditions that may take place.

In summary, Professor Freedman's discussion of the linkage between norms and deterrence contributes nicely to the ongoing discussion of how deterrence, in theory and practice, may best be updated for the twenty-first century. Unfortunately, despite the ready availability of detailed and unclassified descriptions, his exegesis of the new directions in US strategic policy and thought is deeply flawed, as, consequently, must be his critique of the same.

Notes

The views expressed in this article are solely the author's and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Department of Defense.

1 *Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University*, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1 May 2001. Reprinted in, 'Documentation', *Comparative Strategy* 20/4 (2001) pp.425–8.

2 See, Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Senate Armed Services *Hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review*, 14 Feb. 2002, prepared text; Assistant Secretary of Defense, J.D. Crouch, *Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review*, DoD News Briefing, 9 Jan. 2002, slides 4–5. Available at <www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/review.htm>, accessed 15 July 2003; *Statement of John A. Gordon*, Undersecretary for National Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, US Department of Energy, Before the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 14 Feb. 2002, prepared text; *Statement of Admiral James O. Ellis*, USN, Commander In Chief, US Strategic Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, on the Nuclear Posture Review, 14 Feb. 2002, prepared text. See also, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, *Department of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, 2002, Ch. 7, p.1, at <www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/html_files/chap7.htm>, accessed 19 Aug. 2002; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Keith B. Payne, *The Nuclear Posture Review: Key Organizing Principles (Unclassified) DoD Briefing on the NPR*, 30 July 2002.

3 Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Malden, MA: Polity Press 2004) p.2.

- 4 Freedman (note 3) p.84. Professor Freedman is not alone in this interpretation. Ivo Daalder observes, 'Throughout the nuclear age, the fundamental goal has been to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Now the policy has been turned upside down. It is to keep nuclear weapons as a tool of war-fighting rather than a tool of deterrence'. Quoted in, Michael Gordon, 'Nuclear Arms: For Deterrence or Fighting', *The New York Times*, 11 March 2002.
- 5 Freedman (note 3) p.20.
- 6 The White House, *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-23* (Unclassified), 16 Dec. 2002, pp.1-3.
- 7 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, Sept. 2002) p.14.
- 8 *Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University* (note 1) p.426.
- 9 *Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith*, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Senate Armed Services Hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review, 14 Feb. 2002, prepared text.
- 10 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (note 7) p.6.
- 11 M. Elaine Bunn, 'Preemptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?', *Strategic Forum*, No.200 (July 2003) p.1.
- 12 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (note 7) pp.6, 14, 29.
- 13 Quoted in Bunn (note 11) p.10.
- 14 And, indeed, in a recent review of *Deterrence*, the reviewer passes along as authoritative Professor Freedman's misassessment that the Bush administration has abandoned deterrence. See, A.T.S., 'On the Nuclear Question', *Current History* 104 (April 2005) p.189.
- 15 Freedman (note 3) pp.55-8, 67, 99.
- 16 Freedman (note 3) p.117. Over three decades ago, Alexander George and Richard Smoke pointed to this limitation of deterrence theory, 'Substantively, deterrence theory is seriously incomplete, to say the least, for a normative-prescriptive application'. See *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (NY: Columbia UP 1974) p.83.
- 17 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, *Department of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, 2002, Ch. 7, p.1, at <www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/html_files/chap7.htm>, p.4.
- 18 Stephen A. Cambone, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, *Prepared Statement Before the Armed Services Committee*, US Senate, 7 April 2004, p.5.
- 19 Freedman (note 3) p.99.
- 20 See the lengthy discussion of this in Keith B. Payne, 'The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight', *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2005), forthcoming.
- 21 'To Cap the Volcano', *Foreign Affairs* 48/1 (Oct. 1969) p.10. Professor Freedman cites another classic description of existential deterrence by McGeorge Bundy. See Freedman (note 3) p.18.
- 22 Freedman (note 3) pp.29, 98-100.
- 23 Feith (note 9) p.2.
- 24 Department of Defense, *Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept*, Feb. 2004, p.10, available at <www.dtic.mil/jointvision>.
- 25 President George W. Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive -23*, 16 Dec. 2002, p.2. US Strategic Command's unclassified report.
- 26 *Ibid*; see also, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, *Foreword to the NPR*, p.3, at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf>.
- 27 Freedman (note 3) pp.120-1.
- 28 The argument that active defense is unnecessary because deterrence will not fail was a staple of the Cold War, and continues to be voiced by those who cling to the notion that nuclear

- deterrence is existential. See, for example, Thomas Graham, 'Sixty years After Hiroshima, A New Nuclear Era', *Current History* 104 (April 2005) p.148.
- 29 As reported in a recent discussion of the challenges to shaping behavior, Alan Deutschman, 'Change or Die', *Fast Company* 94 (May 2005) pp.52–62.
- 30 See Keith B. Payne, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky 2001) pp.40–57.
- 31 Freedman (note 3) p.4.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p.58.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p.104.
- 34 Statement of John A. Gordon, Undersecretary for National Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, US Department of Energy, Before the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 14 Feb. 2002, p.3, prepared text.
- 35 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, unclassified Foreword to the NPR, p.3, at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf>.
- 36 Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, Thursday, 31 Jan. 2002, available at <www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html>.
- 37 See Colin S. Gray, *The Sheriff: America's Defense Of The New World Order* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky 2004).
- 38 Report of a speech delivered by Herr Von Bethmann Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor, on 4 August 1914. Text available at www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/papers/germwhit.html Accessed 21 November 2005.
- 39 Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Volume I, The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985) p. 492.
- 40 See a seminal discussion of this in Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* (NY: Palgrave 2001), especially Part 4.