National Institute Press
National Institute for Public Policy established the The National Institute Press in 2005. Since then, it has published numerous books and monographs. Many of these publications are available to download at no charge. We are pleased to announce the latest publications in our National Security series.
Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict is based on readily-available and open sources of information, particularly including numerous Russian publications. Russian foreign military actions, defense initiatives, markedly expanded conventional and nuclear arms programs, internal repression, and egregious arms control non-compliance all appear to be elements of an increasingly assertive underlying Russian grand strategy. Moscow’s agenda now includes a deeply-troubling mix of ingredients: increasing hostility towards the West, including expressed military threats via statements and nuclear exercises; expanding programs to produce advanced weapons and delivery vehicles, conventional and nuclear; revisions in military doctrine that place greater emphasis on the coercive use of nuclear threats, including first use; the first annexation of European territory by military force since World War II; blatant arms control noncompliance; and increasing domestic repression and authoritarianism. A reappraisal of Russian grand strategy and its elements is long overdue following two decades of confident Western belief in benign relations with Russia and corresponding confident claims about the dwindling value of nuclear deterrence and “hard” power, and naïve expectations of a perpetual “peace dividend.” This monograph is intended to provide an initial step in that reappraisal.
Assessment of U.S. Readiness to Design, Develop and Produce Nuclear Warheads: Current Status and Some Remedial Steps by Thomas Scheber and John Harvey, with a foreword by John S. Foster, Jr. This assessment was initiated out of deeply held concerns that the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise has not achieved the proper balance between life extending the existing nuclear stockpile and providing the capabilities, personnel skills, and production infrastructure to respond to future adverse contingencies. Of particular concern is the atrophy in readiness to design, develop, and produce new nuclear warheads, if required in the future. Numerous studies over the past two decades have documented this atrophy, but recommendations to correct identified shortcomings have not received priority attention from national leadership. This report discusses post-Cold War U.S. policies regarding the development of nuclear capabilities and identifies the most evident capability shortfalls of the current U.S. nuclear enterprise—in particular, sustaining the intellectual capital on which the current and future U.S. nuclear deterrent depends. The report also offers near-term actions to address these critical shortfalls. The intent is for this report to serve as a foundation for follow-on assessments and debate regarding this critical national security issue.
This monograph, Nuclear Force Adaptability for Deterrence and Assurance: A Prudent Alternative to Minimum Deterrence, is the second in a series examining the U.S. goals of deterrence, extended deterrence and the assurance of allies, and how to think about the corresponding U.S. standards of adequacy for measuring “how much is enough?” It begins to address the question, “If not Minimum Deterrence, then what?” by examining the manifest character of the contemporary threat environment in which the United States must pursue its strategic goals of deterring foes and assuring allies. Fortunately, there is considerable available evidence regarding the character of the contemporary threat environment and its general directions. Noted historians have compared this threat environment not to the bipolar Cold War, but to the highly dynamic threat environments leading to World War I and World War II. The uncertainties involved are daunting given the great diversity of hostile and potentially hostile states and non-state actors, leaderships, goals, perceptions, and forces that could be involved. From that starting point, this study identifies general U.S. force posture qualities that are likely to enable the United States to deter and assure as effectively as possible, and should, therefore, help serve as useful guidelines for the U.S. nuclear force posture. Finally, this study links specific recommendations for possible actions and policies consistent with those guidelines.